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ABSTRACT
Between the Wheels:
Quest for Streetcar Unionism
in the Carolina Piedmont, 1919-1922
Jeffrey M. Leatherwood
Between the Wheels examines three Carolina Piedmont streetcar strikes in 1919-22.
These years were marked by the aspirations of workers for industrial democracy, corporate antilabor backlash and by the first Red Scare. Inevitably, these trends swept through the Carolina
Piedmont, long viewed as isolated and resistant toward progress. But scholars should now reexamine the New South in light of broader American context. Three case studies in Spartanburg
and Columbia, South Carolina, and Charlotte, North Carolina, highlight the struggles of New
South labor reformers against union-busting monopolists, exemplified by James B. Duke.
During World War I, many Carolina Piedmont entrepreneurs viewed labor unionism as a
direct threat to their well-entrenched system of exploitation and paternalism. Mill owners and
their investors feared that successful streetcar unions could lead to renewed efforts to organize
their textile mills. While Piedmont streetcar workers represented mere hundreds of skilled
employees, regional textile mills employed thousands more unskilled workers, who were usually
low-paid and poorly-treated by their employers and foremen. After World War I, Carolina
streetcar employees and textile workers forged an informal alliance in opposition to Southern
Power and other corporate interests.
The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees (AASERE) met
with resistance when its organizers sought to unionize the Piedmont‟s urban streetcar workers.
In Charlotte, Southern Public Utilities Inc. employed armed strikebreakers, in defiance of the

city‟s compromise solution. On the evening of August 25, 1919, Charlotte police officers and
strikebreakers fired into a crowd of angry demonstrators, killing five men and wounding over
twenty others. National Guardsmen quickly restored order in North Charlotte.
Charlotte‟s debacle resulted in setbacks for the struggling labor movement in the Carolina
Piedmont. Over the next three years, textile mills crushed similar unionization efforts, while
embryonic streetcar unions withered on the vine in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Durham,
North Carolina. By 1922, this pattern of regression profoundly affected South Carolina,
dislodging streetcar unions in Spartanburg and Columbia, where previous labor gains had
resulted in partial or full recognition. By the 1930s, these New South streetcar lines faced
oblivion due to financial receiverships and the rise of automobiles.
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Chapter 1: Between the Wheels

In late June 1919, Albert Essex Jones, special organizer for the streetcar workers‟
union, arrived in Spartanburg, South Carolina. His arrival heralded the American
Federation of Labor‟s most ambitious campaign in a region long perceived as hostile
toward unionism. For nearly a decade, the Amalgamated Association of Street and
Electric Railway Employees (AASERE) had sought, without much success, to organize
the Carolina Piedmont. In early July, Spartanburg‟s streetcar workers declared a strike.
Partly owned by James B. Duke‟s Southern Power, South Carolina Light, Power, and
Railway (SCLP&R) supplied both power and transportation for local textile mills.
Manager Franklin H. Knox engaged strikebreakers, but South Carolina‟s governor,
Robert A. Cooper, interceded before serious violence overwhelmed Spartanburg.
Arbitrators secured Knox‟s agreement for better wages and schedules – albeit without
union recognition.
Despite this setback, Jones glimpsed a greater opportunity to unionize three major
Piedmont cities – Charlotte and Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Greenville, South
Carolina -- served by Southern Public Utilities (SPU), a major branch of Southern Power.
Just a month later, Jones mobilized nearly 300 streetcar men, who declared a strike on
August 10 for better pay and union recognition. This transit strike paralyzed several
Piedmont and Upcountry towns, as AASERE mobilized sympathy among the region‟s
impoverished textile workers. SPU President Zebulon Taylor refused to acknowledge
Jones as a legitimate representative, despite pressure from local and federal adjudicators.

1

As a result, Charlotte‟s strike developed into a political impasse, with union sympathizers
and progressives challenging the region‟s corporate establishment.1
Charlotte, the “Queen City” of North Carolina, served as the economic keystone
that united the North Carolina Piedmont and South Carolina Upcountry during the
Progressive Era. James B. Duke‟s ambitious electrification program became a significant
catalyst in this urbanization process, which accelerated during the First World War.
Headquartered in Charlotte, Southern Power quickly accumulated most of the traction
companies in nearby Carolina towns. Duke and his fellow New South industrialists
further acquired textile mills and other manufacturing assets across the entire Carolina
Piedmont. Therefore, when Albert E. Jones expanded his union‟s post-war organization
drive into Charlotte, he chose to enter the proverbial lion‟s den.
Even before World War I began, many Carolina Piedmont entrepreneurs viewed
the transit union, AASERE, as the advance guard of a renewed effort to organized New
South laborers. While the region‟s streetcar workers represented mere hundreds of
employees, Carolina textile mills employed thousands more unskilled men and women,
who were usually low-paid and poorly-treated by their employers and foremen. Many
middle-class Southerners also looked down upon these “factory classes,” who usually
inhabited mill villages or urban tenements.
Mill owners and their investors especially feared that successful streetcar unions
could lead to numerous and costly textile mill strikes over union recognition, particularly
since streetcars were conduits of information for working-class riders. Mill workers also
had a documented history of resentment toward their employers, as evidenced by two
1

Charlotte Observer, 10 August to 23 November 1919; Greenville Daily News, 12
August 1919, 10; 15 August 1919, 10; 17 August 1919, 10.
2

recent strikes in Greenville and Anderson, South Carolina. Unsurprisingly, labor
organizers and rank-and-file unionists often valued these mill-hands as significant, if
rather volatile, potential recruits. Throughout 1919 and beyond, electric streetcar
employees and textile mill workers forged an informal coalition against the Piedmont
region‟s well-entrenched system of exploitation and paternalism.
Nowhere is this working-class alliance better documented than the Charlotte
streetcar strike of 1919. Hundreds of mill-workers rallied across Charlotte to protest
Southern Public Utilities, especially after Zebulon Taylor sent armed replacements to
man his streetcars. Several acts of strikebreaker intimidation worsened matters on
August 25. Before long, a crowd of perhaps 2,000 townsfolk began picketing the
Dilworth car-barn. Subsequently, Police Chief Walter B. Orr lost control of the
strikebreakers and policemen guarding SPU property. Three protesters were killed
outright, while two others subsequently died from mortal gunshot wounds. No policemen
or replacement workers were among the dozens of injured reported at the “Battle of the
Barn.” Considerable property damage resulted to SPU streetcars during a subsequent riot
on August 26, which subsided only when National Guardsmen patrolled uneasy streets.
Thwarted in their quest for a union, strikers returned to their jobs in early September.2
In the ensuing months, the political repercussions and legal proceedings
dominated headlines in many regional newspapers. Charlotte‟s press transformed labor
organizers into alien invaders. Meanwhile, the repressive violence perpetrated by the city
police and strikebreakers underwent a similar transfiguration, ultimately finding

2

This epithet for the Charlotte Strike appeared twenty years later in the official city
history sponsored by the North Carolina Work Projects Administration; see Charlotte: a
Guide to the Queen City of North Carolina (Charlotte: News Printing House, 1939), 31-2.
3

sanctification in Charlotte‟s courts. But the defeated streetcar strike did not simply
reflect a city-wide reversal, as some previous historical treatments have implied.
Charlotte‟s streetcar union, along with its new affiliates in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina and Greenville, South Carolina, simply withered on the vine. None of these
chapters sent representatives to national AASERE meetings. Moreover, Charlotte‟s
crackdown on labor unions retarded further organization efforts in the Piedmont and
Appalachia for the next decade, while the strike‟s long-term effects also reversed ten
years of past labor progress.
These consequences were soon felt by organizing streetcar workers throughout
Charlotte‟s sphere of influence. In Knoxville, Tennessee, another streetcar strike over
union recognition occurred in October 1919. Knoxville‟s ruthless suppression of transit
workers and allied coal-miners further weakened the tenuous grasp of unionism in eastern
Tennessee. More ominously, Spartanburg‟s modest labor gains, mandated by South
Carolina‟s governor in 1919, were soon revoked by South Carolina Light, Power, and
Railway in early 1920.3
The AASERE‟s final gasp of union activity in the Carolina Piedmont ended with
the Columbia Street Railway Strike of 1922. During World War I, South Carolina‟s state
capital enjoyed a mutually-beneficial relationship with its streetcar union. After his
successful union rollback in Spartanburg, Franklin H. Knox took over management of the
Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electricity Company in January 1922. To avoid
bankruptcy, Knox discharged many employees, nearly all members of AASERE Division
590. Most of Knox‟s men elected to strike in sympathy, resulting in a year-long deadlock
3

James A. Burran, “Labor Conflict in Urban Appalachia: The Knoxville Streetcar
Strike of 1919.” Tennessee History Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, (Spring 1979), 62-78.
4

in the courts and state legislature. Columbia‟s outcome virtually overturned the union‟s
modest gains in Upcountry South Carolina, much as Charlotte had done to Piedmont
North Carolina. In claiming this Pyrrhic victory against AASERE, however, Knox
blacklisted his most experienced streetcar crewmen, ensuring Columbia Light, Gas &
Railway‟s (CLG&R) inevitable decline in 1925. Thereafter, buses, jitneys, and private
cars began to replace Columbia‟s failing streetcar lines.4
*

*

*

Between the Wheels contributes to several important literatures in modern
American history. First, my work sharpens our understanding of general labor history.
Often viewed in isolation, the Carolina Piedmont region witnessed the same post-war
developments affecting the nation, and its history conforms to a larger narrative.
Woodrow Wilson‟s political downfall weakened political support for Southern labor
unions, while regional businessmen capitalized on the Red Scare to discredit labor
unions. Hence, AASERE‟s protracted struggle in the Carolina Piedmont should be
viewed contemporaneously with Washington‟s Centralia Massacre, the Great Steel
Strike, West Virginia‟s Mine Wars, and the Railroad Shopmen‟s Strike of 1922. 5

4

Thomas Fetters did not mention the prior Spartanburg strikes of 1919 and 1920,
despite the Knox connection. Duke‟s South Carolina transportation interests receive
comprehensive treatment in this useful work. Thomas T. Fetters, Palmetto Traction
(Forty Fort, PA: Harold E. Cox, 1978), 46-9; 86-94.
5
See David Brody, Labor in Crisis: the Steel Strike of 1919 (Urbana & Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1965, 1987); Colin J. Davis, Power at Odds: the 1922
National Railroad Shopmen’s Strike (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
1997); Gene Smith, When the Cheering Stopped (William Morrow: New York, 1971).
For more analysis on the First Red Scare, see also Eliot Asinof, 1919: America’s Loss of
Innocence (Donald Fine, Inc.: New York City, NY, 1990); Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s
Great War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); William
Millikan, A Union against Unions (St. Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota Historical Society
5

Heartened by Woodrow Wilson‟s liberal victory in 1912, the Amalgamated
Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees participated in the Labor Forward
movement. At heart, Labor Forward remained a conservative labor movement, especially
when compared to the more outspoken Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).
AASERE organizers had made cautious inroads in the Piedmont. Under the leadership of
William D. Mahon, the national streetcar union had already established footholds in
Asheville, North Carolina and Chattanooga, Tennessee. In Wilson‟s first year of office,
the AASERE successfully unionized in Columbia, South Carolina‟s capital. But labor
organizers also recognized their need to consolidate individual successes into a stronger
regional network.

For complete victory, the AASERE needed to wage a campaign for

the hearts and minds of streetcar workers, while a favorable political climate still existed.
Between the Wheels demonstrates the AASERE‟s repeated collisions with the
formidable James Buchanan Duke, who undoubtedly opposed the unionization of his
Piedmont employees. No friend to Progressivism, Duke had been forced by the U.S.
government to break up his tobacco monopoly just before World War I. However, Duke
soon rekindled his lost fortunes through competitive textile, electrification, and
transportation projects, which relied on low wages. By 1916, nearly all Carolina
Upcountry street railways were outgrowths of Southern Public Utilities, Inc. (SPU), a
major holding company for Southern Power. Some entrepreneurs, like Benette E. Geer
and Zebulon V. Taylor, became Duke‟s partners. Historian Robert F. Durden, whose

Press, 2001); David Mitchell, 1919: Red Mirage (MacMillan Company: New York City,
NY, 1970).
6

writings have been uniformly favorable toward Duke, uses the word “empire,” even
characterizing Duke‟s foreign tobacco enterprises as nothing less than an “invasion.6
With America‟s entry in World War I, it was now labor‟s turn to invade Duke‟s
corporate empire in the Carolina Piedmont. The AFL had enjoyed a spurt in membership
growth, chiefly owing to AFL President Samuel Gompers‟s political alliance with the
Wilson Administration. The pro-labor reformer Frank Walsh became chairman of the
influential U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, a bipartisan Congressional
Commission investigating labor abuses across America. Wilson further rewarded his
labor supporters by appointing a former United Mine Workers leader, William B. Wilson,
as U.S. Labor Secretary. During the war years, Woodrow Wilson‟s administration also
established the National War Labor Board to arbitrate wage disputes and strikes with
relative impartiality.7
Where does this study fit within New South literature? In 1976, Gerald Carpenter
presented his research on the New Orleans Street Railway Strike of 1929, noting that
many Southern labor historians were too focused upon textile workers, while “virtually
ignoring” trade unions in the New South. He also criticized “standard generalizations.”
Conventional wisdom insisted that the South presented a “united front against the alien

6

Durden, 39-55, 67-84.
Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1997), 19-20; See also Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles
(Harcourt, Brace and Company: New York City, NY, 1936); Graham Adams, Jr., Age of
Industrial Violence, 1910-1915 (New York & London: Columbia University Press,
1966), P.K. Edwards, Strikes in the United States, 1881-1974 (New York City, NY: St.
Martin‟s Press, 1981).
7

7

doctrine of trade unionism.” Carpenter urged future labor scholars to re-examine these
long-held interpretations of Southern history.8
Certainly, the plight of textile mill workers coincided with those of Piedmont
streetcar workers. Historians of Southern mill worker protest have focused on the wellknown Great Depression textile strikes, without looking at earlier textile strikes, such as
the 1919 Wiscasset Mill strike in North Carolina. Therefore, this research complements
Bryant Simon‟s excellent A Fabric of Defeat, which concerns South Carolina‟s long war
against the National Textile Workers Union, ending with the unsuccessful regional strike
of 1934. Allen Tullos similarly addresses Carolina Piedmont labor unrest throughout the
1920s in his work, Habits of Industry.9
Conventional labor literature also suggests that Southern workers were difficult to
organize, particularly before 1929. Piedmont Carolina streetcar employees were lowpaid, much like the South‟s textile workers. But unlike many textile workers, streetcar
unions in the Carolinas did receive local support, even contractual recognition, such as in
the cases of Columbia, South Carolina, or Asheville, North Carolina. One questions the
popular image of the monolithic South, uniformly opposed toward organized labor.
Between the Wheels is also a study in Southern Progressivism. Southern
Progressives held a number of influential positions in the Carolina Piedmont. Southern
Progressivism has been examined by respected historians such as William Link and
8

Gerald Carpenter, “Public Opinion in the New Orleans Street Railway Strike of
1929-1930,” from Essays in Southern Labor History: Selected Papers, Southern Labor
History Conference, 1976 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), 191-207.
9
John A. Salmond, Gastonia 1929 (Chapel Hill & London: University of North
Carolina Press, 1995), 188-9; Bryant Simon, A Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South
Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998);
Allen Tullos, Habits of Industry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989),
134-71.
8

Dewey Grantham. Link‟s research identified “two fundamental values” clashing in the
New South; “the paternalism of [Northern] reformers and the… community power of
[Southern] traditionalists.” However, this dissertation examines native Southerners who
embraced political reform and supported labor unionism. 10
Most of these Southern Progressives were products of Southern urban centers that
sprang up during Reconstruction and would continue to grow into the next century.
Several historians have examined cities as diverse as Charlotte and Columbia. Charlotte
Mayor Frank R. McNinch espoused labor unionism, albeit a conservative model, and
consistently fought against utility monopolies. In Spartanburg, South Carolina,
newspaper editor Charles Hearon openly speculated whether well-disciplined labor
unions might help ensure higher safety standards in public transportation. Charlotte
attorney Marvin L. Ritch sacrificed his career to support streetcar workers. Columbia‟s
labor community also boasted a newspaper, which circulated briefly during the postwar
years. Meanwhile, one South Carolina state congressman, Ambrose A. Gerald, even
served as Columbia, South Carolina‟s AASERE chapter president.11
According to Dewey Grantham, one of Southern Progressivism‟s major hallmarks
was a “desire to expand the [state‟s] regulatory function in behalf of economic
opportunity.” Reformers increasingly came to view Southern Power as a monopolistic

10

William Link, The Paradox of Southern Progressivism, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), xii; Dewey Grantham, Southern
Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition (University of Tennessee
Press, Knoxville, 1983), 258.
11
David Carlton, Mill and Town in South Carolina 1880-1920 (Baton Rouge and
London: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Janette T. Greenwood, The Black and
White Better Classes in Charlotte (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill &
London, 1994); Thomas W. Hanchett, Sorting Out the New South City (Chapel Hill &
London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
9

threat to economic opportunity. This feeling culminated with North Carolina‟s regulatory
impulse against Duke. Regulation to protect smaller businesses fits historically with
Woodrow Wilson‟s presidential campaign for “New Freedom.” But like Wilson, many
Southern reformers, were also proponents of racial segregation. Others, like Mayor
Frank R. McNinch, expressed nativism in their support for immigration restriction during
the 1920s. Moreover, Southern Progressives were deeply divided over the issue of child
labor in textile mills.12
Even as Progressivism ebbed nationally during World War I, both Carolinas
entered their own phases of reform, with progressive state governors and house delegates
swept into office after Wilson‟s narrow re-election in 1916. Governor Thomas H. Bickett
and North Carolina‟s General Assembly launched their anti-monopolist rate war against
Duke‟s Southern Power. Meanwhile, South Carolina drifted toward state-mandated
reforms. After the controversial Coleman Blease administration (1910-14), two
Progressive Democratic governors took office in Columbia, South Carolina. Richard
Irvine Manning and Robert Archer Cooper launched tax-based efforts to improve state
highways and improve the quality of public education. They even broke the power of
company stores in Upcountry mill towns. Despite the Palmetto State‟s lack of a
Department of Labor until the late 1930s, unions expanding their presence could hope for
tolerance at the state level. However, middle-class constituents in New South cities
merely desired cheap and reliable public transportation, and as strikes disrupted the

12

Grantham, 111, 360-1.
10

normal flow, these citizens turned to alternative modes, such as jitneys and motor-buses,
and increasingly the private automobile.13
This research also examines the First Red Scare as it affected the Piedmont
Carolinas after World War I. In late 1918, the AASERE and other AFL unions seized
windows of opportunity to penetrate the Carolina Upcountry. However, this region had
always been suspicious of labor organizers who were, often as not, Northerners.
Reactionary impulses were also unleashed during the war against Germany, and
subsequent Allied interventions against Bolshevism in Archangel and Siberia.14 By
1919, Woodrow Wilson‟s political force had been nearly spent on foreign crusades.
Meanwhile, industrialists across the United States had begun to retrench against the
wartime gains of labor. Republicans had regained control of Congress in 1918, forcing
the premature closure of the National War Labor Board in early 1919. Consequently,
American businessmen revitalized their “open-shop” propaganda, combining their
arguments with elements of a conspiracy theory. Following the recent Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia, American organized labor across the nation became tainted with
putative connections to the “Red Menace.”15

13

Robert M. Burts, Richard Irvine Manning and the Progressive Movement in South
Carolina (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973), 70-144; See also Walter
Edgar, South Carolina: a History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998).
14
Robert M. Burts, Richard Irvine Manning and the Progressive Movement in South
Carolina (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973); Frank L. Grubb Jr., The
Struggle for Labor Loyalty (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1968);
William Link, The Paradox of Southern Progressivism, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1992); McCartin, 69-75.
15
See Allen Wakstein, “The Origins of the Open Shop Movement,” Journal of
American History. Vol. 51, No. 3 (Dec. 1964), 460-75; David Mitchell, 1919: Red
Mirage (MacMillan Company: New York City, NY, 1970); William Millikan, A Union
against Unions (Minnesota Historical Society Press: St. Paul, Minn., 2001).
11

Transportation historians have heretofore focused mostly on Northern and
Midwestern events. One of the best, Scott Malloy‟s Trolley Wars, focuses on Northern
urban centers and streetcar unionism during the Progressive Era. However, only a few
transportation scholars have paid attention to the South, and such publications often deal
less with streetcar workers themselves. Thomas Fetters‟ exhaustive study of South
Carolina streetcar lines, Palmetto Traction, covers parts of North Carolina and Georgia as
well. Fetters‟ 1978 research may not be scholarly, but it does provide useful background
on Upcountry streetcar lines, as well as their bewildering changes of ownership. While
Palmetto Traction did not cover any streetcar strikes in Spartanburg or Greenville, he
provided coverage in detail to Columbia‟s paralyzing 1922 walkout, not to mention the
general decline of South Carolina streetcar transportation.

Fetters also co-authored the

official history of Duke‟s Piedmont & Northern electric railway.16
Some scholars have devoted historical journal articles to Southern transit strikes.
Since 1976, two significant peer-reviewed articles have emerged, dealing with
contemporary problems in Appalachian transportation history. In 1979, James Burran
published his research concerning the October 1919 Knoxville, Tennessee strike, which
took place shortly after the Charlotte streetcar strike in August. James B. Jones Jr. later
wrote about organization efforts in Chattanooga, Tennessee at the turn of the century,

16

Scott Malloy, Trolley Wars: Streetcar Workers on the Line (Smithsonian Institute
Press, Washington D.C. and London, 1996); Thomas T. Fetters and Peter W. Swanson,
Piedmont & Northern: The Great Electric System of the South (San Marino, Calif.:
Golden West Books, 1976); Palmetto Traction, 86-94.
12

culminating with a violent two-month strike in the fall of 1917, during the height of U.S.
mobilization for World War I.17
Chattanooga and Knoxville‟s proximity to the Carolina Piedmont suggests that
this region‟s unionization efforts did not occur in a vacuum. Moreover, Chattanooga and
Knoxville‟s unions were established well before the labor struggles of 1919, providing a
staging ground for further organization. Chattanooga‟s streetcar workers, like those in
Anderson and Greenville, showed internal divisions over union membership and
Northern leadership. Knoxville‟s October 1919 strike took place subsequently (perhaps
consequently) after the reversals of Charlotte. Future investigation may demonstrate that
anti-labor backlash from the Carolina Upcountry spilled over to Eastern Tennessee,
weakening tenuous union support in Knoxville. My research underscores a renewed need
for regional assessments in New South labor history, instead of merely focusing on
individual towns and isolated events.
This study also adds to the literature of New South urban history. Charlotte, in
particular, has received a good deal of attention. In 1979, Miriam Mitchell and Edward
Perzel compiled their sourcebook on the city‟s role during the Great War, detailing the
importance of Zebulon V. Taylor as a wartime booster. Janette T. Greenwood‟s The
Black and White Better Classes in Charlotte leaves off well before 1919, although it

17

Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor in the United States: Volume VIII: Postwar
Struggles, 1918-1920 (International Publishers, New York City, 1988), 102-116; Mark V.
Wetherington, “Street Car City: Knoxville, Tennessee, 1876-1947,” East Tennessee
Historical Society (Vols. 54 and 55, 1982-1983), 70-110; James A. Burran, “Labor
Conflict in Urban Appalachia: The Knoxville Streetcar Strike of 1919.” Tennessee
History Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, (Spring 1979), 62-78; James B. Jones, Jr., “The Other
Side of the "Dynamo of Dixie": Class Consciousness and Worker Solidarity in Urban
Tennessee: The Chattanooga Carmen‟s Strikes of 1899-1917,” Tennessee History
Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 2, (Summer 1993), 98-112.
13

provides a good urban historical reference. She discusses the creation of Charlotte
suburbs, noting the rise of future Charlotte mayor Frank R. McNinch in city politics.
Currently the curator of the Levine Museum of the New South in Charlotte, Thomas W.
Hanchett covers the drab yet historically compelling world of textile mill workers in
Sorting out the New South City.18
No discussion of Charlotte history may be considered complete without Dan
Morrill of the University of Charlotte, who has researched the horse-drawn trolleys of
Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. Beginning in the 1980s, Morrill began championing
historic restoration efforts in Charlotte. Morrill devoted one segment to the Charlotte
strike with his electronic publication, The New South Elite in Control, although his
coverage ends prematurely with the violent confrontation in Dilworth. Morrill also
contributed perspectives on the strike‟s 75th anniversary to the Charlotte Observer.
Morrill also fought unsuccessfully to preserve the original Dilworth SPU car-barn from
demolition. However, since Morrill‟s works are primarily focused on preservation, they
tend to be more descriptive, less analytical of historical problems.19
So far, the best documented scholarly account of the Charlotte chapter has been
Carol Shaw‟s unpublished honors thesis, “A City in Conflict: the 1919 Charlotte
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Streetcar Strike.” Shaw cites two major city newspapers, Charlotte Observer and
Charlotte News, as well as Motorman and Conductor publications. She also consulted
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation records, although she did not make full use of
them. Lamentably, Shaw‟s original research never expanded beyond her 1980 honors
thesis. She focuses primarily on Charlotte‟s urban and political history, but pays little
attention to regional links. Shaw‟s account halts with the strike settlement, only cursorily
assessing the strike‟s political and legal aftermath.20
*

*

*

In rewriting their own past, Southern Power, and its successor, Duke Power, were
clearly successful. Historian Allen Tullos and journalist Richard Maschal each
interviewed surviving Southern Power employees in later years. Maschal concluded that
over 75 years, Duke Power waged a campaign to discourage memory of the Charlotte
strike. Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) historian Shawn Perry confessed he had been
unaware of this dispute. Thus, even transportation workers themselves have become
sadly ignorant about poignant chapters in their own story.21
In 1994, Dan Morrill even debated whether urban streetcar workers actually
possessed a true “culture,” in comparison with Carolina Piedmont mill villages. “One of
the fundamental things about textile mills;” Morrill reminded the Charlotte Observer,
“people lived together, worked together, went to church together. It was more than a
workplace; it was a lifestyle.” Morrill concluded his interview with this somewhat

20

Carol Shaw, “A City in Conflict: the 1919 Charlotte Streetcar Strike” (unpublished
honors thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980).
21
The Charlotte Observer, 23 August 1994, 1E-2E.
15

generalized assessment: “Streetcar conductors had no „culture,‟ and in their defeat, left
no person or institution to tell their story.”22
Between the Wheels ultimately concerns the vanished social history of motormen
and conductors from the Carolina Upcountry. These workers, while relatively small in
number and scope, developed their own work culture alongside those of textile laborers.
While streetcar mechanics and conductors did not have company stores, mill schools, or
common churches, they certainly inhabited a microcosm uniquely their own. Streetcar
workers were visible representatives of the working class, with smartly uniformed
conductors and dutiful motormen dealing with customer relations and public safety
concerns. These ordinary men struggled against extraordinary odds in Spartanburg,
Charlotte, and Columbia. Today, their way of life is gone, and the parallel world of
Carolina textile mills appears to be heading the same direction, with the rise of globalism.
While labor and corporate institutions have both allowed this significant regional
struggle to slip into near-oblivion, individuals still remembered their world, long after it
faded from view. Allen Tullos‟s interviews with two streetcar workers, Loy Cloninger
and Jesse B. Ashe, reveal much about their vanished world. Tullos also interviewed
retired engineer Herman Wolf, a longtime Southern Power employee acquainted with the
strike. Cloninger‟s story in particular serves as an eyewitness account of what actually
happened on that blood-drenched August night. Both men recalled their careers with
Southern Public Utilities, from their personal lives to their workplaces. Unmarried
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streetcar men often shared lodgings, typically in boarding houses, where they shared
meals together. They also played baseball and enjoyed other pastimes.23
More importantly, streetcar worker culture is preserved in several trade and labor
publications, from Southern Public Utilities Magazine to Motorman and Conductor.
SPU‟s company periodical details a vivid milieu wherein its streetcar men held
competitions for job safety records, contributed poems and humorous stories, and above
all, shared the happiness and sorrow of fellow employees. Motorman and Conductor
lends even more insight to the overall world of streetcar workers, and their responses to
post-war changes, from the adoption of one-man streetcars to Red Scare tactics in the
workplace. In conclusion, Upcountry Carolina streetcar workers did not exist in a
geographical or cultural vacuum. Between the Wheels is ultimately their story -- a
struggle for industrial democracy as they perceived it. As Dan Morrill once said of these
unsung workers, “If you don‟t tell their stories… they‟re forgotten.”24
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Chapter Two: Superpowers of the New South

Before visiting the microcosm of streetcar labor conflicts in the Carolina
Piedmont, one should examine larger context of Southern Power‟s electrification
campaign, interwoven with the development of powered textile mills across the region.
James B. Duke‟s transition from tobacco profiteer to power-broker of the Carolina
Piedmont is a tale unto itself. Across the South, municipal and inter-urban traction
corporations were a logical outgrowth of the burgeoning public utility market, which
derived its existence from hydro-electrical developments. As Duke‟s electrification
projects multiplied, so grew his interests in the lucrative realms of textiles and public
transportation.
After Reconstruction, South Carolina‟s Upcountry and North Carolina‟s Piedmont
regions became the focus of intensive manufacturing and trade activity. Northern
developers looked southward, where raw materials were plentiful, and manual labor even
cheaper. But no industry proved more vital to the entire Carolina Upcountry than textile
manufacture. While the region‟s cloth and fabric industry reached its zenith after the
First World War, mills were already evident beforehand. During the 1880s, South
Carolina launched pilot mills in Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg counties. These
Upcountry county seats soon became citadels of Henry W. Grady‟s “New South,”
exemplified by Greenville‟s 1915 Southern Textile Exposition. North Carolina‟s
Piedmont towns also enjoyed growth in textiles and furniture manufacturing.1
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Local boosters – principally merchants and wealthy landowners -- were able to
channel their wealth into these new ventures, becoming stockholders in these new
industries. These economic and industrial advancements came with a steep price,
however. According to regional historians, much of the investment capital accumulated
at the expense of Piedmont farmers, whose credit flow and crop prices were controlled by
the merchant classes. This situation gave rise to friction between industrialists and
farmers, who came to resent urbanization and industrial progress.2
Meanwhile, rural Piedmont families were also rocked by serious agricultural
downturns throughout the 1880s and 1890s, forcing them to sell their lands and move
into cities and towns. According to C. Vann Woodward, ex-farmers who “almost
overnight left the old farm for the new factory” were most enthusiastic recruits. This
important trend began with the Piedmont Manufacturing Company in 1876, near
Greenville, South Carolina. From this development, a veritable textile boom ensued in
the Piedmont over the next two decades. Four mills sprung up in Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina alone in the 1890s. As historian Jeanette Greenwood describes, a “string
of mill villages encircled” the burgeoning city of Charlotte by 1900. “Property-less and
seemingly rootless mill workers” often migrated seasonally between city, country, and
mill. As in the North, some Southern mill towns were “model” villages, masking their
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drudgery behind company housing and schools. But turnover rates in these multifarious
company towns exceeded 100 percent, as massive layoffs and epidemics took their toll.3
In the Carolina Piedmont, paternalistic capitalism became the rule, as textile
barons sent their agents to recruit mill workers from among poor tenant farmers, with
promises of better wages and lodgings. In reality, these mills represented hardship and
toil for adults and children alike. As New South scholar Tom Hanchett shows, adult
earnings were so meager that children as young as eight had to “help their parents” in the
mills – a situation most mill owners cheerfully exploited. Some mills, particularly in
South Carolina, boasted private schools for mill-worker children, but their quality and
effectiveness varied considerably. Moreover, poor sanitation often cost the lives of
children among the mill-towns, due to shortages of physicians and state inoculation
programs. Hence, child labor became a significant cause célèbre for those reformers and
muckrakers who paid attention to the New South‟s plight.4
North Carolina‟s Department of Labor published annual reports on the state‟s
growing industrial sector throughout this period. In 1890, only 49 textile mills existed in
North Carolina. By 1905, this number had grown to 287, with the majority concentrated
in the Piedmont region. The period spanning 1907-08 marks the pinnacle of organized
farmer activity in the Old North State. Coincidentally, James B. Duke also made rapid
strides toward hydro-electric development in the Piedmont. In 1907, 52,178 employees
worked for 329 North Carolina textile mills, earning a high daily wage of $2.56, with a
low of 82 cents. Knitting mill employees, numbering about 4,700 men and women,
3
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earned somewhat less across the board. Two in five of these employees were women,
who typically earned about half the wages paid to males. Children usually brought home
60 cents per day – their exact percentage of labor went unreported.5
Mill shifts typically lasted between 10 to 12 hours, with many operators
unofficially exceeding these arduous schedules. Quite a number of textile and knitting
mills failed to report their actual hours of operation. So-called “stretch-outs” were
grueling periods of overtime without compensation, increasing the likelihood of
workplace accidents. In the Atherton Mill in Charlotte, workers often mangled their
hands, and one overseer died when he became entangled in the belting apparatus. Most
employers, however, turned a deaf ear toward union appeals for eight-hour workdays, or
living wages. Allen Tullos documents how Protestant work ethics bolstered paternalistic
Southern employers, enabling them to justify keeping their workers in check. D.A.
Tompkins, owner of Atherton Mill, summed up the attitudes shared by many of his
contemporaries in Charlotte and the surrounding region. He felt that “surplus time”
would be “absolutely injurious” for the working class. Tompkins further asserted that
employers should not give workers more money than they knew how to spend wisely.6
Workers could strive to change their environment, but those who went against the
run of the mill faced dire consequences. Employers routinely discharged workers
suspected of joining unions. Evictions of whole families often occurred in company
5
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housing complexes. Often, when frustrated mill workers could not lash out at their
employers, they brawled among themselves in the streets. This violent image tended to
undermine cooperation between textile workers and more highly-skilled workers, such as
streetcarmen and electricians.7
Employers often capitalized on their workers‟ fears of outside competition from
cheap immigrant labor. Violent events from the previous century also shaped views, as
strikes often resulted in bloodshed. When private corporations or authority figures
employed force, they were protecting property rights. Laborers who fought back were
invariably characterized as radical threats against law and order. By labeling union
organizers as “foreigners” and “anarchists,” businessmen discouraged their employees
from seeking help from labor organizations. Hence, the seeds for portraying trade
unionism as a thoroughly “alien doctrine” were planted quite early in the rapidly
industrializing Carolina Piedmont.
North Carolina‟s Labor Department interviewed employers in 1907-08
concerning the topics of foreign labor and radicalism. H.L. Beck of Thomasville,
president of Norfolk & Southern Junction Mill, opposed hiring immigrants from Italy and
Eastern Europe, “where anarchy and dare-devils are bred.” L.F. Graves, SecretaryTreasurer of Flint Manufacturing in Gastonia, attacked wandering “stirrers up of strife
and hardship,” who sought to organize mill workers “against the men who give them
employment and… honest bread.” J. Hirshinger of the Charlotte Duck Clothing
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Company sought the exclusion of “labor-disturbing, strike-causing… elements” from
Central Europe, for which North Carolina has no place.”8
Despite incidents of strife, Piedmont factory workers tended to side with their
employers on immigration and race. If nothing else, the specters of unemployed
European immigrants affected American tradesmen on a far more individual scale.
Potential strikers faced the unspoken threat of being replaced by imported labor. Albert
Smith of Gastonia remarked that “our people don‟t go to other countries hunting work,
and we don‟t need any such people here.” Smith also characterized “the majority of
foreigners” as being “worse than Negroes,” often leaving “their own countries by reason
of crimes.” J.E. Torrence of Mecklenburg Country also felt immigrants “flooding our
land” were largely responsible for the high crime rates reported by newspapers. One
Union County police officer, R.H. Moore of Monroe, went so far as to openly declare
“ninety-five percent” of foreigners to be criminals.9
On the subject of foreign labor, European immigrants were almost as reviled as
African-American laborers. Unstable European nations seemed rife with radicals, as
some undoubtedly turned toward anarchism or socialism. Moreover, economic
competition gave breath to religious hatreds, especially toward Catholic groups, such as
Italians and Poles. That many Southern farmers squarely blamed foreign labor for their
misfortunes remains an unfortunate effect of nativism commonly felt across the nation.
These men also belonged to the era of trans-Atlantic ocean liners, which brought
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impoverished steerage passengers and their families over to North America. These new
arrivals were not universally welcomed by most Americans.10
North Carolina farmers led the early struggle against this emergent industrial
capitalism, partly as a response to urbanization and wage labor. The National Farmers
Union (NFU) established a North Carolina chapter in 1908, uniting white agricultural
workers and small farm-owners. Within four years, this militant NFU chapter boasted
33,688 members from 1,783 locals, becoming the “largest and most effective” labor
organization in the Upper South. During its 1907-08 survey, the North Carolina Labor
Department concluded that farmers in North Carolina had rallied since the downturns of
decades past. The state Labor Department also interviewed the Piedmont‟s industrial
workers, primarily mill hands, who desired the same union representation enjoyed by
farmers. One mill worker, J.A. Thompson of Montgomery County, believed North
Carolina “farmers should be organized, as well as other trades and professions.”11
Despite the Piedmont‟s overall reputation for anti-unionism, the NFU organized
effective resistance against textile mill operators, whose recruitment efforts depleted
white tenant populations. This change forced remaining farm-owners to consider hiring
black sharecroppers or European immigrants. W.F. Logan of King‟s Mountain (on the
South Carolina border) voiced concerns shared by many regional farmers. Logan
asserted: “We are getting our state organized as fast as we can, as farmers, so that we
may get more profit out of farming… than we have in the past.” In particular, Logan
10
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blamed textile mills, with promises of year-round employment, for a recent farming
decline: “The farm could be made to pay just as any other work if the people would only
stick together… the Farmers‟ Union will teach them,” he remarked. Another North
Carolina farmer, Avery G. Higgins of Belwood, put it another way: “While the mills are
a great benefit in an industrial way, they are filling graves with consumptive victims.”12
W.F. Logan and his fellow farmers also came to view the NFU as a political
instrument to prevent urban industrialism – and cheap mill labor -- from eclipsing their
own world. As Logan also observed, “Immigrants are giving trouble in some sections
now; so we want to keep them out.” G.F. Hambright – also from King‟s Mountain -- put
it even more bluntly: “I would rather my land lay out than to be worked by Negroes and
foreigners.” C.A. Ridenour of Stanly County told state authorities “we don‟t need
anarchists and hoboes.” James Wilson of Mecklenburg County predicted that “hiring the
scum of the world” for cheap labor would create a “hornet‟s nest” in the countryside.
Some regional farmers were a little more discerning toward foreign labor. B.F. Carpenter
of Gaston County noted that the depopulation of tenant farmers lured to cotton mills
opened the door to hiring “law-abiding” Germans. But Carpenter would employ “no
Southern Italians,” owing to their alleged Mafia and Black Hand connections.” 13
By 1916, the year before America entered World War I, the Charlotte Piedmont
region experienced changes that hastened the general decline of state agriculture. Long
winter delayed the planting season, causing many hands to seek other work in the spring.
According to state records, 89 counties reported a scarcity of farm labor during the
summer. Except for Mecklenburg, all Piedmont North Carolina counties reported a
12
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dearth of overall labor. Charlotte-Gastonia‟s urban industrial powerbase offered
relatively higher wages, offering better wages and housing to more families.
Mecklenburg men were paid $1.25 per day, while Gaston County reported its highest
daily wage at $1.30. While these were not North Carolina‟s highest wages at the time,
Charlotte-Gastonia‟s daily wages were uniformly high in comparison with most of the
Piedmont region, which often dipped below one dollar.14
Further setbacks during the summer of 1916 hastened the demise of agriculture in
the Piedmont. Beginning on July 15, two days of disastrous flooding wiped out acreage
across the Piedmont and Western North Carolina. North Carolina Governor Locke Craig,
hailing from the mountains, responded quickly to the crisis. Millions of dollars were lost,
even as engineers sought to rebuild hydro-electric plants in the Blue Ridge Mountains.
As these men worked to rebuild Falls Branch, their laconic employer muttered “I‟ll be
dinged,” pondering the flood‟s impact on his wide-ranging Piedmont Carolina interests.15
*

*

*

One of the Piedmont‟s most influential figures, James Buchanan Duke, made his
initial mark through agriculture. Together with his father and elder brother, Duke entered
the post-Civil War market with ambition, if not perspicacity. Demand for Southern
tobacco rose in the Gilded Age, aided by mass production of cigarettes via the Bonsack
rolling machine. This technological advance enabled James B. Duke (1856-1925) to
dominate the global market of the smoking industry from 1890 to 1910. Duke‟s sphere
of influence soon extended overseas toward Great Britain, Australia and even Japan.
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Originally from Durham, North Carolina, Duke quickly became an absentee owner in
1885, with a Fifth Avenue mansion in New York City, as well as a posh New Jersey farm
estate. Across the Piedmont, Duke‟s tobacco empire also controlled hundreds of tenant
farms, marking the advent of what today we would call “agri-business.”16
But North Carolina and federal authorities quickly focused on Duke‟s American
Tobacco Company, with over thirty thousand laborers. In 1901, Duke appeared before
the U.S. Industrial Commission to testify in defense of his company‟s practices. One
commissioner, John M. Farquhar, brought up Duke‟s refusal to meet with the National
Tobacco Workers Association on two occasions. Moreover, Duke‟s opposition toward
the chiefly Democratic National Farmers‟ Union is fully documented.17
Victory came for agrarian reformers in 1911, with the U.S. Supreme Court‟s
dissolution of Duke‟s American Tobacco Company. Duke still retained his British
tobacco conglomerate, and continued to own stock in Southern tobacco. However, his
vast domestic empire had suffered a severe blow. As a Republican, Duke chiefly blamed
the reform wing of the Democratic Party, with its endorsements of regulation and labor
unionism. He especially disapproved of Woodrow Wilson‟s “New Freedom” platform.
Duke warned progressive lawmakers: “You are pulling down the pillars of our business
temples.” He also once remarked to a sympathetic B.C. Forbes that wealthy men were
admired everywhere except the United States, where success had become a crime.18
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Duke‟s acquisitive nature has been downplayed through recent scholarship, in
light of his charitable work. Duke‟s many millions enabled him to donate thousands to
charities he felt worthwhile, such as Billy Sunday‟s Protestant ministry. While he was
consistently paternalistic, Duke nevertheless took a charitable interest in the welfare of
North Carolinians, donating thousands to build hospitals and orphanages in Charlotte and
Durham. Many of these projects benefited African-Americans living in the Piedmont.
Allen Tullos has aptly described James Duke‟s character as a formidable combination of
“hidebound industriousness, utilitarian ruthlessness, and fierce practicality.” 19
Well before American Tobacco‟s defeat in the U.S. Supreme Court, James B.
Duke and his brother, Ben Duke, had already sensed the possibility of wealth through the
burgeoning electric-power industry needed to energize the Piedmont‟s textile mills. In
1892, the Dukes invested capital in Erwin Mills, managed in Durham, North Carolina, by
William A. Erwin, also from a significant North Carolina industrial family. With Ben
Duke as the formal owner, Erwin Mills later expanded to include four outlets, plus a
fabric bleachery, according 1919 labor statistics.20
For the Dukes, textile mill ownership began as a side-venture, bearing unexpected
fruit in later years with the advent of hydro-electricity. Such experiments were already
underway in the Piedmont. In 1894, Columbia Mills in South Carolina, popularly called
the “Duck Mill,” successfully integrated 17 motors (at 1105 horsepower), deriving the
region‟s first alternative current from nearby Congaree River. Another major Piedmont
19
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waterway, the Saluda, brought electrification to Upper South Carolina, while the Seneca
River helped to power the nearby mill-town of Anderson as early as 1898. More
importantly, the Catawba River, flowing past Charlotte, provided an ideal location for
entrepreneurs capitalizing on regional growth.21
After 1895, Dr. Walker Gill Wylie (1848-1923) of Chester, South Carolina, began
investing in new hydro-electric projects on the Catawba River. Wylie‟s Upcountry
experiments capped off a lengthy career of intellectual and professional distinctions.
Graduating from the University of South Carolina at twenty, Wylie moved to New
York‟s Bellevue Hospital Medical College, graduating in 1871. Dr. Wylie went overseas
to study European medical practices in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, and his
recommendations prompted Bellevue Medical College to open the nation‟s first nursing
school for women. Following an illustrious career as a lecturer in gynecology, Wylie
returned to his native state during the 1890s, where he became an advocate and booster
for hydro-electrical power in the South Carolina Upcountry. Wylie‟s first documented
venture at Portman Shoals in 1895 developed about 1,800 horsepower of electricity,
sufficient to power a nearby cotton mill in Anderson, South Carolina22
Impressed with the results at Portman Shoals, Gill Wylie subsequently enlisted his
brother, Dr. R.H. Wylie, to back further projects along the Catawba River. By 1900, the
Wylie brothers had established the Catawba Power Company with Gill Wylie as sitting
company president. Despite flooding and personnel changes, Catawba Power Company
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successfully completed its first dam in 1903, located at India Hook Shoals. Coupled with
a network of transmission lines, Wylie‟s ambitious project would bring electricity to
Charlotte and its satellite towns, at an unprecedented rate of efficiency.23
The Dukes, like Wylie, recognized the potential of such innovation. On behalf of
the Duke family, William Erwin began mapping the upper Catawba River for likely dam
sites in 1899. By 1901, Erwin had purchased the Great Falls environs for about $90,000.
Erwin deemed this location less vulnerable to flooding, as the river seldom rose above
eleven feet. The Dukes secured their claim to Great Falls soon afterward, establishing the
generic-sounding American Development Company.24
Chief catalyst behind Catawba Power‟s success, engineer William States Lee, Jr.
began his career shortly after graduating from the Citadel in 1894. Lee served as resident
dam engineer for two hydro-electric projects, at Portman Shoals and Columbus, Georgia.
Soon afterward, W.S. Lee came to the attention of Dr. W. Gill Wylie, who enlisted his
talents. Wylie later explained to Lee that successfully building the Catawba plant would
make his reputation as an engineer. Wylie‟s scheme involved building hydro-electric
dams along the Catawba, utilizing a large part of the 700-foot fall which occurred along
the river‟s course of 130 miles, from Camden, South Carolina to Hickory, North
Carolina. Moreover, the Catawba River became the Wateree River in South Carolina,
further linking both regions. This situation, in effect, placed the Wylies in competition
against the Dukes‟ American Development Company, situated at Great Falls on the
Catawba River.25
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Wylie sensed an opportunity for a “superpower system,” and began assiduously
courting the Dukes as co-sponsors for a merger. While Benjamin Duke had earlier given
a modest boost to Wylie‟s India Shoals project, his wealthier brother remained aloof
toward the venture. Duke later admitted his reluctance, based on perceptions that the
American Development Company did not hold the same opportunity for wealth as had
the American Tobacco Company. As biographer Robert Durden argues, James B. Duke
“never invested his money capriciously.” In late 1904, Wylie‟s medical profession
finally broke the ice, when “Buck” Duke sought the doctor‟s advice on his brother‟s
recommendation. While treating Duke‟s foot inflammation, Wylie unfolded Catawba
Power‟s capital problems to the skeptical entrepreneur. Wylie‟s earnest vision, perhaps
aided by W.S. Lee‟s growing reputation as an engineer, convinced Duke to reconsider.
According to Wylie, Duke requested “that man, Lee” to bring all their plans, and
promised “maybe I will go in with you.” Herein lay the seeds of the great Southern
Power Company, later renamed Duke Power, and known today as Duke Energy.26
Using Catawba Power Company as collateral, Duke raised $2 million for this new
joint venture in 1905. Charlotte became the company‟s central headquarters, owing to
the city‟s reliance on textile mills since 1881. Within 18 months, Southern Power
completed its first dam at Great Falls, South Carolina, yielding 40,000 horsepower.
Within four years, William S. Lee oversaw two more successful dams, at Rocky Creek
and Ninety-Nine Islands, on the Broad River. By 1909, Southern Power‟s total output
exceeded 80,000 horsepower, bringing cheap electricity to the region‟s growing towns. 27
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Just how much impact did Southern Power exert on North Carolina by the close
of World War One? According to one member of North Carolina‟s Geological and
Economic Survey, the war decade boosted Tarheel State industry from twenty-third to
tenth place. Crop value also skyrocketed from nineteenth to fourth place. With this
unheralded growth also came a “tremendous demand for power,” largely satisfied by “the
creation of a gigantic water-power business.” According to Thorndike Saville,
University of North Carolina professor of hydraulic engineering, no region in America
“east of the Rockies” enjoyed such access to electricity.28
While it would be an overstatement to attribute the Carolina Piedmont‟s
expansion solely to Southern Power, its hydro-electrical developments certainly
contributed toward new industry and population growth. Relatively cheap electric power
undoubtedly improved the quality of life for those living in areas within Southern
Power‟s ever-widening sphere of influence. But as a result, the Piedmont region
experienced a surge in mill-building, with commensurate city growth. Southern Power
greatly accelerated these trends toward urbanization and expansion, following its
incorporation in 1905.
The primary market for Southern Power lay with textile mills. According to the
1919-20 North Carolina Department of Labor, the primary energy source for North
Carolina businesses remained steam power. By early 1921, the Tarheel State totaled
3,182 factories and mills powered by various means, yet electricity had enjoyed a steady
increase in North Carolina since World War I. 1,023 of these factories used electricity
exclusively, while 148 others used electricity in conjunction with another form of energy.
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More importantly, a high percentage of knitting and cotton mills relied on electricity to
the exclusion of all other energy sources. 106 of 169 knitting mills and 184 of 377 cotton
mills reported using only electricity for their business activity during 1919-20.
Moreover, 46 cotton mills had been established within two years.29
According to Federal and North Carolina Geological surveys, both Carolinas
ranked highest in actual percentage of power derived from hydro-electric operations.
Whereas South Carolina‟s dams yielded far power more in 1907 (the first data year),
North Carolina had begun to overtake her sister state by 1919. Statistics place North
Carolina‟s power percentage at 93.1 percent, with South Carolina at 92.4. Georgia and
Virginia came in at 82.3 and 38.9 percent respectively.30
By 1920, Southern Power accounted for nearly 70 percent of public utility
electricity in North Carolina alone. It was rivaled only by the Aluminum Company of
America (ALCOA), owner of Tallasee Power Company, which yielded 113,000 out of
the state‟s total of 360,000 horsepower. In comparison, Southern Power‟s Bridgewater
and Lookout Shoals dams brought only 63,000 horsepower, about one-third of Alcoa‟s
quotient. However, it should be noted that much of Tallasee‟s power went toward their
ore extraction operations in the Carolinas. Unlike Southern Power‟s network, little of
this electricity affected the urban development of the Carolinas.31
*

*

*

Without question, Duke‟s Southern Power played a leading role in North
Carolina‟s great industrial leap forward, while South Carolina‟s foothills also witnessed a
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dramatic influx of capital and jobs. Yet, what motivated James Buchanan Duke, one of
the foremost exponents of the New South? Unsurprisingly, Southern Power and Duke
Power sources characterize their founder as altruistic, verging on the beatific. Dismissing
the “New South” creed as an “incantatory phrase so beloved by regional boosters and
politicians,” Robert Durden of Duke University even goes so far as to portray his subject
as an almost transcendental figure, storing up his heavenly estate. Durden states his case
thus: “money-making, per se, was not Duke‟s prime purpose in his zealous effort to
build up and protect the power company. Instead, Duke sought the “industrialization of
the Piedmont Carolinas” largely out of public spirit, while “providing a stable,
dependable source-base for a perpetual charitable trust.”32
One must concede Duke‟s endowment as an overall blessing to the Carolinas, but
businessmen cannot create such a “perpetual charitable trust” without first having built
their business empires with iron resolve. At the heart of Duke‟s vision indeed lay a
“ruthless utilitarianism,” to quote Allen Tullos. Most of the Duke Endowment‟s
philanthropy went into effect many years after his unexpected death in 1925. To accept
Robert Durden‟s uncritical portrait of James B. Duke, one would have to view this
industrial titan as a modern-day Prometheus who sacrificed himself to bring divine sparks
of electricity to his home state. Durden‟s biography presents one interpretation of James
B. Duke, but its origins from Duke University and its conservative, pro-business bias
should also be considered.33
It is almost tempting to view Duke as a reformed monopolist. His ostensible goal,
to “pull the South out of the economic doldrums” seems more humanitarian than
32
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cornering the tobacco market. Duke personally doubted his hydro-electricity investments
would turn out as much profit as his erstwhile tobacco empire. But even as Southern
Power gradually won over city planners and farmers to their electrification campaign, its
other Piedmont interests grew apace. Southern Power (and later, Southern Public
Utilities) employed cheaper rates to undercut rival power companies throughout the
region, with resultant controversy in the North Carolina Corporation Commission.
Throughout the 1920s, Southern Power‟s “rate war” against business regulation spilled
over into the political sphere, with great financial and personal cost to James B. Duke.34
Governing from afar in New Jersey, James B. Duke soon found his earlier
reservations about low profits were ill-founded. As Duke‟s earliest biographer, J.W.
Jenkins, described him, “mass production, volume, [and] giving the largest possible
values for the money, were his hobbies.” Controlling nearly all power-plants along the
major Piedmont waterways eventually led to Southern Power‟s monopoly of electricity.
As Southern Power expanded in the first decades of the Twentieth century, more textile
mills became reliant on Duke‟s utility services. Furthermore, incorporated towns and
mill-villages were also attracted to Southern Power‟s affordable rates and record of high
reliability. According to company sources, Duke initially “took a dim view of expanding
electrical service beyond the industrial and municipal markets,” which had been his
initial targets. Mill-villages were seen as “more of an irritant,” while rural dwellers were
unflatteringly portrayed as superstitious rustics who mistrusted electricity.35
Moreover, as demand grew for Southern Power‟s services, Duke began to see the
advantages of expanding beyond his original “Mill a Mile” strategy. Duke‟s widespread
34
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gains in Charlotte convinced him to delegate management of utility services and public
transportation to a subsidiary company. In 1915, Duke created Southern Public Utilities
(SPU) in Charlotte to handle contracts with textile mills, townships, and individuals. His
close friend, Zebulon V. Taylor, became the first SPU president. While Southern Power
continued to build power plants and dams, Southern Public Utilities acted as the
intermediary, controlling transmission lines to surrounding towns, such as Salisbury.
This expanding Piedmont town adopted a new SPU franchise in April 1919. Newer
textile manufacturers, such as Belbros Mills, a modest Charlotte yarn mill of 3,700
spindles and 50 employees, also entered into power contracts with SPU. These two
utility contracts are all that remain extant of Southern Public Utilities business
correspondence in the Duke Energy Archives.36
Southern Power contracts with textile mills had brought Duke increased influence
as a shareholder in this source of wealth, especially in South Carolina‟s Upcountry.
Herman Wolf, a retired Southern Power engineer, provided some insight into Duke‟s
business practices. Wolf began working for Southern Power in 1916, at age twenty. The
young maintenance technician helped rebuild Lookout Shoals substation after a serious
river flood hit the Catawba region. Following this successful project, Wolf came to
“Buck” Duke‟s attention, receiving more responsibility. During his travels across the
Piedmont, Wolf often assisted in the electrification of North Carolina textile mills,
installing generators. Wolf also recalled Southern Power‟s policy of loaning the mills
money to purchase these generators, while buying up their company stocks. “Many
36
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textile mills were partially owned by Mr. Duke,” Wolf asserted. In this fashion, Southern
Power built a North Carolina plant nearly every year, beginning in 1908.37
In his 1980 interview, Herman Wolf also stressed the selling points of Southern
Power, while giving substance to his late employer‟s philanthropic image. Duke‟s power
rates for cotton mills were “low and attractive,” owing to the fact that electricity was onethird cheaper than steam power. In fact, Southern Power‟s rates were so “low and
attractive,” it is unsurprising that North Carolina‟s state regulators on the Corporation
Commission sought to prevent Duke from under-selling his competitors in the utilities
market. Wolf also maintained that Southern Power did not actually begin to show
dividends until Duke established his endowment in 1924. “Mr. Duke paid his own costs
for maintenance, and even used his own office space for a bedroom,” Wolf recalled.
Certainly, Duke‟s legendary thrift has some basis in reality. However, his personal
abstinence did not discourage the Duke family from purchasing “White Oaks” from his
business partner, Zebulon Vance Taylor. Duke later renamed the Myers Park manor
house “Lynnwood,” residing there whenever conducting business in Charlotte.38
Another Duke confidante, Dr. Bennette Eugene Geer (1873-1964) brought new
investment opportunities in the South Carolina Upcountry. Graduating the University of
Michigan, Ben Geer served as a professor of literature at Furman University until 1911.
Thereafter, Geer chose to assist his ailing brother, John M. Geer, in the management of
his considerable South Carolina textile business. Before his elder brother‟s death in
37
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1919, Ben Geer had taken over several manufacturing sites, including the Westervelt
(later Judson) Mill. Westervelt was the first Southern mill to handle rayon and silk as
well as cotton. More importantly, Westervelt‟s primary stockholders included James B.
Duke, who quickly took a shine to the learned Geer.39
Under Duke‟s business guidance, Geer established Southern Bleachery & Print
Works (Taylors, South Carolina), Southern Worsted Mills (Paris, South Carolina), and
Southern Weaving Company (Greenville, South Carolina). Geer also built the Pacific
Mills in Spartanburg County, which relied upon Southern Power‟s Lyman power-plant.40
Duke‟s assistance to Ben Geer sometimes went beyond advice. At one point, Geer
owned the American Bank & Trust of Greenville, which lost $150,000 during the early
1920s. According to Geer‟s biographer, the mismanagement arose from the bank‟s vicepresident. Duke bailed out Geer for $100,000, and the owner made up the difference
from his own funds. In 1922, Duke also agreed to underwrite $250,000 for Geer‟s
proposed fabrics plant in Greenville, manufacturing auto brake linings and webbing.
Incidentally, all Geer‟s factories were located along Duke‟s personal electric railway, the
Piedmont & Northern, which Geer eventually joined as associate director.41
Their lifelong partnership also placed Geer on the Duke Endowment‟s Board of
Trustees in 1924. Duke‟s grants also proved instrumental in saving Geer‟s beloved
Furman University from bankruptcy. Yet, Ben Geer was a formidable person in his own
right. During the First World War, Geer advocated a national organization for mutual
protection against business regulation. This lobbyist group became known as the “Cotton
39
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Textile Institute,” involving both Northern and Southern mill owners. Geer also served
as South Carolina‟s wartime fuel administrator.42
On balance, Southern Power‟s “Mill-a-Mile” concept fulfilled the requirements
for entrepreneurialism. Duke did not stint himself on investing business capital, as
evidenced by his quiet expansion into South Carolina. Exchanging Southern Power‟s
resources for partial ownership appears to have been his overall strategy, whether it
involved the Carolina Piedmont or the wilds of Quebec – his most ambitious feat of
electrification after World War I. However, relatively few textile mills actually boasted
Duke family ownership. According to 1919-20 statistics, Benjamin N. Duke still owned
Erwin Cotton Mills (founded in 1892), numbering four outlets plus a separate bleachery.
By contrast, James B. Duke was not listed by North Carolina as a principal owner of a
single mill. Being a “silent partner” in Carolina textile markets enhanced Duke‟s
superpower strategy, while preserving his image as a selfless philanthropist.”43
Thus, despite the brief flurry of Federal and state reforms designed to curtail
monopoly, James B. Duke‟s superpower campaign managed to flourish through the
Wilson administration largely unhindered by Progressivism. Democratic opposition in
North Carolina, led by Democratic editor Josephus Daniels, could not repeat its success
against the American Tobacco Company. As early as 1912, Duke began speculating on a
Canadian hydro-electrical project on the Saguenay River, in Quebec Province. For
several years, liberal resistance in Ottawa blocked Duke from diverting hydro-electrical
power across the Canadian border to the United States.44
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However, Canada‟s severe job loss and stagnant post-war economy soon brought
a change in their government. In 1922, James B. Duke received permission from the new
Conservative ministry to complete his Isle Maligne project. This feat required the
building of a separate railroad to supply the construction sites. Duke‟s most ambitious
project eventually resulted in joint partnerships with such American business luminaries
as future Treasurer Andrew Mellon and Alcoa‟s Arthur Vining Davis. Moreover, an
investment deal for Isle Maligne created for Duke a one-ninth stake in Alcoa‟s fortunes.45
By the end of World War I, declining New England textile mills began relocating
to the Carolinas, chiefly the South Carolina Upcountry. These businesses were attracted
by large-scale developments of hydro-electrical power, further enhancing the region‟s
New South reputation. Furthermore, a weak trade union presence in the Piedmont meant
more control over labor sources. South Carolina cities such as Columbia and
Spartanburg had grown steadily during the First World War. Spartanburg expanded from
a population of 17,517 (1910) to 22,638 (1920), while the Palmetto State‟s capital leapt
from 26,319 to 37,544 during the same time-span. The post-war influx of Northern
textile mills into the South Carolina Upcountry counted for much of this expansion.46
Duke stated his sympathy for fellow businessmen in New England, and believed
his Quebec project would also benefit textile mills south of the border, especially in
Massachusetts. Herman Wolf phrased it this way: “If [Mr. Duke] could replicate the
success of Southern Power in New England, then they could keep their mills.” While
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Duke‟s efforts to bring cheaper power to New England received praise for its “public
spirit,” one must also concede the possibility of ulterior motive. Keeping Northern mills
from North Carolina also blocked unwanted competition for Duke‟s own widening
empire. Despite the possibility of competition, Duke nevertheless profited from those
Northern interests he could not persuade to remain in New England. Duke‟s superpower
strategy also harnessed much of upper South Carolina‟s business capital, through a
continuance of his “Mill-a-Mile” program, as well as Southern Power‟s strategic
developments of the Piedmont‟s transportation system.47
*

*

*

James Duke‟s Piedmont transportation interests developed alongside his plans for
regional electrification. Duke‟s idea took shape with his famous Piedmont & Northern
electric railway, but even before this achievement, his Southern Power Corporation had
taken over several urban traction companies suffering financial decline in the so-called
“Roosevelt Recession” of 1907-08. These assets included North Carolina streetcar lines
in Gastonia, as well as South Carolina investments in Anderson and Spartanburg.48
Through lucrative partnerships, James B. Duke rebuilt his business empire after
losing much of his tobacco monopoly. These corporate alliances proved beneficial in the
long run. Partnerships with powerful interests such as Alcoa permitted Duke to enjoy
great financial influence without entangling himself in further Federal anti-trust cases.
Moreover, local alliances with regional businessmen in Piedmont cities built powerful
support bases in the Carolinas. Duke‟s allies embarked on numerous “good will” tours

47
48

101.

Carlton, 251-9; Norcross, 6-10; Wolf interview.
Thomas T. Fetters, Palmetto Traction (Forty Fort, PA: Harold E. Cox, 1978), 9641

across the Carolina Piedmont to garner stockholders for Southern Power‟s transportation
experiment, the Piedmont & Northern electric railroad.49
This ambitious project, designed to compete with the juggernaut Southern
Railway, began in 1909 with a proposal from William States Lee, now the vice-president
of Southern Power & Utilities. As Duke absorbed rivals such as South Carolina Power,
Light, and Railway, the brilliant engineer saw an opportunity to consolidate these gains
by linking the major Piedmont towns via an inter-urban railway system. “Buck” Duke
enthusiastically supported Lee‟s plan, which went into effect in 1910. North Carolina
chartered the Piedmont Traction Company on 8 January 1910, and South Carolina
approved the much larger Greenville, Spartanburg, and Anderson Railway two months
later. Piedmont Traction spanned 21 miles from Charlotte to Gastonia, while its South
Carolina counterpart extended 98 miles from Greenville to Spartanburg. These two
subsidiary corporations linked up at the Carolina borders in 1912.50
Within a few years of its completion, the Piedmont & Northern enjoyed so much
success that extensions were suggested by promoters. Duke favored an Atlanta station,
while other speculators spoke of a terminal in Raleigh, linking the capital city to Southern
Power‟s Charlotte headquarters. However, these ideas never came to fruition. In time,
however, wartime demands for textiles resulted in the Piedmont & Northern Railway‟s
expanded freight service to mill towns, such as Gastonia and Belmont Junction.51
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Viewing the extensive company literature and popular history on the Piedmont &
Northern Railway, readers might be led to believe that Duke‟s trolley investments were
mere afterthoughts. While Duke‟s electric railway certainly ranks as one of his greatest
achievements, at least one urban historian has speculated that Southern Power‟s 1910
acquisition of Charlotte‟s streetcar lines may have encouraged Duke‟s construction of the
Piedmont & Northern Railway. In any case, Duke solidified his control over the rapidly
expanding “Queen City” of North Carolina, which boasted a 1910 population of 34,014.
Just before World War I, Mecklenburg County‟s overall population measured close to
fifty thousand. By 1920, Charlotte had blossomed into a large municipality of 46,338.52
However, James Duke and Southern Power cannot historically claim full credit
for Charlotte‟s staggering growth, or its suburban development. In 1890, Edward D.
Latta first proposed electric trolleys to replace Charlotte‟s antiquated horse-drawn cars.
Originally from South Carolina, Edward Latta resided primarily in New York City, where
he witnessed the development of “streetcar suburbs.” For almost three decades, Latta‟s
Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company (known locally as the “Four C‟s”) played
a role in transforming the Queen City. Many businessmen in Charlotte supported Latta,
anticipating that a modern streetcar suburb would attract workers to a proposed textile
mill, D.A. Tompkins‟ Atherton Mill, scheduled to begin operation in 1893.53
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To capitalize on Atherton Mill‟s eventual construction, Edward Dilworth Latta
planned and developed his model streetcar suburb, named Dilworth in honor of its
creator. Dilworth received an early boost from none other than Thomas Edison, who
visited Latta‟s Charlotte residence in late 1890. Edison agreed to invest in Dilworth‟s
construction, providing an electric distribution system to enable Charlotte‟s first electric
streetcars to begin service as early as May 18, 1891.54
Throughout 1892-93, Dilworth boosters openly courted middle-class residents.
Edward Latta‟s sales pitch stated: “Buy a house with your rent money.” However,
Dilworth‟s development coincided with the nation‟s financial plunge, as well as the
Homestead and Pullman Strikes. Dilworth‟s mainstay instead became white urban
industrial workers, living in cheaply-constructed quarters purchased through Latta‟s
rental and loan agency. Moreover, displaced agricultural families were increasingly
drawn to Atherton Mill‟s proximity, while the new Charlotte Street Railway provided
convenient transportation to nearby amusement parks. Thus, Dilworth soon became a
tangled urban forest of tenements and worker housing on the fringes of textile mills,
interspersed with a smattering of middle-class neighborhoods.55
After Dilworth‟s completion, the Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company
went on to construct streetcar connections and housing developments to accommodate
further population growth after 1900. These new streetcar suburbs included Piedmont
drawn Streetcar System in Charlotte, North Carolina 1883-1891,” research paper, 27
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Park and Elizabeth Heights (both completed in 1902), as well as the upscale black
community of Biddleville (finished in 1903). By 1909, Charlotte Street Railway lines
measured fifteen track miles, serving much of downtown Charlotte. Furthermore, new
textile mills began operations all across Mecklenburg County, creating new suburbs at
Belmont, Highland Park, Atherton, and Chadwick.56
For nearly two decades, Edward Dilworth Latta basked in the Queen City‟s
gratitude. Charlotte‟s Board of Aldermen granted favorable public utility contracts to the
Four C‟s, enabling Latta‟s virtual monopoly over the city‟s gas and electric power. As
late as 1906, one Charlotte publication lionized its city‟s premier developer for his “broad
ideas and progressiveness.” However, the devoutly conservative Latta lacked any true
Progressive inclinations. Throughout his career, Latta showed little compassion for the
new factory class who lived in his suburbs. During the height of his economic and
political power, Latta openly stated that “benevolence has no rightful place in any real
estate deal.”57 In December 1903, Latta fully demonstrated his lack of benevolence.
Among Dilworth‟s teeming thousands dwelt about fifty streetcar workers,
employed by Latta‟s Charlotte Street Railway Company. Dan Morrill indicates these
conductors operated streetcars six days per week, with twelve hour shifts. Depending on
seniority, they could earn from 8 to 12 cents hourly, translating to 64 cents to $1.44 daily
wages. This translates to at least 33 percent better wages than most textile workers, but
still very low in comparison with most urban streetcar workers across the nation.58
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Latta‟s streetcar men received no vacation days, except for Christmas, when
prizes were given to productive workers at a banquet held in the Central Hotel. But
Latta‟s worst trait is evidenced by his parsimonious 1903 decision to cut off streetcar
heaters to reduce winter operation costs. On December 2, 1903, forty-eight of Latta‟s
motormen and conductors resolved to strike in protest. Initially, most of Charlotte‟s
estimated 20,000 inhabitants sided with these beleaguered workers.59
Despite the national trend toward Progressivism, there existed few legal options
for the workingmen to pursue in Charlotte. While labor unions certainly existed within
city limits, North Carolina businessmen were under no serious pressure to negotiate with
them. Even avowed Southern Progressives sometimes placed great confidence in their
region‟s “enlightened industrialists.” Boosters were similarly unreceptive toward labor
reform, because such measures usually entailed recognition of labor unions. As late as
1913, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce openly boasted of their city‟s low presence of
trade unionism, which they described as a “disturbing element.” But Charlotte‟s 1903
streetcar strike lacked any real union leadership. It seems that Southern industrialists
were more than capable of creating disturbances. Historian Dan Morrill distinguishes
Latta‟s conduct as “at worst self-serving, and at best only paternalistic.” Moreover, he
describes Latta‟s subsequent actions as “characteristic” of most New South capitalists.60
From New York City, Edward Latta directed his eldest son, Nisbet, to discharge
his striking workers and replace them immediately. Upon his return to Charlotte on
December 3, the elder Latta discovered quite a number of local citizens sporting protest
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buttons, which read “I Walk.” On that same evening, Charlotte‟s labor leaders met in the
Typographical Hall to rally for the unorganized streetcar workers. Even the conservative
Charlotte Daily Observer (the forerunner of today‟s Charlotte Observer) gave its
conditional support to these striking workers, whose actions were restrained, at least
initially. For once, it seemed that Charlotte workers might actually trump their employer
and gain major concessions through public sympathy.61
But the Charlotte Street Railway men had not counted upon their employer‟s
intractability and essential meanness. Latta‟s men agreed to return to their former jobs if
their complaints were resolved. The workers‟ arbitration efforts were supported by F.C.
Abbott, a respected city realtor who knew Latta professionally. On December 8, one
week after the strike, Edward D. Latta agreed to restore heat to his company‟s electric
streetcars. However, he refused to reinstate those forty-eight employees “who, without
provocation… elected to abandon their position with no other expectation than that the
company and the public would be without service.”62
Immediately, the public condemned Latta‟s summary dismissal of his streetcar
men. Charlotte News editorials questioned Charlotte Consolidated Construction‟s
integrity, even suggesting the city aldermen should review all of Latta‟s exclusive utility
franchises. Moreover, the newspaper argued that perhaps municipal ownership would be
preferable to renewing the “Four C‟s” contract for another ten years. The Charlotte News
predicted a costly victory for Latta and Charlotte Consolidated Construction.63 While it
might be too much to argue Latta‟s mishandling of the strike directly wrought the
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downfall of his own company, public opinion gradually eroded the image of Charlotte‟s
once-invulnerable entrepreneur.
Unfortunately, mounting frustration among some Dilworth inhabitants spilled
over, on the chilly evening of December 10. Patience has its way of evaporating when
hunger and betrayal hang thick in the air. And so, two days after Latta announced his
purge, hundreds of demonstrators converged on South Boulevard to protest hiring of
scabs. No strikers were conclusively identified among the crowds. Reports indicated that
the mob hurled stones through trolley windows, striking at least one conductor, who
suffered an ankle injury. Witnesses also alleged the mob fired pistols in the air while
streetcars rattled past. Charlotte police dispersed the crowd before serious violence
erupted, but irreparable damage to the workers‟ cause had been inflicted. The Charlotte
News sponsored a benefit show on December 21, featuring regional humorist Gilbert
Warren. Yet, Edward Latta still emerged victorious, at least for the short term. None of
his former crewmen were re-hired, and they gradually sought other employment.64
No evidence directly links public opprobrium to Consolidated Construction‟s
downfall, but nonetheless, “profound changes” affected the company‟s fortunes over the
following decade. In 1904, Charlotte‟s Board of Aldermen passed over the “Four C‟s” in
favor of Duke‟s Catawba Power Company, which offered lower annual rates for city
streetlights. Whereas Edward Latta billed the city $90.00 for each pole, the Dukes
drastically undercut their rival by charging $54.00. That same year, Charlotte citizens
also complained about the quality and price of the “Four C‟s” domestic gas services.
That February, gas manager Nisbet Latta publicly defended his father‟s business
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practices, labeling their critics “socialists.” Such outbursts only worsened the local
reputation of Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company.65
By 1910, the Charlotte Board of Aldermen had turned completely against Latta,
entertaining numerous bids from rivals, including Southern Power. After years of
wrangling, Latta grudgingly sold his gas subsidiary – and trolley lines -- to Duke‟s
growing empire that October.66 Despite Southern Power‟s gradual takeover in Charlotte,
Edward D. Latta continued to shape Dilworth until his death in 1925.67
Duke still entertained plans to build electrified interurban streetcar lines across the
region. Duke‟s own Piedmont Traction subsidiary had been growing alongside its parent,
Southern Power, absorbing utility services across the Piedmont. In 1909, Southern
Power purchased Anderson Traction Company, with Greenville Traction Company
selling to Duke in 1910. Just before Piedmont Traction reorganized into Southern Public
Utilities, Duke finalized a transaction for Spartanburg‟s entire power system in late 1912.
This made Duke a partial owner of South Carolina Light, Power, and Railway. However,
complications emerged when Southern Power actually came to rival its own subsidiary,
South Carolina Power, Light and Railway (SCLP&R), for services to Spartanburg.68
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Dilworth underwent two further stages of development in 1912 and 1920, following
the “City Beautiful” trend. In 1911, Latta enlisted the Olmstead brothers to landscape
and organize the newly annexed Dilworth, now part of Charlotte‟s Eighth Ward.
Charlotte‟s once-powerful developer also established the 90-acre Latta Park, accessible
via trolley. While Latta Park no longer attracts professional baseball teams or Buffalo
Bill‟s Wild West Show, it still serves as one of Charlotte‟s major recreation centers.
(http://landmarkscommission.org/S&RR/HelmsBell.html Accessed 17 February 2009).
68
After World War I, a third utility company, the Green River Power Corporation,
emerged to challenge Duke‟s monopoly, but faced long and costly litigation. (Vernon
Foster, Spartanburg: Facts, Reminiscences, and Folklore (Spartanburg:
Spartanburg County Foundation, 1998), 389; Fetters, 69-95).
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With Charlotte‟s public utility portfolio under Duke‟s control by 1910, Southern
Power‟s power base resided in the center of the Carolina Piedmont. Yet profits were still
a serious concern. Already by 1910, automobiles had become a permanent fixture among
Piedmont towns. The original 15-mile streetcar tracks built by Charlotte Consolidated
Construction Company had been operating at only a modest profit margin, according to
fragmentary records. North Carolina‟s Department of Labor published sporadic data on
the state‟s street railways. The Department‟s 1907 report shows the Charlotte lines
serving nearly 2.75 million passengers, about 183,000 per track mile. Despite being the
second-largest trolley system in North Carolina, the Charlotte lines earned a mere
$40,535 when compared to transportation services such as Asheville Electric Company
(14 miles operating at $97,738) or Wilmington‟s Consolidated Railways Light & Power,
whose 19 track miles brought $75, 956.69
Moreover, Piedmont Traction‟s new assets required modernization and expansion.
In 1911 and 1912, Southern Power devoted resources to these tasks. Anderson City
Lines eventually linked up with Duke‟s Greenville, Spartanburg, and Anderson (GS&A)
Railroad. Eventually, Greenville, Spartanburg, and Anderson became closely tied in the
South Carolina Upcountry, although it would be too much to attribute this entirely to
James Duke. Greenville Traction Company (later Greenville City Lines) underwent
major extensions to nearby textile mills -- including Duke‟s private interest at Westervelt
Mill. Concurrent with these developments in South Carolina, nine trolley lines served
Charlotte‟s streetcar suburbs, expanding to 20 track miles and 38 cars by 1916.70
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To streamline Southern Power‟s corporate organization, Duke‟s Piedmont
Traction merged its assets into the Southern Public Utilities Corporation in March 1913.
This major subsidiary now governed Southern Power‟s widespread domestic electricity
and gas services, in addition to public transportation lines.71 Governing this branch of
Southern Power required someone with keen political skills, as well as a hard-nosed
competitive streak. Throughout Duke‟s Piedmont & Northern campaign, one man in
particular had demonstrated these attributes. Zebulon Vance Taylor (1868-1921) would
supervise Southern Power‟s vast public utilities service industry until his death. Having
been a successful businessman raised in the old school, Taylor likewise proved a master
of paternalism. As a booster in the Piedmont, Taylor enjoyed business connections with
the major towns orbiting Charlotte.72
Zebulon Vance Taylor‟s origins were comfortably middle-class, given the
economic chaos of Reconstruction. His parents, Dr. C.W. and Mariah Taylor, were
native Tarheels temporarily living in Sparta, Tennessee when Zebulon Vance – named
for the flamboyant Confederate governor of North Carolina -- came into the world on
September 4, 1868. By age eleven, Taylor‟s family had relocated to Forsyth County,
North Carolina, where their names appear in the 1880 Census.73 After attending Oak
Ridge Institute, Taylor began his career as a telegrapher and dispatcher for Southern
Railway. He completed the equivalent of a baccalaureate in his spare time, before
studying law in Greensboro, under Judge W.P. Bynum. During the 1890s, Taylor met his
future wife, Irving Scales, whose brothers took on the promising young attorney as a

71

Fetters, 75.
Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 6, Nos. 11-12, (April-May 1921), 3-11.
73
1880 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Forsythe County, Greensboro, North Carolina.
72

51

junior partner. Taylor thereafter entered Greensboro politics, serving two single-year
terms as the city‟s mayor. Taylor took office on October 15, 1898, filling a vacancy left
when his predecessor, John J. Nelson, resigned for a court appointment.74
Zebulon Taylor left politics in 1902 to assume the presidency of Greensboro
Electric Company. Taylor held this position until 1910, when he joined Southern Power,
which had just acquired the utility services of nearby Winston-Salem. Duke soon made
Taylor a director of Piedmont & Northern Railroad, to reward his efforts as a booster
during their campaign. Meanwhile, Taylor managed several utility outlets for Southern
Power, including Winston-Salem and Charlotte, until these branches were merged with
South Carolina assets to form Southern Public Utilities in 1913. Zebulon V. Taylor
became the first president of Duke‟s new subsidiary arm in the Piedmont.75
Zebulon Taylor proved an able lieutenant, managing daily operations and acting
as a lightning rod for controversy during the 1919 streetcar strike. As a ranking member
of the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, Zebulon Taylor knew the right connections to
secure influence during the crisis. As a business attorney, Taylor also played a leading
role in Duke‟s court battle against North Carolina regulators. In short, Zebulon Taylor‟s
uncompromising conservatism made him a strong enforcer, serving as the iron hand
behind Southern Power‟s friendly exterior.76
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Company literature later dubbed Taylor the “Father of SPU,” owing to his “spirit
of service” as well as his “tact and diplomacy.” While such traits Taylor possessed to
some degree, he also showed another side to those who challenged his authority. Taylor
was a tenacious defender of business interests and an opponent of regulation, treating all
critics with the tenderness of a “fist in a velvet glove.” His opponents included the liberal
Democrat Josephus Daniels, owner of the Raleigh News & Observer, who described
Taylor‟s “almost violent” tirades against business regulation. Daniels staunchly favored
the regulation of Southern Power, also commented on Taylor‟s trademark “vehemence,”
which spills out like acid during the 1919 Charlotte strike.77
Because Taylor achieved his success in a milieu that scorned trade unions, he
scorned organized labor as anathema. His formative years witnessed the Great Railroad
Strike of 1877, the Haymarket Riot, and other great labor-capital disputes. Growing up
in an environment so mistrustful of organized labor, it should come as little surprise he
would oppose their representatives throughout his political and business career. But his
opposition often took on personal dimensions, even to the point of abusive language.
Despite this character flaw, Zebulon Taylor became something of a regional hero.
One Greensboro editorial, reprinted by Southern Public Utilities upon Taylor‟s death,
acknowledged the company president‟s faith in the “resources of the South,” including its
people. Greensboro‟s eulogist described Taylor as a self-made man who never settled for
mediocrity, finishing with an appeal to young men to follow the SPU executive‟s
example in the “business of living.” His fame extended as far afield as Chester, South
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Carolina, whose newspaper editors likewise spoke of Taylor‟s “fervor and enthusiasm,”
comparable to railroad builder James J. Hill. Such lavish tribute confirms Taylor‟s
significance as a regional booster and developer of Southern Power‟s industry.78
One can also see parallels to Henry Clay Frick‟s erstwhile partnership with
Andrew Carnegie in the steel industry. Unlike Frick and Carnegie‟s later falling out,
Taylor‟s relationship with Duke never ended in acrimony – indeed, Taylor‟s loyalty to
Duke lasted until the SPU president died, while on board his partner‟s personal railway
car in 1921. However, labor history aficionados may see a comparison between Taylor‟s
union-busting at Southern Public Utilities in 1919 and Henry Clay Frick‟s strong-arm
tactics against organized steelworkers at Homestead, Pennsylvania. While lieutenants
handled the strikebreaking with ruthless efficiency, James B. Duke, much like Andrew
Carnegie, preserved his public image as a philanthropist and enlightened industrialist.
Throughout the war decade, Zebulon Taylor became the most visible agent of Southern
Power‟s relentless dynamo, with thousands of workers answerable to him.79
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Chapter 3: Labor Forward in the Piedmont Carolinas

This chapter analyzes the emerging labor movement in the Piedmont Carolina
prior to World War I. Some Southern Progressives endorsed local unions, but many
showed mistrust toward the American Federation of Labor and its affiliates, including the
Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees. However, efforts
to organize streetcar workers in the Piedmont often intersected with similar drives in
regional textile mill villages, so both campaigns will be examined. Mill operators and
their powerful allies in city and state government came to view outside labor
organizations as a challenge to their authority. Moreover, national labor movements
clashed with local businessmen over the treatment and representation of their streetcar
workers. Since many of these public transportation workers operated in mill towns,
employers tended to treat their streetcar crewmen in the same manner as textile mill
employees. This seems especially true of Southern Public Utilities during its early phase,
where Charlotte‟s trolley-men were among the lowest paid in the region.
According to Philip S. Foner, American streetcar workers uniformly received
“deplorably low” wages, often working long shifts under the most unsafe conditions,
including exposure and electrocution. Since its creation in 1892, the AASERE had
represented nearly half of America‟s streetcar workers, chiefly in the North. However,
by 1916, national membership had risen to 60,000, including Southern chapters in
Louisiana, Tennessee, and South Carolina – the citadel of Southern textile industry.1
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Southern textile workers were first mobilized by Knights of Labor in 1886. This
early wave of textile organization affected workers in Charlotte, North Carolina, who
vainly sought a union. Unionization efforts resurfaced in the Upper South with the
National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) and its later incarnation, the United Textile
Workers of America (UTWA). As Dewey Grantham points out, nearly all textile strikes
before the First World War met with total defeat, largely due to AFL indifference toward
the “episodic and ephemeral” nature of Southern labor protest. According to historian
William B. Tindall, textile labor unions were practically moribund in the Carolina
Piedmont by 1921. Sympathetic municipal courts allowed corporate lawyers to file
injunctions against unions, while National Guardsmen and police forces broke strikes,
sometimes aided by private investigators and professional strikebreakers.2
Long before this well-documented defeat of labor, union-busting partnerships
existed between state authorities and businessmen. For example, the Augusta streetcar
strike of 1912 resulted on September 23 only after the powerful Augusta-Aiken Railway
& Electric Corporation refused to negotiate with the national streetcar union over the
formation of Division 577. Augusta-Aiken Railways, much like Southern Power in
Charlotte, crossed state lines between Georgia and South Carolina, owning all streetcar
and inter-urban railways between these two major towns. At the insistence of Augusta‟s
mayor, Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown gladly sent the state militia into a town
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already plagued with strikebreakers, provoking minor incidents of violence that Brown
thereafter blamed on the AASERE.3
Another reason for Southern resistance toward the national labor movement lay
with some local craft organizations, which suspected the motives of “big labor.” Most
Southern union members were skilled craftsmen more interested in protecting their jobs.
Sometimes with tacit support from manufacturers and businessmen, these conservative
unionists were not particularly interested in helping unskilled laborers rise above their
low-paid stations. Hence, construction workers and longshoremen in the coastal ports of
Savannah and Charleston were able to unionize effectively, but Upcountry textile
workers were strongly discouraged from taking such a course.4
Meanwhile, textile mills burgeoned in the South, as more Northern businesses
relocated to the Carolinas and Georgia for lower wages and weaker local unions, if any.
Throughout the period between 1915 and 1925, George B. Tindall noted “subterranean
turbulence” in the Piedmont mill villages, signs of developing class alienation. This
“widening gulf” between textile workers and bosses reinforced impressions that cotton
mill workers were becoming “a hereditary occupation group.” While connected to
mainstream America by railroads and newspapers, Piedmont mill towns were effectively
isolated, with their own churches, schools, and company stores. As their work-force
enlarged during the war years, mill workers became restive toward their employers.
Tindall stresses this class consciousness came less from labor militancy, more from a
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sense of desperation and isolation.5 But when the mill towns did become energized, as in
past cases in South Carolina, mill operators instinctively looked for troublemakers to
blame for circumstances largely within their own control. Despite the AFL‟s relative
conservatism, Southern industrialists freely associated them with IWW radicals.
While mill owners expected the state governments to support their campaigns
against labor unions, North Carolina Governor Locke Craig and his Palmetto counterpart,
Richard I. Manning, were both products of Southern Progressivism. Even though both
governors owed their elections to conservative Democratic constituencies, they were also
swept up in Wilson‟s progressive “New Freedom” platform. Long a foe of corporations,
Governor Craig became known as the “Good Roads” governor of North Carolina,
improving the state‟s Piedmont and Appalachian regions with modern highways. Under
Craig‟s successor, Thomas Bickett, state legislators also fought to control utility rates in
North Carolina. Meanwhile, Governor Manning commenced a short period of political
reform, following his personal victory over demagogue Coleman T. Blease in 1914. In
short order, Manning overhauled state taxes, outlawed labor by children under fourteen,
and set up a Board of Arbitration for labor disputes. Manning also recognized state labor
unions and broke the power of company stores. His successor, Robert A. Carpenter,
furthered this progressive trend.6
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At the same time, Governor Richard I. Manning retained something of a
provincial outlook on organized labor. As a wealthy South Carolinian with conservative
states-rights roots, Manning took a dim view toward “foreign” labor agitators, linking
their brand of radicalism to his immediate predecessor. As governor, Coleman
Livingstone Blease thrived on “petty bickering and turbulence.” But despite Blease‟s
ruthless suppression of IWW strikers at Greenville‟s Monaghan Mill in July 1914, he also
used local unions for his own patronage. Following Blease‟s ouster that November, his
disgruntled followers, known as “Bleaseites,” often encouraged mill walkouts in the
Upcountry. Bleaseites played to white supremacy, alleging that textile businesses treated
white “lint-heads” worse than black slaves. However, these agitators served more to
undermine Manning‟s authority than to help exploited workers.7
Monaghan Mill‟s strike in July 1914 attracted some modest national attention, due
to Joseph James Ettor‟s involvement. Best-known for leading the 1912 Lawrence textile
strike, Ettor staged Socialist demonstrations in sympathy with the striking Greenville
textile workers. One local Wobbly supporter even carried a red banner in a downtown
parade. Many South Carolinians saw Ettor as the sort of “outside agitator” they feared
most in organized labor. For nearly two months, Monaghan Mill ceased operation.
However, the Industrial Workers of the World soon decamped from the South Carolina
Upcountry, after their efforts proved fruitless. Monaghan Mill owner Lewis Parker

7

Further examination of Governor Blease can be found in Bryant Simon, A Fabric of
Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1998), 17-23; Walter Edgar, South Carolina: a History (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 473-7; Carlton, 258-59; Tindall, 21-22.
59

quickly settled with his own workers, but other mills in the region began sacking workers
suspected of being Wobblies.8
Under Richard Manning‟s governorship, the small Upcountry city of Anderson
encountered further labor unrest in early 1916. Since the previous year, UTWA
organizers had sought to unionize Brogon Mill. To punish their rebellious workers,
Brogon Mill‟s owners sought to evict the striking workers from company housing, in
violation of rental contracts. Despite his Progressive leanings, Governor Manning used
the Palmetto National Guard to enforce the company‟s eviction notices. This action
brought the strike to a halt, intimidating workers into silence. Carlton explains the
governor‟s actions as those of a “scion of an old planter family,” who later became a
successful banker. This fits well with the previously established premise that Southern
Progressives preferred to handle their own reforms at the state and local levels, resenting
outside interference. However much Governor Manning personally disliked using state
troops in such fashion, he also felt an obligation to uphold the social order as he
perceived it. As a businessman himself, Manning placed the interests of South Carolina
business foremost.9
Manning‟s exercise in conservative policy had its dividends; he sacrificed
national labor unions to secure state-wide political support. Initially lukewarm toward
Manning‟s progressive stance, the Upcountry mill owners backed the governor‟s reelection against Coleman Blease in November 1916. Even the reactionary “Pitchfork”
Ben Tillman supported Manning, despite his progressive reputation, because he dealt a
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sound blow to the “damned factory class.” Moreover, some urban workers in Anderson
and Spartanburg came to see outside unions as detrimental to their livelihood. Employers
warned that union-dictated wages would result in massive unemployment. Most
Upcountry textile workers aspired toward steady income, despite the widening divide
between skilled and unskilled workers.10
While Carlton‟s work deals mainly with South Carolina, one sees numerous
similarities to the North Carolina Piedmont. Charlotte and her satellites proved resistant
toward outside reformers, who were systematically viewed as intruders. Like vigilant
seraphim, Rotarians and other “organization men” zealously guarded admittance to the
burgeoning New South middle class. Many residents decried a “new class of loafers”
vaguely attributed to “foreign” influences. During the mid-1880s, factory workers,
dependent upon their employers for home and livelihood, sided with textile mill owners
against the local Knights of Labor. Some successful trade unions came to Charlotte in
the 1890s, as farms failed and urbanization spread across the Piedmont. For example, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers established Charlotte Division 84 in 1894.
Indeed, most of Charlotte‟s local unions before 1910 reflected a bias toward craft workers
and skilled tradesmen. For unskilled workers, such as the new mill class, few advocates
dared to plead their cases until well into the next century.11
According to Janette Greenwood, the strongly Methodist Charlotte region had its
own paternalistic reform movement, the Charlotte Humane Society, sponsored by
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ministers and lay members, who began advocating temperance and cleanliness among the
benighted mill workers during the 1890s. One of these reformers, Frank Ramsey
McNinch, later became Charlotte mayor in 1918, presiding over the city during its violent
streetcar strike. These Protestant reformers, notably suspicious toward Catholics and
Jews, also believed themselves the rightful guardians of impoverished mill families,
resenting outside interference from labor agitators. Many skilled craftsmen from
Charlotte and Gastonia were similarly divided between progressive self-interest and
provincial attitudes toward unskilled laborers.12
Were streetcar workers skilled or unskilled workers? In 1915, Congressman
Stephen G. Porter of Pennsylvania served as arbitrator during Pittsburgh‟s streetcar strike
on behalf of Division 85. Dissenting from the majority opinion, ruling streetcar crewmen
were no more important than other wage workers, Congressman Porter stated his views
on the streetcar profession. By dint of their rigorous training and responsibility, streetcar
men deserved concessions to ensure high levels of performance and morale. While
Pittsburgh‟s three thousand streetcar workers might seem worlds apart from Charlotte or
Columbia‟s mere hundreds, their overall professional development bears comparison.13
North and South Carolina streetcar men underwent six months of training, and
were not considered the equivalent of journeymen until two years passed. According to
Stephen Porter, prospective motormen and conductors underwent medical examinations
to ascertain fitness and sobriety before entering a period of apprenticeship. All streetcar
employees could be routinely tested for technical knowledge and rules comprehension by
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inspectors. Pittsburgh streetcar workers memorized 167 regulations. Given the complex
nature of electric streetcars, workers were expected to be mindful of machinery as well as
passengers and pedestrians. Exposure to elements and disease were constant risk factors.
Moreover, these professionals had to maintain neat uniforms, handle money, and meet
unkindness with “forbearance and self-control.” Congressman Porter concluded that,
given these different criteria, electric street railway employees should be considered in
the same light as a locomotive engineer.14
However, in Southern mill towns, especially in the Carolina Piedmont, streetcar
companies relied more heavily on low-wage laborers. Since streetcars often ferried
textile mill workers, this may have reinforced the perception that motormen and
conductors were also part of the “factory class.” As Southern Public Utilities belonged to
a larger corporation with textile mill interests, this may also helped justify Zebulon
Taylor‟s overriding policy of low wages for his streetcar men. After all, Southern Power
had appropriated streetcar lines as an outgrowth of urban electrification. Without union
representation, SPU workers earned from eight to twelve cents hourly, according to
organizational reports sent to the AASERE in June 1913.15
Such reports doubtless troubled William D. Mahon (1861-1949), International
President of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees
(AASERE) since its inception in 1892. Time Magazine described Mahon as an “old-time
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crony” of Samuel Gompers. Hailing from Detroit, Mahon‟s leadership is best described
as conservative and traditional. Mahon‟s organization primarily served the interests of
transit workers across the United States and Canada. In marked contrast with other AFL
branches, the AASERE did not agitate for “closed shop” working conditions, although it
stressed the benefits of union membership. While the AASERE‟s trade publication,
Motorman and Conductor, focused more on Northern and Midwestern events, Southern
chapters contributed sporadic progress reports. Asheville, North Carolina, and Columbia,
South Carolina were both fairly regular correspondents from the Upper Carolina region,
where the AASERE‟s relatively conservative approach toward labor activity found some
acceptance among local governments.16
To illustrate this delicate relationship, the Labor Advocate of Columbia offers a
rare first-hand glimpse of the conservative union ethos at work in a large Southern town.
Writing shortly after the Armistice, Charles Henry describes his labor newspaper as
“above all things American,” decrying radicalism as a threat to “stable labor.” The local
editor also boasted that Columbia had “more organized workmen than ever in its history,”
thanks to worker patriotism during the war. Henry further clarified his position as a
progressive conservative, espousing the late Theodore Roosevelt‟s “Square Deal.” That
this shibboleth had often been twisted by Southern employers did not escape the editor,
as he further upbraided bosses who “sow discord” or “beat down wages.” Henry
considered corporate strikebreakers “no less an enemy… than is the bewhiskered [Red]
now seeking to terrorize the country.”17
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Even before the First Red Scare, labor radicalism threatened the American
Federation of Labor‟s moderate reputation. Mahon once stated the international streetcar
union‟s purpose was to peacefully assist its members in “meeting the troubles of life.”
Mahon‟s personal beliefs also espoused the Social Gospel, as evidenced by his
devotionals in Motorman and Conductor. “If we give men full economic development…
they will be better prepared for the future,” he once wrote. Mahon also counted Northern
business leaders among his colleagues in the National Civic Federation. Furthermore,
Mahon remained an “adamant opponent” of radical labor groups, such as the Industrial
Workers of the World, whose actions he blamed for sabotaging negotiations. However,
the IWW also promoted equal memberships among women and minorities, in marked
contrast with Samuel Gompers and William Mahon‟s policies.18
Despite William Mahon‟s policy of accommodation, his nationwide organization
faced prevalent anti-labor sentiments. While hardly alone in its distrust of unionism, the
“Solid South” proved difficult to crack. One implacable foe, Governor Joseph E. Brown
of Georgia later described the AASERE as being “defiant of State and National laws and
ruthless in committing murder.” Citing incidents in Augusta (1912), Atlanta (1916), and
Savannah (1918-19), Brown also decried “bloody violence against the public” across the
nation. Governor Brown no doubt feared the Labor Forward movement, during which
AFL memberships had risen dramatically to 1.75 million by 1916, with approximately
60,000 belonging to AASERE.19
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Correspondingly, the AASERE had established a few significant footholds prior
to World War I. In fact, Asheville, situated in western North Carolina, had organized
under Division 128 in late 1899. Then as now, Asheville thrived on tourism and vacation
homes during these early decades owing to its mountainous, scenic locale. Although by
1920, Asheville‟s general population only numbered 10,235; many times that number
visited the city each year. Asheville Electric Company at its peak had 45 streetcars on 18
track miles to accommodate traffic. Asheville Electric Company‟s isolation may have
discouraged Duke‟s interest in its acquisition. Moreover, AEC did very well before
World War I. During 1911, services extended into West Asheville, where three new
streetcar crews were recruited.20
Division 128 took pride in their town, “one of the most extensively advertised
resort towns in the United States.” However, relations with the Asheville Electric
Company were not always harmonious. Division 128 informed the Amalgamated that
“conservative observers” were present to remind them of their duty. On 3 May 1913,
workers won a settlement for improved wages after a brief walkout in April. Division
128‟s workers received wages beginning at 20 cents for the first year of employment –
more than twice the starting rate offered by Charlotte. 21
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By 1915, Asheville‟s Division 128 had constructed its own union headquarters.
Older employees had been replaced by a dozen new men who promptly joined the
organization. Division 128‟s standing improved to the point of adopting benefits for
widows and disabled members, in addition to international AASERE funds. Several
members were able to begin families during this period, owing to substantial pay raises.
In 1916, hourly wages increased commensurately by approximately two cents, with
workers earning from 21 to 27 cents depending on seniority. This raise factored into
Division 128‟s reported yearly wage increase of $7,600, bringing Asheville Electric‟s
streetcar workers just under the wage scales of most Northern cities. But these
advancements did not come easily; Division 128‟s correspondent, known only as “Newt,”
indicated Asheville‟s tourists made the summer runs very challenging.22
Successful organizations in Asheville and Chattanooga provided a springboard for
the union to break out of the Lower Appalachians, entering the Piedmont Carolinas for
the first time in 1911-12. While the Amalgamated‟s campaign of 1919 stands as the most
ambitious effort to organize public transportation, it was by no means the first operation.
During the national upswing in labor membership before the Great War, AFL organizers
led a comprehensive effort to unionize skilled workers in the Carolina Piedmont in the
summer of 1911. On July first, AFL organizer W.A. Neal commissioned AASERE
Division 566 in Charlotte, while later in August, AFL organizer Charles McDaniels and
AASERE Special Organizer Ben Commons established Division 571 in Spartanburg.
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Motorman and Conductor covered both struggles, showing initial concern for their
vulnerable compatriots in the Carolinas.23
Just prior to the formation of Southern Public Utilities, the Charlotte Electric
Railway had 95 employees, 83 of whom comprised Division 566. Their union
correspondent, “COR,” described their rail system as “small in comparison” to larger
cities, but “very thorough” in terms of regional service. With only one exception,
Charlotte‟s streetcar runs were “agreeable.” However, lamenting Charlotte Electric
Railway‟s low pay scale, the writer indicated the company stood “at the bottom of the
list” in comparison with other cities. Nonetheless, “COR” anticipated no serious
obstacles to union recognition, despite some opposition from “lesser lights.” According
to this correspondent, Division 566‟s future rested on their new employers, who were
“men of the highest type and… national reputation.”24
“COR”‟s allusion could only mean James B. Duke and his partners, whose
powerbase of hydro-electric dams, textile mills, and railways throve on low wages and
unregulated commerce. Although no reports confirm this fact, Division 566‟s fate seems
to have been eventual disbandment. Two years after unionization, Charlotte Electric
Railway‟s wages had failed to improve under Southern Public Utilities‟ banner. Even
their most senior employee could only hope to earn 11 cents hourly. After July 1911,
“COR” sent no further communiqués to Motorman and Conductor, although someone
from the newly formed Southern Public Utilities Company leaked the 1913 wage scale to
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the union publication. This revealed that Charlotte workers initially fared no better under
Duke and Taylor than they had under Edward Latta. 1916 efforts by AASERE executive
Allen H. Burt to unionize Charlotte resulted in the immediate surrender of AASERE
Division 695‟s charter.25 Hence, Zebulon Taylor‟s predetermined hostility toward labor
unions was well-established years before the strike of 1919.
Taylor‟s superintendent of street railways, Roswell Lawrence Wommack, also
opposed the unionization of his subordinates. Wommack (1867-1940) came from
Forsyth County – like Taylor -- and began his career with the electrification of the
Yadkin River. After a brief stint in Savannah, Georgia, Wommack transferred to
Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company, arriving shortly after Latta‟s Christmas
purge of 1903. Wommack then went to work for Piedmont Traction in 1911, until that
corporation merged to become Southern Public Utilities. Wommack then became
superintendent of all Southern Public Utilities streetcar operations across the Piedmont,
enjoying the sobriquet of “Charlotte‟s Street Railway King.”26
Wommack‟s assistant superintendent, Tull R. Drum, had more day-to-day contact
with the city‟s streetcar men. Southern Public Utilities Magazine upheld T.R. Drum as a
company success story, “climbing to a responsible position” through diligence and
loyalty. Drum began his career with the Charlotte Street Railway System in 1905, after
25
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serving three years in the U.S. Army. Within eight months of becoming a conductor,
Drum received a promotion to inspector. Drum became assistant superintendent in 1910,
ensuring that streetcar inspectors and platform men followed daily schedules and
operated streetcars safely and courteously. Both Roswell and Drum were prosperous
middle-management employees who owned their own homes, raised their families, and
lived the American dream. But, like Taylor, they both opposed labor unions.27
Corporate literature also reinforced images of “self-made men” like Wommack
and Drum. Southern Public Utilities Magazine (later renamed Duke Power Magazine)
circulated among workers in the region served by the company. Part newsletter, part
propaganda, this magazine influenced workers and perpetuated the company‟s self-image
as a benevolent employer. Its first editor, Leake Carraway, began as a Charlotte booster.
Carraway established SPU‟s publicity department in 1914, lasting through the war years
only to resign in May 1919 for employment with another company.28
Carraway‟s successor, John Paul Lucas, enjoyed professional ties to both local
newspapers, the Charlotte News and Charlotte Observer. In 1905, Lucas served as
assistant city editor for the conservative Observer, while he later edited the Evening
Chronicle, a subsidiary of the Charlotte News. Lucas also dabbled with real estate until
America plunged into Great War. Lucas then used his political influence in Raleigh to
lead the wartime North Carolina Food Administration. Afterward, Lucas took over
Southern Public‟s publicity just prior to the Charlotte strike.29
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Throughout its circulation history, Southern Public Utilities Magazine targeted its
gas, electrical, and streetcar workers with a mixture of professional development and
doggerel poetry, much in the same fashion as Motorman and Conductor. Certain SPU
workers may well have read the AASERE periodical, but they probably did so furtively.
It is highly unlikely that Superintendent Wommack would not have approved such
literature. Southern Public Utilities Magazine unabashedly competed against the union
publication, reaching at least one railway employee in Cincinnati, Ohio. Imploring for a
subscription, Harry Howard complained to Leake Carraway that his company did not
publish its own magazine. Among the professional journals Howard listed as his favorite
reading materials Motorman and Conductor was notably missing.30
Southern Public Utilities streetcar employees were cultivated from the immediate
Carolina Piedmont region. Responsibilities of motormen and conductors require some
description. Motormen typically handled the mechanical aspects of the streetcar, while
keeping an eye on passengers. Conductors managed driving, braking, and fare collection.
SPU streetcar runs sometimes exceeded ten hours, although North Carolina
recommended the eight-hour workday. Literacy rates tended to be very high among
streetcar workers, who needed to read schedules and so forth. Locomotive and streetcar
conductors were listed as one hundred percent literate, for example. Streetcar conductors
in North Carolina required five full years to establish seniority, and were required to be at
least twenty-one. Motormen were somewhat lower on the rung than conductors, but they
sometimes worked their way to conductor positions.31
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Statistical analysis from Charlotte‟s Eighth Ward, also known as Dilworth,
suggests a fairly typical variety of lifestyles for streetcar workers. Out of 36 Southern
Public streetcar men inhabiting this contentious suburb, less than one-third (ten) were
homeowners. Fifteen other streetcar men also rented their homes, rubbing elbows with
mill workers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen. Eleven men either lodged with family or
boarded with other streetcar workers. Such figures are slightly lower than those given by
the 1920 U.S. Census report, indicating 37.7 percent of Southerners owned their homes,
while 62 percent rented.
Two notable streetcar families interacted at every level in the Dilworth suburbs.
Assistant Superintendent T. R. Drum, at age 44, owned a house in one of the better
sections of Dilworth. Adolphus McFarland, working at age 61 as a car inspector, also
owned a home in Eighth Ward. One son, conductor William A. McFarland, rented a
home with his newlywed wife. Another son, Edward McFarland, shared a rented house
with his fellow conductor, R. Olin Drum, presumably a relative of the Assistant
Superintendent.32
What more can we know about the ordinary motormen and conductors who
worked for Southern Public Utilities? Their world is but a shadow of memory,
photographs buried in archives. Most newspaper perceptions of the Carolina Piedmont
streetcar men come from the company perspective. Zebulon V. Taylor could appear
fatherly, not to say paternalistic. In 1919, Taylor often portrayed his “boys” as misled
Census Reports, 1920, Mortgages on Homes, 14-15; U.S. Bureau of the Census Reports,
1920, Mecklenburg County, Charlotte, North Carolina.
32
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children whose prodigality had brought them under “outside influences.” They were
“men” when they followed orders. Taylor‟s attitudes lent his workingmen little credit as
to their intelligence or freedom of action. Loy Cloninger, one of the chief union
spokesmen during the 1919 strike, later admitted that his fellow workers did not like
Taylor overmuch, but were unable to express their sentiments openly. On the other hand,
Taylor rewarded loyalty among streetcar workers who resisted the lure of unionism.33
Jesse B. Ashe (born 1887) began his career working on the Southern Electric
Railway, eventually rising from lowly conductor to Southern Public Utilities streetcar
inspector in the 1920s. Ashe had more positive feelings toward Zebulon Taylor, insisting
he got along personally with his company president, and his co-workers “used to think a
lot of him.” Ashe nevertheless took part in the post-war Charlotte strike, accompanying
Loy Cloninger to Chamber of Commerce negotiations with President Taylor.
Unfortunately, his interview with Allen Tullos only skimmed over the topic of the strike,
focusing instead on the recreational activities and workaday details of his career. 34
While Ashe‟s account is descriptive, one is also left with the impression his employers
did not encourage him to remember the events of August 1919.
Jesse B. Ashe grew up working on a cotton farm in York County, South Carolina.
In 1912, he left for the city of Charlotte in the company of his brother. They both went to
work for Southern Electric Railway before its consolidation under the Southern Public
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Utilities Company. Unlike his brother, who quit after six months, Jesse Ashe decided to
make a career in public transportation. He retired from Duke Power in 1955, having
made the transition from streetcars to motorbuses. As he recalled in 1980, “We weren‟t
making much, about 14 cents an hour… seven days a week, nine hours a day, and no
vacations.” After five years as a motorman, Ashe became a conductor in 1917, but the
pay increase only amounted to 21 cents hourly. This wage figure quoted by Ashe,
amounting $1.89 for a nine-hour shift, is well below the daily average of $4.50 given by
the 1916 North Carolina Department of Labor.35
According to Jesse Ashe, being a streetcar conductor had its unglamorous side.
Manipulating the streetcar‟s nine points of speed proved “tough work,” requiring two
different gloves for handbrakes and other controls. Ashe‟s job forced him to “sit out in
the cold, with the doors always open.” Evidently, the heating for Charlotte streetcars did
not improve greatly after the 1903 strike – which had occurred primarily due to that same
issue. During his bachelor years, Ashe lived in a South Boulevard boarding house,
directly across from the Dilworth car-barn, sharing a room with four other streetcar
employees. Ashe‟s room and board amounted to $3.00 weekly, later increased to $4.00
after the war years. Ashe ruefully admitted his situation did not leave him with much
money to save. Such dearth of income suggests Ashe likely had a strong financial
motivation to join the Charlotte streetcar union in 1919.36
Judy M. Fourier, Ashe's sister-in-law, also revealed that Jesse‟s mother had
dissuaded him from accepting a baseball scholarship during his youth. Whether Ashe‟s
35

Ashe interview; Thirtieth Reports of the Department of Labor and Printing of the
State of North Carolina, 1916 (Raleigh: Edwards & Broughton Printers, 1917), 30.
36
Ashe interview; United States Census Reports, 1920, Mecklenburg County,
Charlotte, North Carolina.
74

mother held religious prejudices toward professional sports is unclear. Perhaps, Ashe felt
immediate employment might help his family‟s cotton farm, which may not have been
faring well. Beyond question, Ashe‟s decision haunted him throughout his life. Early in
his career, conductor Jesse Ashe made quite a reputation for himself as a promising
pinch-hitter for the Southern Power baseball team. In 1980, Ashe recalled that company
vice-president William States Lee played alongside his men, rewarding good hits with a
dollar bonus. Home runs brought three dollars to the skilled athlete‟s paycheck. While
some of Ashe‟s acquaintances went to the major leagues during the Twenties, marriage
and fatherhood forced the conductor to give up baseball entirely.37
Loy Connelly Cloninger (1893-1985) came from Lincoln County, North Carolina,
where his father built houses. Best known as “L.C.” to his compatriots, Cloninger did not
begin working for Southern Public Utilities until 1917. By then, wartime drafts brought
vacancies to the region‟s major employers. Being married with one child, he received
exemption from the draft. In search of stability, L.C. turned down a short-term
construction job, paying daily laborers $9.00 to build a gunpowder plant in City Point,
Virginia. Instead, Loy Cloninger began working for SPU as a night-shift streetcar
mechanic at $1.75 per day. He moved temporarily into a rooming house known as the
Flatiron Building, until he could afford to bring his family.38
L.C. received a personal recommendation from his older brother, J.L. Cloninger -already a popular streetcar conductor nicknamed “Klondike” for his wealth of anecdotes
and jokes. Relatives often helped one another find gainful employment. One brother-inlaw, W.V. Osborne, later came to the Charlotte SPU maintenance section, becoming a
37
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master mechanic. Within two years, Loy Cloninger himself became night foreman, and a
confirmed unionist. During his 1979 interview, Cloninger showed a badge from the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, indicating twenty years of membership. This would
suggest a closer relationship between street railway workers and locomotive trainmen
after the Charlotte Strike. Since its establishment in Charlotte predated the streetcar
union by two decades, the railroad union may have taken up the slack for street railway
workers.39
Cloninger‟s work involved winding electrical armatures in streetcar motors, as
well as trolley controllers. Sometimes, when Charlotte streetcars went off track, L.C.‟s
crew put them back on course. This task actually exposed the workers to extreme
hazards. One crewman named King received a lethal jolt of 550 volts while repairing a
fallen trolley near the Lakewood district. On this occasion, King unwisely used bare
hands to pick up the non-insulated pole feeding power to the streetcar motor. Cloninger
recalled he must have “been stuck hundreds of time on top” of the streetcar, with the live
wire right next to him. Remorsefully, he repeated an old maxim for streetcar workers on
the trolley lines: “Grab a pole and get it all.” 40
Cloninger‟s account is significant, not to say unique, for its references to
interracial unionism, albeit within strict limitations. When the Charlotte organization
drive began in 1919, Cloninger recalled union meetings were open to black transportation
workers, but no evidence exists to confirm that blacks took leadership roles. Loy
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Cloninger also indicated little friction between blacks and whites at the local union
meetings. But given the context of Jim Crow, relationships were sometimes tinged by
condescension and paternalism. When interviewed in 1979, Loy Cloninger shamelessly
referred to “an old nigger,” who chided a fellow streetcar mechanic – a white man from
Georgia -- for refusing to join the local union after complaining about low wages.41
Southern Public Utilities streetcar employees, black and white, frequently
interacted in the shops and car-barns, where returning vehicles were cleaned and repaired
after each nightly run. Unfortunately, when viewed through the lens of white authority,
African-American streetcar workers in the Piedmont largely remain a mystery.
According to Philip S. Foner‟s labor history, black employees in most streetcar
companies were relegated to servile positions, such as porters and sweepers. Southern
Public Utilities seems no different in this sense. No 1920 census data confirms the
employment of black motormen or conductors. However, at least ten African-Americans
held maintenance jobs in Charlotte. Six black men were general laborers in the car barns,
while other individuals fulfilled specific duties, such as track maintenance or car
cleaning. Only a single black streetcar employee, Frank Moss, at age forty-two, held a
significant skilled position as car-barn electrician, inspecting the streetcar wiring systems.
Moss and his family of five rented their home in Third Ward, a predominately black
sector of Charlotte.42
Charlotte also boasted two segregated black streetcar suburbs, Biddleville (1903)
and Washington Heights (1912). Often referred to as “Black Dilworth,” Biddleville had
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its own college, and provided employees for two cotton mills. One might assume that,
under the vagaries of Jim Crow, streetcars going through Biddleville and Washington
Heights might have been operated by African-Americans. However, Southern Public
Utilities were proprietary toward “white” jobs, outweighing any perceived stigma of
running streetcars through a black neighborhood. Moreover, black citizens of Charlotte
rode toward the back of segregated streetcars, partitioned with a screen. AfricanAmerican conductors would certainly have posed a challenge to this system.43
Southern Public‟s Jim Crow policy toward its streetcar lines seems representative
of the era‟s contradictory racial policies. In Making Whiteness, Grace E. Hale
acknowledges a permeable color line aboard Southern streetcars, which she terms as
“disorder” amid Jim Crow‟s “racial order.” Grace Hale echoes Progressive Era writer
Ray Stannard Baker‟s description of streetcars as relatively free “points of human
contact.” However, she also paraphrases Robin Kelley‟s argument that Southern
streetcars continued as “arenas of racial struggle” until motorized buses took their place
in the Civil Rights era.44
Most black Southern Public Utilities employees worked in the most dangerous
occupations, chiefly in gasworks installation. John Ellis, one black construction worker,
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nearly perished from gas inhalation in 1919. Company publications described a white
senior engineer, John V. Brookshire, using medical skills honed in wartime France to
revive Ellis from his near-coma. Later, in 1920, the former ambulance driver rescued
another black gasworks employee, Wylie Johnson. Both men appeared in what today
would be considered a “photo opportunity.” John Brookshire acted selflessly and above
the call of duty in saving these two black workers. Yet, however much the company
magazine emphasized human interest; these articles still possess an undertone of racial
hierarchy. In both cases, black workers were portrayed almost like children who needed
a white father to save them from danger.45
My research has not divulged any proof that Piedmont traction companies ever
engaged black employees as replacement workers. Such tactics were not unknown in the
Deep South; coal operators in Alabama employed black strikebreakers against the United
Mine Workers in 1920, thwarting the UMW‟s interracial union efforts. But Piedmont
newspapers of the era fail to make any mention of such decisions to hire black
strikebreakers, a move that would conceivably strengthen local support for striking
whites, despite anti-union prejudices. 46
Spartanburg, located in the South Carolina Upcountry, proved even more hostile
to unions than Charlotte. That city‟s connection to Southern Public Utilities‟ empire
solidified in March 1913, with Duke‟s investment in Spartanburg‟s utility company,
South Carolina Power, Light, and Railway (SCLP&R). Franklin H. Knox remained the
45
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company‟s titular president, while his corporation enjoyed semi-autonomy. In early
September 1913, Knox discharged several employees involved in the organization of
Division 571. Knox also fired envoys from the local union when they pled for worker
reinstatement. On September 23, Division 571 declared a strike that lasted four days.
Spartanburg‟s city government brokered an “open shop” agreement with Knox, who
promised to reinstate his workers at a pay scale of 14 to 18 cents, based on one to four
years in service. However, a follow-up report in March 1912 indicated that SCLP&R had
rehired “very few” of Division 571‟s members. Despite AASERE organizer Ben
Commons‟ best efforts, Spartanburg‟s first attempt to organize its transit workers met
with failure.47
Spartanburg‟s streetcar workers, like Charlotte‟s complement, tended to inhabit
urban sectors, although a few motormen and conductors lived in outskirt farming
communities. Most Spartanburg streetcar men were still renting homes by 1920, with
some few homeowners, such as the streetcar “overseer” William H. Deming, a veteran
employee at 57 years. Most of the Spartanburg streetcar men from First and Second
Wards were married with several children per household. Adolescent children often
worked at local textile mills.48
Like Southern Public, black laborers working for SCLP&R usually held menial
jobs, although George Evans served as streetcar repairman at the relatively young age of
26. Spartanburg‟s workers tended to live in segregated parts of town, but unlike the
Queen City, Spartanburg tended to be less suspicious toward European immigrants.
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Samuel C. Burris, a conductor in District 110, lived next door to a Russian Jewish
shoemaker, whose eldest children worked in a department store. District 112, home to
several streetcar workers, boasted a well-established Russian community.49
Despite setbacks in Charlotte and Spartanburg, the AASERE met with success in
two major South Carolina towns, Charleston and Columbia. In the Palmetto state capital,
160 platform men from Columbia Railway, Gas & Electric Company successfully
unionized on May 24, 1912. Unlike Charlotte, Columbia‟s streetcar workers were not
employed by Southern Public Utilities. Instead, the Columbia Street Railway also
remained independent of Southern Power. Following a six-day strike, company president
Edward W. Robertson signed a two-year “closed shop” contract on 25 October 1912.50
Division 590‟s president, Ambrose A. Gerald, led his chapter throughout its
existence, commanding strong political clout at the local and state levels. Riding on
South Carolina‟s wave of progressive reform, Gerald and another streetcar union
member, William D. Hampton, were elected to state legislature in 1918. Included within
the umbrella of Columbia‟s Federation of Trades (linked to the nationwide American
Federation of Labor), streetcar conductors and motormen were represented equally as
skilled workmen. Ambrose Gerald even served a term as the Federation President.
Moreover, Division 590 repeatedly expressed its support for conservative leaders such as
Governor Coleman L. Blease. In 1913, the Federation of Trades sponsored the Heat and
Air Brake Bill, requiring South Carolina‟s streetcar services to install electric heaters and
air brakes on all vehicles. With Governor Blease‟s vocal support, this legislation became
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effective on 1 October 1914, ensuring the streetcar union‟s support for Blease in
November. Division 590 even sent Mary White, teenaged daughter of one of its officers,
bearing a bouquet of flowers to the Governor‟s Mansion.51
Columbia‟s streetcar workers were well-organized, but friction still persisted
between Division 590 and its employers, despite their initial victory. After Cole Blease‟s
defeat by Richard Manning in November 1914, Columbia‟s platform men relied less on
state patronage, more on local arbitration efforts. In March of 1915, Division 590
received a settlement for higher wages, owing to a general perception that Columbia‟s
street railway had fallen behind. Later in September, Columbia Light, Railway, and Gas
Company allegedly began circulating “spotters” to keep tabs on their workers. Two men
were sacked, prompting the union to strike for one week. Arbitration successfully ended
the strike and reinstated the lost workers.52
“Spotters” were commonly used to check up on motormen and conductors in
street railway systems, especially those belonging to unions. Wisconsin reported similar
activities in March 1915, describing these spies as “reptiles” with the “inherent elements
of a scoundrel.” Workers from Peoria, Illinois, reported two pretty girls employed as
“spotters” aboard a streetcar in October 1916. They were accused of intentionally
provoking conductors and motormen into flirtation. Columbia‟s instances of company
espionage focused upon whether the crewmen kept accurate headcounts of their
passengers. Crewmen who made errors were unceremoniously sacked, sparking an
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outcry from Division 590. While only Governor Manning could overrule such a
checking system, arbitrators were successful in convincing the company to desist in its
practice. On this rare occasion, Division 590 sent for outside help to enforce the
arbitration process. J.C. Colgan of the AASERE‟s General Executive Board oversaw the
reinstatement of workers discharged in September 1915. Columbia‟s street railway men
were also mollified by a modest pay raise in the spring of 1916.53
Columbia‟s streetcar workers were mainly South Carolina men, with a few from
Georgia or North Carolina. Much like their counterparts in Charlotte and Spartanburg,
the Columbia car men effectively barred their profession from African-Americans,
although Columbia Light, Railway, and Gas Company did employ at least one black
woman, Eva Smith, as a car-barn laborer. Nearly all workers from First Ward of
Columbia either rented or lodged with someone. Charley Morgan, married with four
stepchildren, provided lodgings to three other conductors and motormen in District 80.
Even Ambrose A. Gerald, a member of South Carolina‟s General Assembly and local
union leader, still rented his own house in Fourth Ward, District 88.54
Despite these economic setbacks, Columbia‟s streetcar union had won both
recognition and a closed shop contract. Resolving their differences with company
president Edward Robertson, Division 590 of Columbia remained a vital mainspring of
South Carolina labor throughout the next three years, serving the interests of public and
company alike. Unlike cities such as Chattanooga, Tennessee, or Atlanta, Georgia,
Columbia did not experience notable transportation strikes during the Great War. Until
53
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Columbia Light, Railway, and Gas management changed for the worse after 1920,
Columbia‟s streetcar union remained a working model of wartime union cooperation.
Hence, some elements of organized labor were still able to penetrate the industrial
South before World War I, even in the Carolina Piedmont. While full unionization of the
textile mills still seemed impossible, the existence of Columbia‟s Division 590
represented a new birth of unionism for semi-skilled workers. However, even the
AASERE‟s superior organization had failed to tackle James Duke‟s powerful utility and
industrial empire, now headquartered in Charlotte. After the United States entered World
War I, streetcar labor unions reached their peak in power, even as traction companies fell
under government control or went into receivership. However, Southern Power
prospered in the war years, largely due to its connection with James Duke. Even though
wartime influence enabled the Amalgamated to reach out once more toward the
Piedmont, Duke still remained an implacable – if imperceptible -- foe of unionism.
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Chapter 4: The Great War Comes Home

America‟s official involvement in World War I ignited hopes for organized labor
across the United States. AFL leadership tended toward moderation and cooperation
with business, using strikes only as a last resort. In late 1917, President Wilson approved
the National War Labor Board (NWLB), chaired by ex-President William H. Taft. This
body of arbitrators resolved many strike situations to facilitate wartime production and
transportation. By supporting the war, the American Federation of Labor also hoped the
Wilson Administration would lend its political support for labor organizers operating in
states hostile to unionism. Meanwhile, federal crackdowns on labor radicals such as the
IWW met with few objections from Samuel Gompers and William Mahon of AASERE.
Yet, despite such cooperation from labor leaders, conservative newspapers across the
U.S. portrayed unions as wartime malcontents and potential traitors. Southern
newspapers led the way, often adding charges that unions incited racial tensions.1
During World War I, William Mahon delegated more authority to his chief
lieutenant, William B. Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald, a one-time factory worker in Troy, New
York, switched careers in 1896 to become a streetcar conductor. Fitzgerald‟s successful
organization of Troy‟s streetcar union, Division 132, soon brought him to Mahon‟s
notice. In 1903, Fitzgerald joined the Amalgamated Association‟s executive board.
Rising through union ranks, Fitzgerald had become the First International Vice President
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in 1917. Throughout World War I, Fitzgerald personally oversaw all but the most
difficult strikes and arbitrations.2
As Joseph McCartin denotes, a “chilling conformity” overtook the United States
during World War I, as reactionary impulses silenced dissent among the ranks. The
Espionage Act provided government officials with the tools to silence the IWW, while
organizations like the American Protective League (and its local equivalents) suppressed
other groups, such as the pacifist Non-Partisan League. While union-busting
organizations like the Minneapolis Citizen‟s Alliance existed before the war, such groups
gathered support and membership during the war, convincing many that labor unions
were working hand-in-glove with Bolsheviks.3
Public transportation also underwent changes during World War I. While
Southern traction companies never went so far as hiring female “conductorettes,” as New
York City did in 1918, they shared many common problems with Northern companies.
One ongoing major problem lay with fluctuating wages and car fares. Transportation
workers facing increased work hours during the war often received war bonuses from
their employers. Some of these raises were the results of NWLB arbitration, citing the
cost of living increases in 1918 and early 1919. In other cases, employers used the pay
raise as a defensive tactic to ensure nearby strikes in such cities as Memphis and
Spartanburg did not spread to their own work force. However, the traction companies
also had to raise car-fares to make up for their overhead, which invariably aroused the
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riding public, who often felt they were footing the bill for labor unions. Sometimes, this
public sentiment played into the hands of union-busters and employers, as we will see.4
In 1918, Southern Public Utilities workers were rewarded with two wartime
bonuses in May and September to counter living expenses, raising effective wages to
between 28 and 35 cents per hour. On 10 September, Zebulon Taylor addressed his
platform men, stating his desire to grant even higher wages, but revenues under the fivecent car fare did not permit it. This carefully worded statement, with reminders of loyalty
and duty, served to recruit worker support for higher car fares. If the company
president‟s statement also served as a backdoor plea for the Piedmont region‟s towns to
approve a fare hike, then it succeeded. On the first of October, as the war ground to a
close, Charlotte and Winston-Salem raised fares to seven cents, followed by South
Carolina towns such as Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg. Generally, the Piedmont
citizenry accepted this hike with the usual wartime attitude of sacrifice. The Greenville
News, for example, acknowledged that their SPU branch had been operating at a loss, and
townsfolk preferred a modest increase in car fares in lieu of raising electricity rates. 5
Columbia‟s Division 590 did somewhat better than the unorganized Southern
Public streetcar workers during World War I. During Camp Jackson‟s existence, a fivemile extension connected soldiers to Columbia, adding an estimated 30,000 passengers to
the system. In 1917, Ambrose Gerald lobbied to protect his chapter‟s jobs through a city
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ordinance blocking the use of one-man streetcars. Moreover, the city of Columbia passed
a transportation law requiring streetcar crews to have fifteen days of training under
motormen and conductors, each of these trainers being required to have six months or
more track experience.6
From 1917 to 1919, Columbia Railway and AASERE Division 590 resolved their
differences without resorting to strikes or lockouts. Nearly all Columbia employees,
excluding part-time “extras,” belonged to the union, which exercised restraint during the
war years. In January 1917, Ambrose A. Gerald assumed leadership of the Columbia
Federation of Trades, perhaps explaining his chapter‟s high level of discipline. Only
weeks before America entered the war, the company granted a major wage increase.
Regular employees received from 19 to 24 cents hourly, slightly below Asheville‟s rate.
One year later, 1918 rates improved to 20 cents for new employees, working upward to
27 cents for senior crewmen. Columbia Railway also instituted a wartime bonus system,
awarding 3 more cents hourly on every tenth day of service. By January 1919, overall
rates jumped to 30 cents for new crewmen, with senior streetcar workers earning 40 cents
hourly, plus overtime. Such rates exceeded Southern Public Utilities wage scales by two
to five cents, reflecting Division 590‟s overall power.7
However, the economic problems that affected streetcar services during the Great
War smoldered beneath Columbia‟s atmosphere of compromise. In November 1914,
Columbia Street Railway lost nineteen cars in a barn fire. Although Camp Jackson
6
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brought military passengers during the war years, general ridership began to slacken with
the purchase of automobiles. Raising the car fare to seven cents, plus three cents for
transfers brought the “proverbial wolf knocking at the door,” according to transportation
historian Thomas Fetters. Soon, Columbia Railway was in serious financial straits.
Likewise, Division 590‟s post-war relationship with Columbia Railway, Light, and Gas
Company deteriorated rapidly after 1919. 8
In other Southern locales, street railway labor relations were more contentious.
One salient example of wartime tensions exists in the Chattanooga Streetcar Strike of
1917. This event provides illustrations for the bitter divisions within the ranks of
streetcar workers toward unionism. It also sets the immediate stage for the Piedmont
campaign, as AASERE organizers began to re-orient their strategy in the western sectors
of North and South Carolina. Chattanooga, known as the “Dynamo of Dixie,” prided
itself on its mountain location as well as its recent modernization, factors in common
with the Carolina Piedmont. However, the same class conflict later inherent in the
Piedmont prompted the Chattanooga streetcar workers to strike four times within twenty
years. In Chattanooga, AASERE chapter Division 115 formed as early as August 1899.
Chattanooga‟s union later reorganized into Division 715.9
The AASERE sought to organize in Tennessee for the next two decades.
Knoxville‟s Division 644 was chartered in September 1913, with Memphis‟s Division
713 following in July 1916. However, union recognition in Chattanooga faced
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unexpected resistance in 1899 and 1911, both times due to older streetcar employees‟
mistrust toward “foreign” union organizers. In this case, “foreign” meant labor
organizers from the North. One senior Chattanooga Railway and Light (CR&L)
conductor, E.L. Mallicoat, outright scorned AASERE organizers, stating: “When we get
ready for anyone else to show us how to run our personal business, we will send for
him.” Younger streetcar men, however, continued in their efforts to gain union
recognition, through the maintenance of informal meetings and caucuses. Such a division
between older and newer workers may reflect generational and political differences. 10
During World War I, strikes occurred in 1916 and 1917, testing the resolve of
AASERE Division 715. After Memphis trolley men staged a walkout in the summer of
1916, Chattanooga employees received a 7 percent pay raise to ensure loyalty. But
CR&L‟s July 1916 pay raise, based on seniority, tended to favor the anti-union segment.
This action precipitated unrest among some of the company‟s 215 workers, and by midAugust, over 55 percent of CR&L employees had signed union cards, according to
AASERE organizer Chris Cline. Shortly thereafter, twenty employees were discharged
for joining the union. Cline announced a strike on August 21, which eventually resulted
in temporary recognition of Division 715.11
Broken promises on the part of CR&L management eventually led to a more
serious strike in September 1917. Unrest and dissatisfaction simmered among the union
members over wages, but under Chris Cline‟s distant guidance, Division 715 maintained
the peace throughout the summer. In late August, CR&L introduced new ticket
machines, Rooke Automatic Fare Registers. Previously, conductors had collected fares
10
11
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by hand, marking their daily intake on a wall chart. The AASERE supported this
innovative register for its labor-saving merits, but local conductors resented these devices
as an implication of mistrust from their employers. Rumors also circulated about a
company purge of union members.12
Several workers were fired for noncompliance or insubordination at the behest of
CR&L vice-president Von W. Hoover, a known foe of unionism. Thereafter, Hoover
announced that the CR&L would endorse an “open-shop” doctrine. Hoover subsequently
dismissed officers of Division 715, which touched off a strike on September 7.
Strikebreakers were deployed on the company streetcars while AASERE representatives
met with Hoover. Since CR&L workers were technically still under union contract,
organizer Chris Cline declared the company in violation of its union contract.13
What resulted in Chattanooga remains one of the most violent and acrimonious
strikes in the city‟s history. On the evening of September 7, union members and
strikebreakers clashed in the streets, while union supporters vandalized twenty streetcars.
No deaths resulted, but several injuries were reported on both sides. Two U.S. cavalry
troops were called into Chattanooga to restore order. Chris Cline soon regained control
over Division 715, counseling the union men to await arbitration. But many local
businessmen, represented by the Chattanooga Manufacturers Association (CMA),
suspected outside agitation from the IWW. First National Bank president C.A. Lyerly
even accused the strikers of collaborating with Imperial Germany. U.S. Attorney Wesley
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T. Kennerly of Knoxville, Tennessee, looked into this allegation, but military
investigators from nearby Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, found no such connections.14
Federal arbitration efforts in Chattanooga began almost immediately after the
September 7 riots. However, violent incidents still occurred on the streetcar lines.
During one confrontation, a bystander suffered minor shotgun wounds after a CR&L
replacement fired at a band of union supporters attacking his streetcar. On September 23,
Division 715 renewed its strike, staging a joint march with other unions, numbering about
2,000 workers. At Von W. Hoover‟s order, two CR&L streetcars blocked the parade‟s
path, triggering an outbreak of violence that left one brewery worker slain by a federal
officer, S.O. Welch, acting as a strikebreaker. Welch later faced indictment for murder.
Four companies of U.S. infantry restored order without further injury to the civilians,
although one soldier was wounded in the process. Fort Oglethorpe received orders to
dispatch machine-gun units to Chattanooga on the following day.15
Fallout from the strike hit the region‟s newspapers immediately. Opinions were
polarized, with a very strong showing for the workers. While conservative editors railed
against the specter of class warfare, Chris Cline turned the tables by accusing company
vice president Von W. Hoover of acting like a German sympathizer. As a counterblast,
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CR&L‟s chief attorney, George Lancaster, implored U.S. Attorney Kennerly to arrest
Cline on a technicality that their client‟s streetcars sometimes conveyed U.S. mail
shipments. This ploy had proven effective for both company and government officials
during the 1893 Pullman Strike in Chicago. But Kennerly reasoned that CR&L streetcars
were private property, and no one could prove these vehicles were carrying mail during
the vandalism of September. In any case, Kennerly asked both sides to restrain their
hostilities until the Department of Labor had completed its negotiations.16
George Lancaster subsequently took the streetcar company‟s charges of IWW
terrorism to Attorney General Thomas Gregory‟s office in Washington, where they were
considered without much fanfare. Both Chattanooga Railway and the Chattanooga
Manufacturer‟s Association pleaded for the Attorney General to enforce the “open shop.”
However, none of these mill and factory owners could prove connections with radical
groups. Considering Gregory‟s role in establishing the Espionage and Sedition Acts of
1917, his office‟s lack of alacrity tends to disprove the CMA‟s charges. Gregory also
used similar “anticipatory action” toward the 1917 Minneapolis streetcar strike.
Throughout this time, one hundred and sixty-six members of the Industrial Workers of
the World stood trial for sedition in Chicago, including their leader, William “Big Bill”
Haywood. But nothing came of Chattanooga Railway and Light‟s efforts to link their
striking workers to greater national, not to say global, events.17
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Chattanooga streetcar workers agreed to return to work on October 7, under
CR&L‟s “open shop” contract. Unfortunately, some streetcar workers resented the
company‟s retention of ten African-American linemen who were suspected of being
scabs. During this racially-charged era, whites often considered replacement by black
workers as a personal insult. Despite Chris Cline‟s moderation, sufficient members of
Division 715 were motivated to strike without warning on October 16. Following a court
injunction, the strikers lost public sympathy, especially after one CR&L streetcar
exploded mysteriously on December 2. Even though most CR&L workers had returned
to the open shop by January 1918, their union – and way of life --collapsed quickly
afterward. Chattanooga Railway and Light fell into receivership by 1922, as the rise of
automobiles and motor-buses ended the city‟s history of streetcar transportation.18
*

*

*

Incidents such as the one in Chattanooga were a foretaste of what would come
after the Armistice of 1918. Owing to public outrage over fare hikes, plus gradual
increases in private car ownership, many transit enterprises went into receivership after
the Great War. Fourteen percent of the nation‟s streetcar companies had fallen to
receivers within one year of the war‟s end. While Southern Public Utilities avoided such
a fate, exaggerated fears of nationalization proved useful to the company‟s anti-labor
arguments in 1919 and beyond. Meanwhile, other regional traction corporations failed
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across the Carolina Piedmont region. Southern Public Utilities Magazine and its chief
rival, Motorman and Conductor, both weighed in regarding the causes of this economic
threat to their combined interests in streetcar transportation. However, as one might
expect, the streetcar company and the union drew widely divergent conclusions.19
One popular cost-cutting measure employed by streetcar companies, the one-man
streetcar proved more threatening to platform workers and streetcar operators than
automatic cashiers. Motormen were gradually phased out in favor of conductors, who
were thereafter expected to do both jobs. As one might imagine, the decreased work
force and increase in responsibility did not please AASERE leaders, reflected by a
campaign to discredit the one-man car‟s design and implementation. While Southern
Public Utilities Magazine printed favorable editorials toward its use of one-man cars,
Motorman and Conductor aired many complaints, especially during the immediate postwar period of 1919-21.
One editorial decried a massive advertising campaign in 1920 to replace all twoman streetcars with single-conductor models. The unsigned writer blamed poor behavior
and indifference on the part of some conductors, but criticized the lack of two-man cars
because single conductors tended to make more mistakes without a counterpart to watch
out for them. 20 Prophetically, Motorman and Conductor warned that one-man streetcars
would encourage the traction companies to eliminate jobs and raise car fares. Another
article warned that single-conductor streetcars were more prone to accidents, owing to the
conductor being so busy making change and collecting fares. Without a motorman to

19
20

Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 6 (January 1920), 1-4.
Motorman and Conductor, January 1922, 12.
95

assist in braking, Motorman and Conductor asserted that streetcar accidents had
increased nationwide from 1919-21. 21
By January 1921, unions were strong enough in Detroit and Philadelphia to block
use of single-conductor streetcars in their respective suburbs. Some cities, such as
Minneapolis, only employed these models in downtown areas. However, many Southern
cities, such as Mobile, Alabama found these new streetcars quite profitable. In the
Carolina Piedmont, Southern Public Utilities introduced their first single-operator
vehicles as far back as 1916. According to Loy Cloninger, his older brother, J.L.
Cloninger, took charge of the first one-man car in Charlotte. Wartime labor shortages
accelerated the need for faster, more efficient streetcars, especially after the establishment
of Camp Greene, where SPU had built a terminal extension to serve hundreds of young
officers and thousands of enlisted men visiting Charlotte during the weekends. 22
By December 1918, the South Carolina town of Anderson had totally replaced
their older two-man cars with newer models. Mayor Foster Fant believed that “no good
end [could] be attained by a return to the old type of cars,” while a local attorney, H.H.
Watkins discounted complaints from larger cities, where loading and unloading
passengers often required a motorman as well as a conductor. After the 1919 strike,
Charlotte and Winston-Salem introduced “one-man safety cars,” designed for safer stops
and loading procedures. These went into effect in January 1920, with Dilworth
predictably receiving the first improvements. Eight cars covered the First and Fourth
Ward lines through Dilworth, with only five-minute layovers. Among the drivers
selected for this new route were G.L. Cloninger and Jesse Ashe. Twelve other cars were
21
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divided evenly between the Winston-Salem and Greenville lines. Proponents believed
these one-man safety cars would save the electric streetcar industry. 23
Instead, this measure merely staved off the inevitable decline, as new modes of
transportation eclipsed the trolley. The proliferation of automobiles, taxis, and
motorbuses, plus the advent of quasi-legal jitney services, all led to a decline in street
railways. Moreover, as the automobile became a symbol of middle-class prosperity and
perceived independence, streetcar suburbs and trolleys no longer had the same
respectability they once enjoyed before the war.24
*

*

*

Throughout the immediate post-war year of 1919, the AASERE continued its
nationwide campaign for national influence. Winning hearts and minds proved more
difficult in the post-war Carolinas. Despite federal support and acknowledgement, the
Amalgamated‟s recognition in traditionally hostile regions like the Carolinas still hinged
upon boardroom decisions and public opinion.25 Isolated victories aside, the Carolina
Piedmont remained unchallenged by AASERE organizers. Without an apparatus to link
Asheville to Columbia, these gains would remain islands in a hostile sea. For a truly
successful campaign, the union required more cities to organize their streetcar lines,
creating a stronger regional network of disciplined municipal labor unions, capable of
controlling emotional impulses, such as “wildcat” strikes and vandalism.
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However, establishing such labor unions required compromises with utility
corporations and traction companies that seldom were forthcoming. Throughout the
country, many businessmen resisted organized labor, despite their contributions toward
the war effort. Union memberships flourished during wartime, but new employer
associations also proliferated. Chattanooga‟s Manufacturers Association had many
counterparts across America, so-called “unions against unions.” William Millikan used
this term to describe professional strikebreakers in Northern industrial sectors such as
Detroit and Minneapolis. However, Southern textile mills could also rely on professional
strikebreakers who used intimidation, vandalism, and deadly force.26
As wartime cooperation with the government waned, corporations saw a grand
chance to break the unions. As the nation‟s brief spurt of wartime productivity wound
down, consumer prices skyrocketed. Congress prematurely ended price controls, further
compounding the situation. Following the dissolution of the National War Labor Board
in August 1919, corporations no longer felt obligated to negotiate over union recognition
or wage increases. Under the so-called “American Plan,” major corporations breathed
new life into the old “open-shop” gospel, blaming unions for the economic downturn. As
a lame duck, Wilson‟s wartime policies had already alienated conservative voters,
evidenced by the Democratic Party‟s losses in Congress in November 1918. By late
1919, distracted by his physically exhausting battle for the League of Nations, Wilson
seemingly placed less emphasis on the conditions of labor in America.27
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To be fair toward President Wilson, he did not totally ignore the plight of
American workers as he strove for peace in Versailles. Labor Secretary William B.
Wilson remained in contact with his chief executive, concerned about the “strained
conditions” and anti-union hostility in the public transportation sphere. On May 15,
President Wilson approved the creation of a Washington conference on the state of U.S.
electric railways, moderated by John H. Pardee, presiding officer of the American
Electric Railway Association. Given the receiverships and mounting strikes after the
war, both the traction companies and unions feared their way of life would soon end.
Delegates from investment banks, state commissioners, and the mayors‟ league shared
the same table as union members, but notably missing were representatives from major
street railway and utility companies. Perhaps the corporations sensed that not everything
said in Washington that summer would be to their liking. However, Southern Public
Utilities Magazine dutifully reported the proceedings, as did Motorman and Conductor.
Both were very selective in their quotations from the proceedings and reports, adding
choice editorial comments in regard to the speakers and their conclusions.28
This railway conference began on July 15, and lasted until August 11. Former
President William Howard Taft spoke first. As Joint Chairman of the National War
Labor Board in 1918, Taft described his official position as a neutral conciliator who
settled industrial disputes without strikes or lockouts. Taft acknowledged the wartime
authority of Congress to raise streetcar fares, usually regulated by state and local
officials. While Taft felt the public had to make sacrifices in order to ensure labor‟s

28

Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 27, No. 6, (June 1919), 6-8; Charlotte Observer, 10
August 1919, 3; Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 3 (15 August 1919), 914.
99

cooperation, he felt raising the car fares actually hurt consumers more than utility
increases. Rates above seven cents would hurt consumers as well as businesses
themselves. Since most traction companies were outgrowths of municipal utility
corporations, Taft argued these businesses should find more equitable means of making
up for their losses. On the subject of pay, he felt peacetime rates should be decided by
the companies, but wages should not be decreased.29
Harlow Clark, editor of the American Electric Railway Association magazine,
Aera, believed merely increasing fares would not restore lost credit. Operation costs
were becoming more expensive by the month. Southern Public Utilities Magazine listed
48 companies in receivership during 1919 alone, with 53 U.S. cities already charging ten
cents. While SPU blamed federal control during 1917-18 for beginning this decline in
revenue, their own mathematical figures indicate these problems began as early as 1915,
when investment bonds tripled. In 1914, only 10 traction companies reported losses. But
over the next year, 27 streetcar lines fell into receivership – two years before the U.S.
entered the war. Moreover, 1909 through 1913 had also been poor years, with 1910
reporting over $75 million in debts against $12 million in profits.30
Other distinguished speakers weighed in concerning the solvency of streetcar
services. Secretary of War Newton Baker, prior to his political appointment, had served
under – then succeeded – Tom L. Johnson as Cleveland mayor during that city‟s
disastrous 1908 street railway strike that led to Johnson‟s removal. Baker helped
establish one of the first successful “service-at-cost” street railway systems – the Taylor
29
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Franchise. In practice, a company would put its entire property up for collateral in
exchange for investments. Banks would risk 6 percent of the total property‟s worth in
order to bolster the traction service. Fares were regulated depending on actual cost of
operations, plus the 6 percent capital. This operational method appealed even to
moderate conservatives like Taft, who believed “service-at-cost” could counter pleas for
public ownership – viewed by many as one step removed from socialism.31
However not everyone in the ranks of labor shared the same enthusiasm for the
Taylor Franchise. Motorman and Conductor, for example, believed that keeping fares at
the lowest possible rate would also act as an incentive to keep employee wages at a
similar level. Public ownership and profit-sharing enterprises appealed more broadly to
AASERE members. One of the more cogent – and controversial – public ownership
proposals became known as the Plumb Plan, named for its chief proponent, Glenn T.
Plumb. Author of Industrial Democracy, Plumb represented labor organizations during
the war, becoming a popular speaker at labor rallies. Plumb argued for the continuance
of government management of railways, which popular historian Eliot Asinof later
alleged “turned chaos into order.” One New York City franchise expert, Delos F.
Wilcox, told the Washington committee that continued municipal control, if not
ownership, would be the only solution for saving street railways. By contrast, AFL
leaders, including Samuel Gompers, feared this step would invite charges of Bolshevism.
Gompers opposed endorsement of Plumb‟s proposal during the AASERE‟s June 1919
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convention. However, William Mahon changed his opinion toward public ownership and
halfheartedly endorsed the Plumb Plan, perhaps as a gesture toward union solidarity.32
In August 1919, the Motorman and Conductor began featuring a subscription to
the Plumb Plan League, proposing “railroads shall be managed by human beings for
human beings,” instead of solely for profit. Despite opposition to the plan, Samuel
Gompers even consented to become its honorary president. Acting as a lobby for
government ownership, the Plumb Plan League convinced lawmakers to incorporate the
railway plan into the Sims Bill in late 1919. However, Plumb‟s proposal met with defeat
during Congressional hearings in early 1920. 33
The Lower Carolina Piedmont appears to have split over the question of public
ownership for street railways. In one Columbia, South Carolina, newspaper, Frederick J.
Haskin cited the period‟s high bankruptcy rates in public service companies as a
“casualty of war.” While Haskin did not begrudge the streetcar union‟s drive for higher
wages, he lamented the companies being forced to raise their fares, prompting
unpopularity among those citizens unable to afford cars. Haskin‟s solution to South
Carolina‟s street railway crisis resembled the Plumb Plan in most particulars, except it
relied upon state, rather than federal oversight. Charles Henry, editor of the Columbia
Labor Advocate, deemed the Plumb Plan too radical for his tastes. However, he urged
Railroad and Streetcar brotherhoods to propose a “more understandable and realistic”
government plan. More indicative of the Upcountry‟s mood, newspaper editor Calvin
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Hemphill of Spartanburg avowed total opposition to the Plumb Plan or “service-at-cost”
franchises. Marrying labor radicalism to proposed federal control, one unsigned
Greenville editorialist warned his readers to “get ready for a strike to force government
ownership,” because railroad labor organizations were prepared to use “other means”
than persuasion.34
Most corporations, including Southern Power, printed refutations of government
ownership in their company publications. Southern Public Utilities Magazine featured
editorials from such notable anti-labor apostles as Boston governor Calvin Coolidge and
Seattle mayor Ole Hanson. These impassive figures, like James B. Duke and his
corporate lieutenants, were opposed to public ownership, as well as “service-at-cost”
plans. After all, Duke‟s ventures had done pretty well during the war. Thus, Southern
Public Utilities aligned itself against organized labor and post-war reforms. However,
during the war years, SPU offered incremental pay raises to offset the increasing costs of
living. Between October 1, 1916 and August 1, 1919, the company boasted an aggregate
wage increase of more than 100 percent. Moreover, Taylor promised future pay
increases for 1920, subject to revenue improvements.35
Initially, Southern Public Utilities streetcar workers did not openly question
Taylor‟s economic arguments. Some of Taylor‟s men were perhaps swayed by a
November 1918 appeal to “revival” among its workers. However, this same company
editorial autocratically stressed servility and deference, traits which seemed out of place
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in a nation so recently devoted to battle for democracy. 36 As post-war economic
troubles mounted across the Carolina Piedmont, Southern Public Utilities streetcarmen
and electricians commenced a quiet rebellion, which eventually led to open war with their
employers by the summer of 1919.
*

*

*

What conditions helped convince the streetcar workers of the PiedmontUpcountry to unionize? After the November Armistice, returning servicemen almost
invariably found their prior jobs had been filled by men who did not serve overseas.
Immediately, the AASERE launched campaigns to win veterans over to unionism,
stressing trade unionism‟s altruistic motives toward war veterans. The Motorman and
Conductor decried the “returned soldier problem” as a means for post-war “open-shop”
exploitation. Indeed, many non-union manufacturing plants had closed down in late
1918, rather than permit the return of unionized workers. When these factories reopened
for a peacetime economy in 1919, they began hiring unemployed veterans at reduced
wages, stressing “patriotic preference.”37
Union rhetoric, however, only played a modest part in convincing Carolina
Piedmont workers to organize. As a field ambulance driver who served in four Western
Front campaigns, Jesse B. Ashe later admitted Southern Public‟s low wages had been a
primary factor in his decision to join the streetcar union. To Zebulon Taylor‟s own
credit, Southern Public re-employed some returning veterans, including Ashe. Even so,
disappointment continued to foment unhappiness among many streetcar workers. Ashe,
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at thirty-two years, still lived in a boarding house on short commons, with little hope of
marriage, and even less hope for home ownership.38
After the war, an aura of quasi-militarism also seems to have penetrated Southern
Public Utilities. Zebulon Taylor utilized wartime rhetoric against unionism, appealing to
wartime duty and obligation on one hand, while simultaneously condemning union
organizers as traitors. Uniformed streetcar workers competed in safety drill teams led by
captains, first lieutenants, and second lieutenants. These teams were rewarded for their
drills with cash rewards totaling over $1,000; although the captains and lieutenants
received most of the cash. Fifty-five streetcar employees boasted honorable service
records, but perhaps not everyone enjoyed replicating Army life in the civilian sphere,
especially now that their wartime duties were concluded.39
Union sickness benefits and widow relief programs may also have appealed to
Southern Public workers in a decade punctuated by the Great Influenza. October 1918
brought the epidemic to Charlotte. Conductor A.T. Hamlet died of pneumonia after
suffering from the virus. Over twenty other conductors and motormen reported illnesses,
some affecting entire families. One SPU machinist, R.L. Crosby, tragically lost two of
his three children to the rampant illness. Another employee lost a newborn son due to
complications. Quarantines left most SPU workers short about two weeks of pay. Even
as late as February 1920, several motormen still reported attacks of influenza.40
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By late spring of 1919, the South faced an unemployment crisis, with South
Carolina suffering particularly hard times. Columbia and Spartanburg‟s streetcar
employees were both adjudged poor in morale and efficiency by regional newspapers.
Charleston reported about 400 unemployed industrial workers; in Columbia, more than
1,000 mill-hands and mechanics were out of work. Federal offices were so overwhelmed
that they closed briefly during the summer. Spartanburg‟s Journal and Carolina Spartan
further speculated that many unemployed workers were returning “Negro” veterans, who
met with redoubled Jim Crow prejudices on their return from the Great War. Job
competition fueled racial tensions. During one eighteen-month period, from January
1918 to June 1919, the Tuskegee Institute Records and Research Department reported
seventy blacks lynched across the South.41
How did national trends, characterized by the “Red Summer” of race riots in
Chicago, affect the Carolina Piedmont? Southern conservatives blamed racial conflicts
on Bolshevik subversion. South Carolina progressives, like Richard Manning and James
F. Byrnes, were not immune to such fears. Senator Lee S. Overman of North Carolina
also saw putative connections between Bolshevism and race riots. Meanwhile, Ku Klux
Klan activity increased in the Upper South. In June 1919 alone, South Carolina
witnessed one lynching, while North Carolina reported two documented cases.42
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Yet race played a surprisingly peripheral role in the Piedmont streetcar strikes,
primarily because none of the employers brought in African-American replacements.
White streetcar workers in the South zealously protected their jobs against so-called black
“scabs,” as evidenced by the conduct of Chattanooga workers in 1917. In New Orleans,
African-Americans were able to qualify for conductor jobs, but this trend does not seem
to have spread across the South. White shopmen and electricians openly supported the
Southern Public Utilities strike of 1919, but no evidence suggests participation from
black shopmen. Moreover, black mill workers did not show open sympathy for either
Spartanburg or Columbia‟s streetcar strikes. If this had been the case, both corporations
and newspapers would have described these situations in racial, rather than Red Scare,
terminology. Moreover, returning black veterans had more problems than unemployment
facing them. Blacks were outraged by conservative implications that they were witless
tools of the Bolsheviks. One African Methodist Episcopal bishop, Charles H. Philips,
stated in the Carolina Spartan that race riots, while detrimental to “peace and harmony,”
were independent from the Bolshevist revolution. One regional newspaper, the Star of
Zion, claimed in “The Negro and Bolshevism” that “the Negro will be kept immune”
from labor agitators once the issues of “lynching and burning” were resolved.43
Inevitably, white workers fared better than blacks, even during the post-war
economic tailspin. North Carolina streetcar employees were listed on paper as improving
economically due to wartime wages, averaging 48 percent increases by 1919. North
Carolina required all railway work shifts to match the Federal standard of eight hours.
Union pay scales were encouraged for all employees, including textile mill hands.
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However, such gains were seriously offset by cost of living increases, which averaged
about 104 percent in North Carolina alone. Nationwide, food expenses had risen 84
percent since 1914, while clothing increased 114 percent. By 1920, Charlotte became the
most expensive city in the Piedmont. Annual food costs for a Charlotte working-class
family amounted to $772.20, with average yearly rents at $45.07.44
Ultimately, American involvement in World War I did not last nearly long
enough to seriously challenge longstanding social order in the “Solid South.” While the
Great War certainly expanded the growth of Charlotte and other Piedmont towns,
peacetime meant business as usual. Historian David Carlton concludes that the future
belonged to Piedmont industrial towns, with their vision of a “well-organized, rationallyrun” society. Fellow historian Allen Tullos echoes this perception, citing Duke Power‟s
promotional literature distributed across North Carolina. Duke‟s answer to abject rural
poverty in the Piedmont lay with the recruitment and urbanization of “racially pure” old
pioneer stock, a Southern “yeomanry” unhampered by “un-American ideas.”45
Such language appealed to many Piedmont entrepreneurs, and it also resonated
among white Protestant workers. While most laborers certainly desired better wages and
prospects, many were swayed by arguments of company loyalty and local protectionism.
Powerful, influential men capitalized on these workers‟ doubts by promoting their
mistrust of federal interference and Northern labor agitation. From Spartanburg to
Charlotte, these prejudices hardened during World War I, posing a challenge to the
region‟s fledgling union chapters in 1919.
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Chapter 5: Grant Us a Contract

In June 1919, the AASERE General Executive Board sent Albert Essex Jones to
organize Spartanburg‟s street railway employees. Despite a decade of union leadership
experience in Ohio, Albert Jones lacked regional knowledge of the South and knew even
less about the people he sought to assist. Jones, widely perceived as an outsider to the
Carolina Piedmont, now faced the challenge of winning Spartanburg‟s conservative
leaders over to the side of organized labor. His arrival in Spartanburg augured a summer
of labor controversy, beginning with Spartanburg‟s streetcar strike of July 1919.
Over the Fourth of July weekend, labor organizers from two chapters of the
American Federation of Labor led a strike against South Carolina Light, Power, and
Railways, a subsidiary of Southern Power‟s utility empire. This strike opened a wider
regional dialogue on organized labor, encompassing textile, transportation, and electrical
workers. A closer examination of the events in Spartanburg suggests the eventual
rejection of labor unions in the Carolina Piedmont was never a foregone conclusion.
Spartanburg‟s two newspapers, the conservative Journal & Carolina Spartan and its
progressive rival, the Spartanburg Herald, provide a gauge of sentiments, from outright
scorn to cautious tolerance. Equally important, the Spartanburg strike triggered a bitter
contest for the unionization of the region‟s most powerful corporate structure. Although
James B. Duke remained elusive, his invisible hand still guided the larger events of
Piedmont industry. Meanwhile, Duke‟s partner, Zebulon V. Taylor, watched the
unfolding events at South Carolina Light, Power, and Railways with deep concern.
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Streetcar strikes were the last thing on Duke‟s mind that summer, as he quietly
attended the third annual Southern Textile Exposition, held in Greenville. None other
than his close ally, Benette E. Geer presided over this week-long event, just before the
Spartanburg strike demanded his talents. In all, 40,000 attendees came to the recently
unveiled Textile Exposition Hall. Southern Power funded much of the $225,000 to build
this structure, which included a huge auditorium and two levels for exhibitions.46
Benette Eugene Geer‟s participation in the Spartanburg strike is significant,
principally because of his close relationship with James B. Duke and Southern Power.
Little has been written about Geer, apart from L.M. Glenn‟s hagiographical treatment.
As mentioned in the second chapter, Geer shared common business interests with Duke.
But Geer also operated independently, evidenced by his leadership in the Cotton Textile
Institute. This lobbyist organization sought to protect textile mill owners from regulatory
efforts in Washington – just the sort of collective bargaining rights many Piedmont
employers sought to deny their workers.47
Despite his alignment with the forces of capital, Geer also enjoyed a reputation
for diplomacy and moderation that made his participation integral to a strike settlement.
Geer would doubtless benefit from a prompt resolution of the transit deadlock because he
owned Pacific Mills in Spartanburg, whose employees often relied on the SCLP&R
streetcars. As sitting president of the Spartanburg Commercial Association, Geer‟s
influence could make or break the union‟s chances in the “City of Success.”48
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Between 1910 and 1920, Spartanburg grew steadily from 17,517 to 22,638
inhabitants. Four major railroads converged at this Upcountry city, including Duke‟s
Piedmont & Northern electric railway. One factor in this railway hub‟s growth was
Camp Wadsworth, but its impact was fleeting. Like many of the Southern military bases
established during the Great War, Camp Wadsworth dried up following the Armistice.
Nevertheless, its presence doubtless accelerated the Piedmont‟s urbanization.49
Spartanburg County‟s thirty or so textile mills had felt economic jolts throughout
the war. Spartanburg, alongside Greenville and Anderson, launched South Carolina‟s
textile industry during the 1880s. Converse Mill, one of the largest in the nation, began
its eighty-year lifespan in 1892. Wartime contracts brought prosperity to mill owners, if
not their workers. Spartanburg later benefited from the decline of Northern textile mills.
Overproduction and labor disputes forced many mill owners to transfer assets to the
Piedmont, renowned for its anti-union sentiment. For decades afterward, Spartanburg
became known as the “Lowell of the South.” Ten unincorporated mill towns orbited the
county seat, connected by a series of roads, and significantly, trolley lines.50
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These trolley lines were owned and controlled by South Carolina Light, Power,
and Railways (SCLP&R). Originally the Spartanburg Railway, Gas, and Electric
Company, this mid-sized corporation had managed for years to remain independent of
Duke‟s Southern Power, operating twenty-one track miles leading from Spartanburg to
the mill towns of Clifton, Glendale, and Saxon. This independent status changed after
June 12, 1912, when SCLP&R became a subsidiary of Southern Power in all but name.51
Franklin H. Knox (1864-1936), described by editor J. Calvin Hemphill as a “brass
tacks booster,” served as both general manager and senior vice-president for SCLP&R.
Originally from Pennsylvania, Knox remained a bachelor at age 55, living with his elder
brother, William, who acted as company purchasing agent. Franklin Knox also backed
Spartanburg community projects, such as a memorial park for fallen South Carolina
soldiers. Usually well-liked by Spartanburg citizens, Knox could, nonetheless, be
paternalistic toward his men, as well as contradictory in his public dealings with
Spartanburg and the streetcar union.52
Doubtless, Knox expected many Spartanburg businessmen would share his
opposition to labor unions. Foremost among these local leaders, J. Calvin Hemphill
served as managing editor of the Journal and Carolina Spartan. Hemphill and his wife
Rebecca lived in a rented townhouse located in the city‟s Second Ward. At 68, Hemphill
represented “old” Spartanburg‟s views toward states‟ rights and organized labor.
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Hemphill had only recently crowed over labor leader Eugene V. Debs‟s imprisonment in
Atlanta for protesting the war. Hemphill also praised hardliner mayors who forbade
unions from congregating within city limits, comparing Spartanburg‟s John F. Floyd to
the infamous Seattle demagogue, Ole Hanson.53
According to one Palmetto historian, South Carolina‟s city mayors at this time
were endowed with the same powers as a police court magistrate. This authority
governed the passage of town ordinances and declarations of emergency, placing Mayor
John Floyd in a strong position of authority to block labor unions from meeting in
Spartanburg – despite the fact such laws violated the Constitutional right to peaceful
assembly. Floyd certainly had the wherewithal and clout to use such magisterial powers.
During the Great War, Floyd also served as president of Spartanburg‟s Chamber of
Commerce, negotiating valuable contracts for Camp Wadsworth. Floyd also had a
reputation for strictness and forthrightness. However, given Mayor Floyd‟s reputation as
a foe of organized labor, some of his gestures during the forthcoming strike reveal a more
complex figure than Hemphill‟s description might lead one to expect.54
But not all in Spartanburg shared such prevalent anti-union views. Calvin
Hemphill‟s rival, Charles Oscar Hearon of the Spartanburg Herald, took a somewhat
different tone. Hearon, at age forty-one, represented the “new” South Carolina.
Originally from Virginia, Hearon earned Spartanburg‟s respect for his tireless service,
alongside Mayor John B. Floyd, as a major wartime booster for both Spartanburg and
Camp Wadsworth. The Hearons owned a house on Marion Street, where the editor and
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his wife Belle raised four school-age children. His newspaper once advocated the
“mutual advantage” of its long-standing relationship with Spartanburg‟s Typographical
Union. Hearon‟s support for skilled laborers is well-documented, although his feelings
toward the region‟s unskilled mill workers seem less clear.55
However, Charles O. Hearon consistently demonstrated Progressive values
throughout the Spartanburg strike. The Spartanburg Herald stood for the public interest,
which its editor held separately from business or labor concerns. Hearon also
championed consumerism, efficiency, and public safety. While hailing Franklin Knox as
a “considerate gentleman,” Hearon criticized Spartanburg street railways as “one of the
most unsatisfactory services in [this] city.” Serving on the city council, Hearon had
previously voted against the company‟s request for higher streetcar fares. Hearon‟s paper
further cited the SCLP&R‟s lack of progressive spirit, of good equipment, and of trained,
well-paid men. Moreover, Knox‟s company had failed to yield annual profits except
during the previous year, owing to traffic from Camp Wadsworth. Hearon further
suggested a municipal study of the company‟s streetcar problems, in order to suggest
reforms that would mutually benefit the company, its workers, and the public.56
By June 1919, the SCLP&R‟s traction services in Spartanburg had become
notorious for poor working conditions. D.L. Goble of the electricians‟ union spoke at the
Temple of Justice on behalf of streetcar workers as well as electrical employees.57
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Goble, originally from Dallas, Texas, played a leading role throughout the campaign to
mobilize trade unions in the Carolinas. On 16 June, he decried the treatment of the
SCLP&R‟s forty car-men, who were “treated worse than prisoners in any state.” Goble
attributed low worker morale to “speedups:” grueling twelve-hour shifts, for which a carman received no more than $24 weekly. Nor was Goble alone in such condemnations.
State Senator W.S. Rogers and local solicitor Ibra Blackwood gave their support to these
statements. This convergence of organized labor and local opinion suggests that not
every South Carolinian characterized unionization as the chief tool of Bolshevism.58
With thousands of visitors coming to the Piedmont, rebellious streetcar workers
could prove an embarrassment to the region‟s power-brokers. In this tense atmosphere,
the Amalgamated Association decided to launch its campaign to unionize the Piedmont
and Upcountry transit workers. Several chapters had already been organized throughout
the region, as noted in previous chapters. But streetcar workers in the South were
especially hard hit by the ongoing economic slump, owing to low pay scales and hard
hours. While the national Street Railway Commission in Washington still deliberated
over possible reforms, hundreds of streetcar men across the Carolinas took
encouragement from union leaders on the front lines.
One of these front-liners, Albert Essex Jones (1874-1962) figures prominently
throughout Spartanburg and Charlotte‟s respective strikes. Jones had been a lifelong
citizen of Cincinnati, Ohio, where he served as president of Division 627, which
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consisted of 400 conductors and 128 motormen. Twice married, Jones had lost his first
wife, Irene, in childbirth. Remarried by 1917, Albert Jones‟s familial status and
approaching middle age precluded him from military service. However, Jones‟s
dedicated wartime union service earned him a promotion to Ohio‟s special organizer,
responsible for preventing violent confrontations across the state.59
From available records, it appears that Jones was a sincere crusader for
workingmen‟s rights, with a gift for oratory matched by a fierce combative streak. One
whimsical picture from 1914 reveals a broad-shouldered, clean-shaven man in early
middle age, posing next to a large doll meant as a contest prize for Cincinnati Street
Railway‟s employee picnic. Yet underneath such humor and generosity, Jones also had a
quarrelsome side. In September 1917, a local rival questioned Jones‟s integrity as
Division 627 president. A quarrel ensued between the two union members, requiring the
intercession of a special committee of peers, which promptly exonerated both litigants.
Such a penchant for controversy could not have improved Albert Jones‟s standing in
Cincinnati. By early 1918, Jones had left his union chapter to become a full-time
organizer, coordinating a new union chapter in Columbus, Ohio. Shortly afterward, the
AASERE sent Jones to aid new organizations in the Appalachian and Piedmont regions.60
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In late June, Albert Jones conferred with C.E. Diltz, spokesman for the aggrieved
SCLP&R workers. Resultantly, Division 897 of the AASERE formally drafted its charter
on June 25, 1919, with H.E. Sitton serving as first president of the Spartanburg chapter.61
Nevertheless, Franklin Knox considered this union‟s charter as an act of disloyalty.
During the third week of June, the company director fired one worker, R.L. Kitchins, on
charges of union activity. But if Knox had hoped to make an example to discourage
unionization, he instead created yet another grievance among his workers. During the
first round of negotiations on July 1, 1919, Kitchins‟s co-workers requested that Knox
reinstate the discharged man at his prior level of seniority.62
Spartanburg‟s transit workers officially declared a strike at midnight on July 2,
after their first negotiation with Knox failed to yield concessions. Chapter 897 sought a
new wage scale of thirty-seven cents to forty-one cents hourly, depending upon seniority.
Workers had also requested a nine-hour shift to replace grueling “speedups” lasting
eleven and a half hours. These terms were quite modest compared to suggested federal
standards. President John Pardee of the American Electric Railway Association argued
in Washington for overall pay hikes of one hundred percent in order to encourage striking
workers to return to their cars. 63
The sticking point, however, lay with Knox‟s staunch refusal to officially grant
his workers the right of collective bargaining. On this point, Knox characteristically
masked his iron resolve behind cautious, sometimes ambiguous statements. On the
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strike‟s first day, Knox told Journal and Carolina Spartan reporters he would not
recognize “forced demands” from labor unions. However, Knox offered to eliminate
“split runs” in favor of two nine-hour shifts per day. Union members described this
concession as one of Knox‟s longstanding promises that he had never honored. On July
3, Knox replaced his striking motormen with new recruits and transferred personnel from
the sheds. Maintenance crewmen were not covered by AASERE, so they were under no
expectations to strike. But there were too few remaining skilled men to staff the streetcars
in operation for the Fourth of July. Knox‟s streetcar foreman and freight manager had
already joined the union. Eight more workers defected to Division 897 over the
weekend. While Knox took a brief vacation, only three trolley-men were available for
work. Since Knox could not run streetcars anyway, he pointedly gave these “loyal”
workers the day off.64
Division 897 did not take this snub lightly. A.E. Jones stated publicly that the
Amalgamated did not intend to attack business outright. Instead, his organization sought
to compromise with the company on behalf of workers. He stated that his union‟s goal
was a “fair living wage” for each one of its members. South Carolina‟s Central Labor
Union, a federation of local trade unions, endorsed Division 897. According to the
Journal and Carolina Spartan, many Spartanburg citizens either walked or got a lift
during the Independence Day celebration.65
One form of blue-collar protest against the streetcar company developed out of
necessity. The Spartanburg Herald noted the use of “jitneys” to convey workers to their
jobs. Such impromptu car-pools might remind present-day observers of municipal “ride64
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share” programs. Strike sympathizers across the United States often rode “jitney”
transports to boycott streetcar lines raising their fares or employing “scab” replacements.
In several cases across the United States, transit corporations and private citizens actually
filed injunctions against such activities, citing a spike in traffic accidents. 66
Unfortunately for Spartanburg County, the SCLP&R‟s inter-urban lines only
connected to three communities: the unincorporated mill towns of Clifton and Glendale,
as well as the incorporated town of Saxon. Eight other mill towns in the county at large
were not serviced by the SCLP&R, so their interest in the strike would have been
minimal at best. Thus, the actual impact of jitney travel on the Spartanburg strike of
1919 is difficult to ascertain. Nonetheless, textile mill workers comprised the vanguard
of strike sympathizers during the AASERE campaign of 1919-22.67
The two main – and rival – city newspapers reacted promptly to the forced
cessation of streetcar service. J.C. Hemphill of the conservative Journal and Carolina
Spartan preferred compromise to confrontation, and suggested that shift changes would
improve both public safety and employee morale. However, the editor doubted whether
the SCLP&R could afford any government-mandated wage hike – Hemphill neglected to
mention that federal standards were far higher than the modest rates expected by the
Spartanburg car-men. Hemphill vehemently remained opposed to all reforms smacking
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of government oversight or state ownership, such as the aforementioned Plumb Plan. 68
Hemphill‟s subscribers did not unanimously agree with his sentiments. On July 6, his
newspaper printed a caustic letter from R.E. Tillotson, an employee of the Southern
Railways Company. Tillotson voiced frustration toward loyal SCLP&R workers who
remained on the job. He also addressed the company‟s refusal to recognize the local
streetcar union, characterizing “Mister Knocks” as the opponent of labor. Although
Hemphill did not deign to comment, the Journal and Carolina Spartan held fast
throughout the strike.69
Charles O. Hearon‟s Spartanburg Herald took a more tolerant approach toward
labor. As previously mentioned, Hearon‟s newspaper operated in conjunction with
Spartanburg‟s local typographical union. Correspondents interviewed streetcar workers
who revealed that Knox had fired several employees who had asked for back pay. These
men did not identify themselves, most likely over the real possibility of blacklisting.
Hearon also criticized Mayor John Floyd for his perceived indifference to the strike. But
Floyd, whose anti-labor reputation we have already noted, deliberately chose to take
neither side in the dispute. Spartanburg‟s mayor also noted that if SCLP&R failed to run
their streetcars within nine months, the company would violate its franchise with
Spartanburg and go out of business. Floyd also praised the orderly conduct of both
strikers and company men. City policemen reported only one incident over the holiday
weekend, wherein a strikebreaker swore at two local citizens for calling him a scab. The
city government fined this replacement worker $5.85.70
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In this manner, the Spartanburg Streetcar strike affected the city for an entire
week, with virtually no streetcar service throughout the city. Calvin Hemphill opined
that the strike had become “more of an annoyance than a real problem.” But the editor
also warned union members that the public grew tired of the dispute. Charles Hearon‟s
column, entitled “Can‟t We End This Strike?” urged the members of Division 897 to give
their company president‟s proposals another chance. Hearon felt that the streetcar union,
reliant upon “out of town” leadership, held the weaker position. Therefore, the editor
further exhorted the strikers to face reality by placing the public interest first in priority.71
On the evening of July 10, Mayor John Floyd made a public-minded gesture of
his own, by openly visiting Division 897 president H.E. Sitton, convalescing at home
with appendicitis. Despite his anti-labor reputation, Floyd seems to have understood the
need for mediation. Sitton and Floyd promptly scheduled a second conference for the
next day, bringing company and union representatives to the bargaining table.72
On July 12, Floyd and Knox met with AASERE organizer Jones and local union
president H.E. Sitton. Knox refused to acknowledge Jones as a spokesman, but offered
Sitton a new wage schedule that the company established for replacement workers over
the previous week. Knox conditionally agreed to implement nine-hour workdays, as
personnel would permit, but would not budge on collective bargaining. Knox also
pointedly refused to reinstate the discharged worker, R.L. Kitchins. This meeting

4.
4.

71

Journal and Carolina Spartan, 11 July 1919, 4; Spartanburg Herald, 11 July 1919,

72

Journal and Carolina Spartan, 11 July 1919, 4; Spartanburg Herald, 11 July 1919,
121

concluded without any progress, as lines began to harden between Knox and his
disgruntled employees.73
Following this round of negotiations, Jones openly praised the mayor for “using
his good offices” on behalf of the public trust. The organizer asserted that Floyd had
caught the company president in a prevarication during the hearings. Knox had given
one set of terms to Mayor Floyd during the preceding week, but his actual terms on July
12 were substantially different. The SCLP&R‟s new wage scale did not equal the first
offer Knox made prior to the strike. Moreover, in this new contract proposal, overtime
wages and “time-and-a-half” guarantees were dropped altogether. 74
These discrepancies fostered an atmosphere of mistrust throughout the summer.
Jones further commented on Knox‟s past record, stating that his promises “looked very
rosy, but never materialized.” His fellow workers could not “sell their lives and very
existence without the scratch of a pen to protect them.” Jones reminded Knox that his
“personal feelings” alone could not support families, and implored him to “grant us a
contract … and we will start your cars before the ink is dry.” If Knox persisted in his
hostile course, Jones warned, “then [your] men will never operate them again.”75
Despite Jones‟s forthright vow, Knox continued to reject the mayor‟s requests for
compromise with his striking workers. Nor would the company recognize national labor
organizations such as the AASERE. Charles Hearon made a very perceptive summation
73
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in his editorial on July 12. “In this present controversy,” the Herald editor observed,
“unionism will rise and fall by the fate of the demand that the union be recognized.”
Hearon also asserted that organized labor hitherto had failed to make headway in
Southern states because “individualism… pride of family… and freedom of action”
prevailed in their culture. But while “the average Southerner can take care of himself
without organizations,” the Spartanburg Herald also speculated whether “increased
industry [in the South] may well require better acceptance of organized labor.”76
Spartanburg‟s now week-long transit strike subsequently drew the attention of
Governor Robert Archer Cooper (1919-22). Cooper had recently succeeded Richard I.
Manning, but unlike his predecessor, the Laurens County native had not yet faced a
serious labor dispute in South Carolina. The incoming governor, while expressing
empathy for “the man who toils,” failed to delineate his policy toward organized labor or
collective bargaining. Governor Cooper roundly condemned “Bolshevism, anarchy, and
commercial greed.” His remedy for these post-war evils lay with the “spirit of sacrifice
and disinterested purpose” which he believed had guided the nation during wartime.77
More significantly, while Cooper called for “improved transportation facilities,”
he did not imply public transportation, but private autos. Highway constructions derived
from state taxpayers became a hallmark of Governor Cooper‟s two terms. As later
chapters will elucidate, Cooper‟s road initiatives directly affected South Carolina‟s public
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opinion toward traction corporations as well as transit workers. But, in July 1919,
Governor Cooper had a full-blown labor-capital crisis on his hands.78
As a progressive, Governor Cooper favored conciliation between the company
and union, which he promised to oversee personally in Spartanburg if the situation failed
to improve. Several citizens‟ groups with connections to Cooper had already registered
their concerns with the governor‟s office. Given the potential disruptions in textile mill
production and public commerce, such opinions were not to be idly ignored. Moreover,
since South Carolina‟s establishment of a conciliation board in 1916, the state legislature
had also granted wide subpoena powers to its governor-appointed arbitrators. Cooper‟s
statements came as a surprise to the major principals of Spartanburg‟s transit strike, who
quickly resumed their conference on July 13. During the negotiation, Knox proceeded to
restore partial streetcar services by using his replacement workforce.79
This fateful decision carried some consequence, as striking workers could lose
their jobs to these alleged “scabs.” Knox‟s replacements appear to have been a mixture
of loyal company men and new hires. The SCLP&R could not likely employ
professional strikebreakers, trained more for intimidation than for industry. Nonetheless,
the company expected opposition from strike sympathizers, if not the strikers themselves.
On July 13, Superintendent B.A. Buckheister, Knox‟s second-in-command, armed his
streetcar crews with concealed handguns from an undisclosed private arsenal.80
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Subsequently, three SCLP&R streetcars returned to the lines. Initially, no troubles
arose from local strike sympathizers or union men. But ill will gathered against union
membership, as reported in the Greenville Daily News. One unnamed correspondent
attacked Jones as a “rank outsider,” who was bent on “making trouble between employer
and employe[e].” This critic of the Amalgamated Association also referred to the
organizer‟s opening speech in Spartanburg, insisting that because Jones “gave [SCLP&R]
the business,” he should be “run out of town as a nuisance.” Significantly, this writer did
express his support for a local streetcar union, but argued that it should answer to the
community, not outsiders. This unsigned editorialist likely meant either a company
union, or perhaps a local employee representation plan, divorced from Northern, ergo
“foreign” ties.81
As a so-called “foreigner,” Albert Jones did take considerable risks entering a city
like Spartanburg, with its reputation for hostility toward union agitators. Just three years
before, Ben Commons, one of the AASERE‟s regional vice-presidents, suffered bodily
injury in Memphis, Tennessee. Streetcar workers in Memphis had just endured a lockout
over union recognition. Company strikebreakers assaulted the visiting union officer
shortly after his arrival on June 27, 1916, openly striking him in a restaurant. In the
presence of Memphis policemen and a court justice, the Memphis company
superintendent then warned Commons his assailants “would get him if he did not leave
town.” Subsequently, one of Ben Commons‟ escorts suffered serious injury from a
blackjack-wielding ruffian, who was arrested and promptly released on bail.82
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However, negotiations among Knox, Jones, and Floyd remained peaceful.
Despite any inconveniences, Spartanburg‟s citizens could claim their town was working
far better to resolve its labor strikes than Macon, Georgia. Both newspapers covered
Macon‟s streetcar strike, wherein 180 employees struck for wages, briefly paralyzing the
entire Georgia city. Neither editor wanted the same conditions to emerge in Spartanburg.
Charles Hearon praised his own city government‟s “square-dealing” efforts to find a
balance between company revenue and worker wages.83
By July 14, the situation improved enough for the company to add a fourth car to
service, even though Knox‟s new motormen were inexperienced. Countywide rumors of
greased tracks and derailed cars proved false, and no acts of violence were as yet reported
anywhere in Spartanburg. Perusal of Spartanburg County‟s criminal records indicates a
spike in malicious damage arrests in June and July of 1919, but case details remain terse.
Police officers seemed more concerned with prohibition violations and morals charges.
While eight cases of criminal assault and battery were reported in July, none of these
were connected with the streetcar lines outside Spartanburg. Therefore, one can surmise
that the ensuing violence of July 15 did not spread to the nearby textile mill towns.84
On July 15, just before 6 pm, the first blows were exchanged aboard SCLP&R‟s
Streetcar 32. One hothead, Grady LeMaster, forcibly attempted to remove a replacement
conductor from his post. Both men were arrested for causing the affray, whereupon
strikebreaker C.E. Edwards revealed that he was carrying a concealed handgun issued by
Superintendent Buckheister. Edwards and LeMaster paid their bonds, $66.50 and $15.75
83
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respectively and went before Mayor Floyd to hear his verdicts. Under Spartanburg‟s city
statutes, mayors exercised the same powers as a magistrate within city limits. Floyd‟s
decision to uphold the company‟s right to issue firearms came as no surprise to those who
knew his views. LeMaster‟s actions vindicated everything opponents of labor associated
with unionism. While Floyd did not hold the streetcar union accountable for LeMaster‟s
actions, he ruled that C.E. Edwards had the “same right as a constable” in the line of his
duty. Although concealed weapon charges held a higher penalty than brawling, the mayor
nonetheless fined the strike sympathizer, Grady LeMaster, $100.
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Worse violence occurred that same evening at Pine and Main Streets when
another streetcar returned to its barn. Local demonstrators halted the car and demanded
to know if the operator or his two bodyguards were union supporters. One of the
strikebreakers, J.L. Brown, brandished a firearm, and fisticuffs ensued between the two
opposing groups. C.C. Crouch, the motorman on duty, was a fifteen-year employee who
had refused to strike on July 2. He suffered serious injuries and required hospital
treatment. Interviewed later in his hospital room, Crouch could only vaguely identify his
attackers as “union men.” Whether these unionists were Crouch‟s former co-workers
remains unknown. But Hemphill‟s editorial on 16 July implored the streetcar union to
find and “turn out” Crouch‟s assailants.86
Three Spartanburg policemen promptly arrested J.L. Brown for carrying a
concealed handgun. In the meantime, Superintendent B.A. Buckheister arrived on scene,
brandishing his own firearm. Officer Jack Alverson arrested Buckheister as well. Mayor
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Floyd acquitted the company official subsequently on precedents set by his July 15 ruling
for C.E. Edwards. Since SCLP&R employees were entitled to carry arms “as a
constable,” Buckheister‟s case was clear, at least in Mayor Floyd‟s eyes. Despite claims
from witnesses who saw Buckheister draw the handgun from his coat, the superintendent
firmly insisted that he had carried his gun openly, as he had expected trouble at the carbarn. Buckheister also threatened to charge his accusers with inciting the previous
evening‟s riot.87
Vandalism escalated during the evening of July 15. Police cars drove to South
Church Street to remove one automobile blocking the trolley line. Edward Wooten was
arrested for placing bricks upon the tracks and later fined. Hundreds of townsfolk
congregated following the incidents, but apart from the exchange of angry words, no
further violence ensued. The mayor subsequently stationed a police officer on each
operational streetcar. Incidentally, one plainclothesman, Moss Hayes, registered strong
objections to the use of police to guard company property, resigning after 15 years with
the Spartanburg police. Evidently, some policemen at least sympathized with the local
union. But Hearon‟s newspaper later castigated the disobedient Hayes for “setting a
dangerous precedent.”88
Undoubtedly, these problems convinced Governor Cooper to become personally
involved in the local Spartanburg strike. He appointed a mediation committee and
mobilized fifty South Carolina reserve troops from Company F of the “Spartan Rifles.”
Another military reserve company from Greenville remained on stand-by in case of
87
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emergency. Despite rumors of steam-plant sabotage, there were no more incidents.
However, streetcar services were suspended until a compromise could be reached.89
How did these small tremors of violence affect public opinion toward the
AASERE? Hearon pleaded for “sanity and resourcefulness” from all sides in the
controversy. Furthermore, he warned that the union would lose “public sympathy” if
recent incidents were to multiply during negotiations. Perhaps, Hearon reasoned, the
newly formed Spartanburg Commercial Association could “take the helm” of arbitration
and thus avoid reliance on Governor Cooper‟s intervention.90 This suggestion appears
consistent with local sentiments emphasizing independence and self-reliance in the face
of any outside interference. Moreover, Spartanburg did not want to experience a military
intervention, such as those witnessed in the recent textile strikes at Greenville and
Anderson. While Governor Cooper had mobilized a token force, he preferred diplomacy
as well.91
On the evening of July 17, Governor Cooper convened a board consisting of five
labor representatives, five company spokesmen, and twelve South Carolina arbitrators.
Governor Cooper remained in Spartanburg as an observer. Jones and Sitton directed the
labor contingent, while Knox voiced company concerns. Benette E. Geer, president of
Spartanburg‟s Commercial Association, led the final negotiations. For several hours,
Geer‟s committee reviewed two contract proposals, one from each side.92

89

Journal and Carolina Spartan, 16 July 1919, 1, 8; 17 July 1919, 8; Spartanburg
Herald, 17 July 1919, 4, 8; Greenville Daily News, 17 July 1919, 1.
90
Spartanburg Herald, 16 July 1919, 4.
91
David Carlton, Mill and Town in South Carolina 1880-1920 (Baton Rouge and
London: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 258-59.
92
Journal and Carolina Spartan, 17 July 1919, 1; 17 July 1919, 8; Spartanburg
Herald, 17 July 1919, 4, 8; Glenn, 31-33.
129

Geer walked a delicate line as chief arbitrator. As a major Upcountry booster,
with manufacturing interests, he seems an unlikely champion of unionism. Moreover,
Geer had clashed with Governor Cooper‟s predecessor, Richard I. Manning, over state
mill reforms. On the other hand, Geer likely wished to resolve the city‟s streetcar crisis
quickly before unionism spread to other segments of the Piedmont‟s working class.93
Under pressure from the Spartanburg Commercial Association, Knox agreed to
reinstate all striking employees, provided these men swore under oath they had no
involvement in the July 15 disorder. This new contract also retroactively covered R.L.
Kitchens, the union activist who had been discharged prior to the strike. Knox also
promised a review process for employees and a wage schedule matching the union‟s
earlier demands. Senior employees would earn 42 cents hourly after five years of
service. Furthermore, Knox promised to organize two nine-hour shifts by August 15, and
offered vacation days amounting to seventy-two hours each quarter.94
However, Knox‟s agreement did not reflect a capitulation on the subject of union
recognition. Knox permitted his men to form local unions as long as they promised to
remain loyal. But Division 897 still lacked official standing. Recognizing Knox‟s
ambiguous terms as the best possible settlement, Jones agreed, as did the local chapter
president, H.E. Sitton. Public reaction to this settlement proved reassuring, as
Spartanburg citizens began riding the trolleys once again. 95 Despite relatively minor
incidents of hostility, Spartanburg had resolved its transit strike largely on its own terms.
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While the AASERE did not gain outright legitimacy, its successful efforts on
behalf of car-men were viewed as a potential threat to local authority. Spartanburg‟s two
major newspaper editors did not conceal their dislike of “outside interference” from
either the state government or the AFL. Despite the governor‟s decisive and careful use
of state power, neither newspaper credited Cooper with hastening the resolution of July
17, nor did they even mention him by name. Hearon did congratulate the Spartanburg
Commercial Association and praised both Knox and Sitton. Moreover, neither
newspaper gave favorable coverage to AASERE‟s organizer, Albert E. Jones. Hemphill
did make a sarcastically oblique reference to “imported talent” and suggested that local
unions could resolve their problems without such “outside sympathizers.” Yet,
Hemphill‟s Carolina Spartan conceded Knox‟s initial hesitance to compromise had
brought public “ill will” against the SCLP&R. Greenville‟s newspaper issued a call for
“compulsory arbitration” in all future strikes. But after two weeks of the “hottest and
sloppiest weather [in] the season,” Spartanburg could move forward.96
By July 19, Division 897‟s streetcar men were back on the job. Newspapers
reported some friction on the first day, as old employees were not always returned to their
usual positions. Knox promised to uphold the contract he had signed but also explained
that changes would require patience and time.97 Shortly thereafter, local papers turned
toward rising utility prices and race riots, two reigning news issues of post-war America.
Emboldened by his unexpected success in Spartanburg, Albert Essex Jones
traveled to Charlotte, where Knox‟s concessions had already sent shockwaves to
Southern Public Utilities. Streetcar workers comprised only one segment of James B.
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Duke‟s Piedmont workforce, which included electricians and mechanics. Yet, SPU‟s
traction services also extended to Winston-Salem in North Carolina, as well as Greenville
and Anderson in South Carolina. SPU president Zebulon Taylor took pre-emptive steps
to forestall union encroachment into Duke‟s empire. On August 1, he gave substantial
pay raises to all his streetcar employees, which served to divide their ranks in the coming
strike. Jones had decisively won the first skirmish in South Carolina; now, battle lines
formed in Charlotte, where Jones entered a much larger forum than Spartanburg.98
Spartanburg hosted the annual South Carolina labor conference on September 15.
Given the state labor federation‟s relatively successful negotiations that July, its
Secretary-Treasurer, John L. Davis, invited no less than Samuel L. Gompers himself.
Governor Robert Cooper also planned to attend this significant labor meeting, in
recognition of his largely unsung efforts to resolve Spartanburg‟s transit crisis.99
John L. Davis presided over South Carolina‟s Federation of Labor meeting, hailed
by the Columbia Labor Advocate as “the most successful ever.” Governor Robert
Cooper gave an address touching on the Spartanburg strike and the importance of
arbitration. South Carolina‟s labor contingent boldly endorsed the Plumb Plan as a
solution to railroad receivership. Union leaders more cautiously addressed “Negro
unions,” favoring a Jim Crow approach, wherein blacks should be represented by their
own State Federation and local chapters. The few black unionists present at the meeting
quickly stressed to their white counterparts that they “sought emulation only in an
industrial sense.” This statement is especially relevant in light of concurrent events.
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Only that previous August, the Southern Labor Congress convened in Asheville, North
Carolina, where SLC President Jerome Jones from Atlanta made a surprise endorsement
of black laborers as equals to whites in terms of union representation.100
More importantly, the Spartanburg streetcar strike occurred at the high watermark
of labor activity in the Tri-City region. Both Anderson and Greenville played roles in the
Charlotte regional strike, despite eventual defeat for the movement. Moreover,
Spartanburg itself had changed since the war began. Unions had indeed established a
solid foothold. By early 1920, Spartanburg‟s Central Labor Union had grown to include
almost 20 chapters, jointly operating a co-op grocery store on South Liberty Street with
$10,000 capital. Union and non-union customers were treated equally in terms of prices,
with business supervised by a nine-man board elected by the Central Labor Union.101
In retrospect, the Spartanburg streetcar strike seems relatively modest in its local
impact. But it serves as a prelude to further strife across the Carolina Piedmont.
Moreover, it encapsulates the major issues found in many Southern streetcar strikes
throughout the time period. The company‟s refusal to negotiate with the international
union triggers a strike for better wages and treatment. Inevitably, the city (or state)
government is drawn into the debate, as local opinions clash over the presence of
“outside” agitators. Violent incidents flare up over the use of scabs or strikebreakers.
Finally, some concessions are made to the workers, but the company is not legally bound
to recognize the Amalgamated Association, or even to permanently keep its agreements.
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Regrettably, this proved the case with Spartanburg, whose fledgling union would suffer
reversals in 1920, in light of the next chapter focusing on Charlotte‟s strike.
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Chapter Six: Battle of the Barn

Charlotte‟s rapid transition to a regional metropolis, initialized by the New
South‟s textile revolution, accelerated when federal negotiators agreed to establish Camp
Greene just outside Charlotte in July 1917. None other than Zebulon V. Taylor led the
city‟s lobby effort, favorably impressing General Leonard Wood with the Piedmont‟s
untapped potential. Southern Power held an outdoor banquet where General Wood
intemperately criticized the Wilson Administration for its perceived lack of preparedness.
Politics aside, Taylor‟s interests were well served by Camp Greene‟s construction, as
Charlotte‟s street railway system expanded, permitting thousands of officers and enlisted
men to socialize. Camp Greene officially disbanded in July of 1919.1
At this crucial time, Southern Power and Southern Public Utilities also strove to
contain the labor movement in the Piedmont. To forestall a repetition of Spartanburg,
Zebulon Taylor increased company wages by ten percent for motormen and conductors,
beginning August 1, 1919. Prior to this announcement, SPU streetcar workers brought
home 28 to 35 cents hourly, depending upon seniority. Taylor‟s platform men now
earned 37 to 42 cents per hour, with annual raises of a single penny. Ostensibly, Taylor
anticipated economic improvement through one-man safety cars, which would eliminate
the number of workers on the lines. But Taylor‟s ten-percent wage increase also matched
union rates won by Albert E. Jones in Spartanburg earlier that July.2
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Despite Taylor‟s efforts, labor unrest soon began chipping away at Southern
Power‟s powerful foundations. On August 4, 600 Columbia shop-men struck en masse
for higher wages, leaving Southern Railways, Southern & Atlantic Coastline, and
Seaboard Air Line without skilled mechanics. The latter two railroads were still under
federal management, so President Wilson expressed his outrage toward unauthorized
“wildcat” strikes. Both union and government leaders expressed their fears that this
independent strike might soon spread. No doubt, Zebulon Taylor likewise watched these
new developments, given their scope and proximity to Southern Public Utilities‟ sphere.3
Taylor‟s concerns were soon confirmed on August 6, when forty Piedmont &
Northern platform men struck in sympathy with the Columbia shopmen and a related
Southern Railways strike at Spencer, North Carolina. Since the electric Piedmont &
Northern belonged to Southern Power, this directly affected the Duke conglomeration.4
Despite Taylor‟s August wage increase, AASERE organizers sought to press their
point in Charlotte, nerve center for the most powerful streetcar employer in the Carolina
Piedmont. By this point, Southern Public Utilities had also acquired streetcar assets for
Salisbury-Spencer, North Carolina. Albert E. Jones did not sit idly after his initial
success in Spartanburg. Even while that Upcountry town resolved its streetcar conflict,
Charles W. O‟Daniel of the AFL had already organized AASERE Division 901, while
A.E. Jones organized Division 904 in Greenville-Anderson. These two chapters were
chartered in July 1919, along with Division 893 in Winston-Salem.5
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Therefore, the Charlotte strike could not have come as a great surprise to “Buck”
Duke and his lieutenants. But the question remains: how much personal involvement
was there from Duke himself? While no correspondence remains between Duke and
Taylor, one may safely assume the Southern Public Utilities president had his partner‟s
complete confidence in handling potential streetcar strikes. Yet, John W. Bridwell, the
federal conciliator sent to Charlotte in August, still predicted “Southern Power… may
become involved, although not now shown on the surface.” Bridwell also identified “the
close affiliation of the Utilities [Company] and the Southern Power [Company]” as the
central issue during the Charlotte Strike. Emphasizing Southern Power‟s ownership of
225 cotton mills and 2,000 miles of primary electrical lines, Bridwell urged his
Washington superior, H.L. Kerwin to “just think of the magnitude of this company!” 6
By 1919, magnitude had indeed become a chief hallmark of the Southern Public
Utilities Company. Long the nerve center for Duke‟s urban transportation, Charlotte‟s
streetcar system now boasted fifty operating cars on almost 30 track miles, with about 7.8
million passengers. Bought by Duke in 1913, Winston-Salem‟s streetcars numbered 49
cars on about 10 busy track miles, with 4.1 million riders by 1920. Gastonia‟s numerous
mills received their public transportation service from the Duke-owned Piedmont &
Northern inter-urban electric railroad, connecting it to Greenville, Spartanburg &
Anderson Railway – also the possession of Southern Power. Moreover, Piedmont &
Northern had built a three-mile extension to Belmont Mills in March 1916.7
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Charlotte‟s regional strike officially began on Sunday, August 10, 1919. The day
before, Taylor met with his workers at the Mecklenburg Chamber of Commerce to
discuss terms for a union contract. Albert Jones excused himself from these proceedings,
hoping his absence would improve the meeting‟s tone. Representatives from all three
local divisions agreed to a nine-hour workday, guaranteed overtime, and salaries from 41
to 45 cents per hour. SPU streetcar workers currently received no overtime for their 12hour shifts. Company officials indicated their income could not support union-dictated
wage figures. Moreover, Taylor refused to negotiate with these three AASERE
representatives, labeling their parent organization as a “foreign influence.” Taylor
conceded that he might negotiate with members from a local union, calculating that their
bargaining strength would be weaker.8
Taylor reiterated his official position through the auspices of local newspapers,
but saved his choicest words for Southern Public Utilities Magazine, where his words
could be printed in full. Once again, the utility company would “deal or enter into a
contract with unions of its own men,” but refused to deal with outsiders. Taylor singled
out the Amalgamated Association for its reputed “disorder, rioting, and bloodshed,”
citing the isolated violence in Spartanburg‟s recent strike, as well as a major walk-out in
Brooklyn, New York.” Entering into contract with the AASERE, Taylor argued, would
“plant the seeds for trouble… for our Company and for the public which we serve.” He
specifically charged that the union‟s mandated wages might eventually force his
company to raise fares, thereby reducing Charlotte‟s considerable number of riders. 9
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Initially, the company president took a paternal tone. Taylor professed respect for
North Carolina Governor Bickett‟s “Square Deal” approach toward labor and capital.
Taylor also stressed a lack of “ill feeling” toward his striking workers, expressing
“personal regret” if he were forced to secure replacement workers to fill vacant positions.
However, Taylor reminded his workers that they had “a very distinct duty and
responsibility to the public.” To demonstrate his own public spirit, Taylor assured
Charlotte‟s citizens, wary of rioting and bloodshed: “We shall not import strikebreakers.”
Instead, Taylor proposed keeping his streetcars in barns until he could interview “good
men of our own section and community,” who would be paid at the company‟s best
possible wage scale. Meanwhile, Taylor still hoped for a peaceful settlement with his
striking employees, whom he often referred to as “our boys.”10
Following their rebuff, Taylor‟s “boys” convened at the Woodmen‟s Hall in
Charlotte. At 11 p.m., on Saturday, August 9, Divisions 893, 901, and 904 elected to
strike effective Sunday, August 10. Charlotte‟s Central Labor Union, with sixteen craft
organizations and three thousand members, lent their support to the streetcar divisions.
Jones felt commencing the strike on a Sunday would cause “a minimum of annoyance.”
Perhaps, Jones also anticipated potential support from the religious community, as most
streetcar workers attended church. Presbyterians largely dominated Charlotte‟s society,
but other Protestants were no less active, especially in the wards of downtown Charlotte.
One prominent Methodist, attorney Marvin Lee Ritch, supported textile workers.11

10

Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 3 (15 August 1919), 1-3; Greenville
Daily News, 11 August 1919, 1, 4, 7-8; 26 August 1919, 18.
11
Greenville Daily News, 12 August 1919, 2; Charlotte Observer, 10 August 1919, 3;
Ann Ritch Brantley, interview by author, transcript, 19 September 2008.
139

Meeting with city reporters, Albert Jones asserted that SPU motormen and
conductors were 100 percent organized, totaling over 200 union members. Charlotte
counted 120 members, while Winston-Salem had 65. Greenville-Anderson, South
Carolina counted the remaining 30. However, during the arbitration process, Federal
conciliator John Bridwell later counted the total number of Southern Public Utility men
as follows: Charlotte (131), Winston-Salem (73), and Greenville-Anderson, (59). While
approximately ninety percent of Charlotte and Winston-Salem streetcar workers were
unionized, the same could not be said of Greenville-Anderson. Bridwell‟s precise figures
suggest a degree of numerical overstatement on Jones‟s part.12
Albert E. Jones‟s leadership throughout the Charlotte strike deserves scrutiny.
While he demonstrated courage and sincerity toward the region‟s workers, Jones also
downplayed their precarious position in his reports to William D. Mahon. His
confrontational personality clearly did not suit the region‟s conservative political climate.
Moreover, Jones overestimated the strength of AASERE‟s support base in the Carolina
Piedmont. For one matter, the streetcar union‟s three divisions lacked a labor network.
While Columbia, South Carolina, and Asheville, North Carolina, had streetcar unions,
these cities were too distant to afford much support to Charlotte. Southern Power
electricians, organized that same year by D.L. Goble, were reliable allies, but they were
fewer in number than the streetcar workers.13
When the Charlotte division staged its walkout on August 10, union president
W.H. McFarlane united streetcar worker demands with those of forty Piedmont &
12
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Northern platform men already on strike. However, these railway men swiftly returned to
work on August 11, after Southern Railways settled with its striking workers. Piedmont
& Northern workers remained on the job throughout the Charlotte regional streetcar
strike, although at least one Southern Railways engineer took part in the events to come.14
Jones‟s hopes for worker solidarity suffered a further blow when Anderson SPU
workers parted ways with their Greenville counterparts, showing up for work on Sunday,
August 10. Citing their recent pay increase on August 1, Anderson streetcar employees
issued a statement of loyalty to Southern Public Utilities. Under the heading, “A Study in
Contrasts,” Taylor exploited this development in Southern Public Utilities Magazine and
regional newspapers. The company boasted that Anderson‟s platform men remained on
the job “without a single deflection (sic).” Praising the Anderson workers, Taylor
indicated their rebellious co-workers were not acting “of their own volition.” Instead, the
unionized workers were acting on the orders of “outside influences,” who did not share
their best interests. The company president also promised the Anderson SPU workers
that their “splendid loyalty” would not be forgotten. 15
How did this serious rift occur within the ranks of AASERE Division 904? Fear
of unemployment or home loss may have convinced the Anderson contingent to remain
on the job. One could point toward the respective labor experiences of Anderson and
Greenville. Whereas Greenville‟s working class may have taken inspiration from the
near-successes of 1914‟s Monaghan Mill strike, Anderson‟s 1916 strike ended with the
traumatic eviction of mill workers by Palmetto National Guardsmen. Faith in their
14
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company‟s leadership may also have been a factor, as Zebulon Taylor‟s promised wage
increases materialized in January 1920. Southern Public Utilities Magazine alleged their
company‟s employees had “no thought of striking,” while the Charlotte Observer
confirmed Anderson‟s service was not suspended on August 10.16
Given Jones‟s inflated figures, Greenville-Anderson‟s union membership may
have only accounted for about 30 of 59 total workers, with Anderson refusing to abide by
August 9‟s decision to strike. One must also consider the possibility that Anderson‟s
streetcar workers may not have actually agreed to join Division 904. Albert Jones
included Anderson with Greenville‟s figures in order to exaggerate AASERE‟s presence
in the region. Present-day Anderson and Greenville have developed alongside
Spartanburg to create the Upcountry Tri-City region, but in August 1919, these three
towns were still distinct entities, with different agendas.17
Immediately after the strike began, Greenville Daily News admonished local
strikers for their “slight degree of ill-advised haste” even as the National Railway
Conference sought to resolve their problems. The Greenville editorialist quipped that it
was “better to strike „on the job,‟ than to strike by quitting the job.” 18 However, other
South Carolina Upcountry towns unaffected by the strike registered only cursory interest
in Charlotte. While the Spartanburg Herald duly reported major developments in the
Southern Public Utilities strikes, Charles Hearon‟s editorial column remained curiously
16
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silent. Similarly, the Daily Spartan paid less attention to the Charlotte Strike, despite its
editor‟s staunch conservative position. One might surmise both editors had felt enough
had been said during the previous Spartanburg strike in July.19
In 1919, the Queen City had two major newspapers, the Charlotte Observer and
the Charlotte News. One retired Charlotte News reporter, Emory Wister, reminisced that
“back in the old days… the Observer was considered the conservative newspaper and the
News was the liberal newspaper.” Wister mused that when the “liberals got more
liberal,” many News reporters went over to the Observer. Both papers merged in the
1980s, with the Charlotte Observer remaining moderately liberal in its sympathy. Later
in the century, the Observer led historical preservation efforts, while its editorials largely
supported the return of Charlotte‟s trolley in the 1980s.20
Initially, the Charlotte News took a somewhat balanced position toward the
union‟s strike. Emphasizing the moderating efforts of James Pardee during the ongoing
Federal Commission on Electric Railways, Charlotte News editors Julian Miller and
Jasper C. Hutto urged moderation. One representative News editorial, reprinted in
Southern Public Utilities, even acknowledged “badly demoralized service” in
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Spartanburg and Columbia. Since both South Carolina trolley lines were under AASERE
contracts in 1919, this concession cost Southern Power very little.21
However, such conciliation did not inform the Charlotte Observer‟s ultraconservative editor, Colonel Wade Harris. Harris, a long-time foe of unionism, began
circulating full-page propaganda inserts for the Sunday edition. These cartoonish
drawings were unique to the Observer. Touted as “one of a series,” at least twenty
different articles were circulated between July and August. One such item invoked the
images of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln, showing their
disapproval toward “un-American” labor organizers. “Tousle-haired radicals” had misled
good American workers to wreck the sacred free enterprise system. Union organizers
were also demonized in the Observer as Semitic stereotypes with disheveled appearances.
Those who listened to these “Apostles of Unrest” were portrayed with sloppy clothes and
slouching postures, while virtuous Americans walked past the rabble-rouser, wearing
stylish garments and hats denoting respectability and affluence. 22
What effect did Wade Harris‟s virulent propaganda have on Charlotte‟s public
opinion? None of the letters printed in the Charlotte Observer throughout the strike
endorsed the cause of unionism. Furthermore, two representatives from the Charlotte
Central Labor Union petitioned U.S. Senator Lee S. Overman, a staunch Democrat, citing
Colonel Wade Harris‟s “tremendous advertising campaign… to prejudice the citizens.”
Charlotte‟s Central Labor Union implicated Zebulon V. Taylor‟s inflammatory
statements in the regional newspapers as another factor in swaying people against
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organized labor. Federal conciliator John W. Bridwell later sent samples of Taylor‟s
screed and Harris‟s anti-labor cartoons to Washington for “future use.”23
Attorney John Franklin (Jake) Newell (1869-1945) also excoriated the Observer
for failing to present the “bold and unbiased” truth to its readers. Newell, a liberal
Republican, had recently won acquittal for a black jitney driver accused of murdering a
white soldier outside Camp Greene. Newell ably demonstrated how his client had been
nearly robbed at gunpoint. Newell later represented the Charlotte Central Labor Union in
the strike. In his post-strike letter to North Carolina Governor Bickett, Newell expressed
his professional opinion that the streetcar workers‟ cause had been “muddled in Charlotte
by a wave of propaganda,” exercising “an unhealthy control of public sentiment.” 24
Some citizens were certainly swayed by Wade Harris, but others were neutral or
even sympathetic. Loy Cloninger maintained that Charlotte‟s riding public did not
express much anger toward the SPU streetcarmen during or after the strike. In fact,
Cloninger indicated strong vocal support from North Charlotte, where hundreds of textile
workers traveled by streetcar to Atherton Mill. While strikebreakers manned the cars in
late August, ordinary people with “Model T‟s” would sport “eight or nine hanging… on
[the] old running boards.” These jitney drivers were allowed by the city to charge a dime
per passenger, keeping the proceeds for themselves. Historian Carol Shaw‟s urban
23
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research confirms a proposed local ordinance permitting jitneys during the strike, which
would suggest that some elements of the Charlotte city government were tolerant enough
toward the striking streetcar workers to refrain from halting a jitney boycott.25
To John Paul Lucas‟s credit, Southern Public Utilities Magazine initially
refrained from excessive abuse when the strike began. However, after the events of
August 25 and 26, Lucas employed Red Scare tactics to further damage the union‟s
flagging support base in the Piedmont. Much of Southern Public‟s cant quoted directly
from Scripture, while other examples came from major newspapers. “A Strike for
Power,” in the New York Commercial, cast the labor war as “Americanism versus
Russianism.” Another chief contributor, F.G.R. Gordon of the American Anti-Socialist
League, preached about the worldwide menace of Socialism, using selective examples
from history. Lucas also delighted in teaching a “Lesson for the Radical,” quoting
Massachusetts governor Calvin Coolidge, hero of the thwarted Boston Police Strike.26
Ultimately, how persuasive were these anti-labor cartoons from the Charlotte
Observer? One can assume that Harris‟s propaganda merely reinforced already-existing
prejudices toward labor organizations, especially among many middle-class and elite
Charlotte citizens. Others who empathized with the plights of workers were either
offended, as in the case of the Charlotte Central Labor Union, or otherwise ignored the
newspapers outright. Nevertheless, the violence ensuing in late August 1919 eclipsed
any incident in the Queen City‟s recent history. Some quantity of hate must have been
exacerbated by the city newspapers‟ irresponsibility. Wartime passions had not yet
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abated, local prejudices toward foreigners permeated each level of society, and new fears
of Bolshevism coursed through the media. One can further speculate about the
ramifications if these virulent drawings had been circulated in Greenville or WinstonSalem. Fortunately, Colonel Wade Harris lacked the influence of a Pulitzer or a Hearst.
Meanwhile, the Charlotte regional strike continued unabated in its first week.
Greenville‟s public transportation remained paralyzed, while cars in Anderson ran
smoothly. Greenville Daily News supported municipal ownership of transportation,
based on the city‟s ownership of its waterworks. However, despite the Upcountry
paper‟s unusual championship of “complete democratization of transportation,” Zebulon
Taylor still purchased advertising space in order to publish his statements and solicit
strikebreakers. Greenville‟s newspaper also promulgated a rumor that union motormen
were allegedly paid 60 cents per hour in comparison to a college professor‟s 18 cents.
Another columnist made light of the entire situation, stating simply: “The Walking is
Good.” This editorial further reasoned that Greenville did not rely on streetcar
transportation as much as Spartanburg, although the writer conceded the area‟s farm and
textile laborers would soon feel the strike‟s effects.27
Charlotte newspapers did not comment on the first three days of the strike,
although they covered the union‟s activities. Initially, the strike appeared orderly.
Workers continued to appeal to their former employers for union recognition, with
predictable, if courteous refusals. Department of Labor officials evidently deemed the
situation too minor to consider intervention. The Amalgamated Association‟s first
appeals to the U.S. Department of Labor were postmarked August 18. At the time,
27
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Washington‟s policy-makers felt that streetcar strikes should be resolved at the local and
state levels. In this spirit of cooperation, Charlotte‟s progressive mayor, Frank Ramsey
McNinch, promised to help seek a mutually beneficial solution. Preliminary mediation
took place in the Mecklenburg County Chamber of Commerce.28
Rescinding Charlotte‟s antiquated town alderman board, city officials established
the new Chamber of Commerce on June 17, 1915. Charlotte‟s first Board of Directors
included conservative businessmen, such as William States Lee, Zebulon Vance Taylor,
and Edward Dilworth Latta. Yet other members were confirmed liberals, such as W.S.
Alexander and Clarence “Booster” Kuester. In 1912, Alexander had developed
Washington Heights to accommodate the growing African-American population in
Biddleville. “Booster” Kuester started out as a travelling salesman and druggist before
entering city politics. Well-liked for his optimistic, sunny disposition, Kuester received
his nickname due to his promotional efforts on behalf of Charlotte. Both Kuester and
Alexander played significant roles on the arbitration commission chaired by the mayor.29
Meanwhile, the forces of labor gathered under Albert E. Jones and D. L. Goble,
leader of the electricians union. Strikers staged a midnight demonstration between
August12 and 13, at the Southern Public Utilities substation on present-day Elizabeth
Street. At approximately 3 a.m., two unionized electricians, J.L. Baker and S. M. Farris,
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cut municipal power for an entire hour. Charlotte Police Chief Walter B. Orr quickly
regained control of the substation. Baker faced criminal trespass charges and paid an
undisclosed fine, while Farris escaped charges altogether, in exchange for giving
testimony to the police and Southern Public Utilities. Farris implicated an alleged
conspiracy fomented by the AASERE, referred to simply as “the Association.” 30
However, no conspiracy motivated the three hundred or so North Charlotte textile
workers who descended upon Elizabeth Street later that night on August 13. In general,
streetcar union members initially welcomed the mill-hands, but they also sought to
discourage undisciplined crowds from taking part in their demonstrations. But SPU
conductor Jesse B. Ashe saw these mill hands as a potentially dangerous crowd, often
engaging in fisticuffs and drunken brawls. Ashe later described North Charlotte as “a
bad place,” characterized by “cutting and fighting on the weekends.” Ashe also believed
these “mill people” used the streetcar strike for their own purposes. Loy Cloninger
confirmed that most of the strike sympathizers came from the textile mills ringing
Charlotte. North Charlotte textile workers may also have felt a particular animosity
toward Chief Walter B. Orr, who had a controversial reputation among Charlotte‟s
working class. However, this first assembly of picketers dispersed without incident.31
Zebulon V. Taylor exploited these minor acts of civil disobedience to their fullest
potential. Using the company magazine and local newspapers, Taylor took to the
offensive. Exaggerating the actual impact of the Elizabeth Street incidents, Taylor
asserted: “We are standing between you and lawlessness.” The corporate executive
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vowed to fight “vicious outside influences” responsible for “jeopardizing the lives of the
suffering in hospitals.”32 Condemning Albert Jones‟s “Organization” in tenebrous terms,
Taylor questioned the real motive behind the strike, claiming that his company offered
higher wages than those contracts Jones had won for Spartanburg. He accused the
AASERE of duping J.L. Baker and S.M. Ferris on the previous night, then abandoning
them to the courts.33
Taylor wrote a simultaneous appeal to his crewmen to return under their original
contracts. “I have thought…with all the sympathy one human being might have for the
distress of another,” the executive reassured. The president blamed “foreign influences”
for “prying apart the close bonds” between his company and its professed “friends.”34
Comparing these labor leaders to German soldiers, bent on “victimizing” innocent
“Southern” women and children, Zebulon Taylor openly declared war on the strikers.
Southern Public Utilities began placing newspaper advertisements for replacement
motormen on August 15. R.L. Wommack took charge of the interview process, which
continued for ten days.35
Mayor Frank R. McNinch (1873-1950) subsequently abandoned his neutrality,
publicly denouncing the perceived “outrage against an innocent and helpless public.”
Charlotte could never “countenance” such a “high-handed invasion” of private property,
although he did not specify whether he meant the rebellious electricians or the protestors.
McNinch also declared further challenges to public safety would incur “personal risk.”
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However, behind the scenes, McNinch exercised his municipal office to seek a
compromise between the utility company and representatives of the AASERE.36
Frank Ramsey McNinch came from staunch Presbyterian stock, a curious mixture
of parochial and progressive traits. Historian Janette Greenwood characterizes McNinch
as a “middle-class reformer” who began as a traveling salesman. A notable
Prohibitionist, McNinch drank goat‟s milk for his ulcers. After graduating from law
school, McNinch entered local politics as a Democrat. In 1917, McNinch succeeded his
older brother, Samuel S. McNinch, as Charlotte Mayor. In this office, the younger
McNinch distinguished himself as a “soft-spoken” problem-solver whose political
instincts made many friends and foes alike. According to his nephew, Samuel S.
McNinch III, his uncle “did not give a damn; he was fiercely independent.” 37
During the week of August 15, Mayor McNinch presided over talks between
strike leaders and SPU president Zebulon Taylor. Their primary arguments focused on
company wages. Taylor claimed corporate revenues could not support the
Amalgamated‟s proposed wage increase of three pennies. Given the SPU executive‟s
affluent lifestyle, his justification must have infuriated the union. His wife, Irving Scales
Taylor, had recently sold their opulent mansion in Myers Park to their business partner,
James B. Duke himself.38 Now aware of Taylor‟s campaign to replace his colleagues,
local streetcar union president W.H. McFarlane rejected Taylor‟s explanation. Mayor
McNinch congratulated McFarlane for his “orderly manner” throughout the meeting.
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Albert E. Jones withdrew from the proceedings as a gesture toward local politics, but
inwardly, the union organizer must have seethed at his harsh treatment in the city
newspapers. 39
Throughout the conflict, Charlotte Observer editor Wade Harris remained highly
biased against labor. Harris expressed “no sympathy with [the strikers‟] attempt to hold
up [community services] because of a mere quarrel as to [with] whom the employers will
deal.” The Charlotte News subsequently began to shift from cautious tolerance to
outright dislike toward Albert Jones, questioning: “Why the services of the professional?”
Julian Miller further queried whether the Charlotte streetcar workers should “wed
themselves to this professional organizer instead of shouldering the responsibility
themselves?” Likewise, the Greenville Daily News grew impatient with the ongoing
strike. “At the outset,” pronounced the editor, “public opinion favored the employes
(sic).” However, the workers‟ “use of outside interference” delayed a negotiation with
President Taylor. The Greenville Daily News expressed resentment toward such
outsiders for “failing to recognize the South‟s ability to solve its own crises.”40
Meanwhile, Zebulon Taylor kept publishing calculated insults against the
streetcar union in regional newspapers. Taylor seldom referred to the streetcar union or
Jones by name, instead using euphemisms like “Foreign Organized Autocracy,” or
“Professional Foreign Agitator.” Taylor also compared the AASERE to the Imperial
German Army, claiming the streetcar union employed similar brutality to assert control
over the city of Charlotte. For Jones, who fought for industrial democracy as he
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understood it, such words questioned his organization‟s integrity, not to mention his own
patriotism. Unfortunately, Jones‟s temper got the better of his judgment.41
On August 17, Albert E. Jones delivered a vitriolic speech in the Mecklenburg
Courthouse. Reporters listened intently as Jones addressed the entire Chamber of
Commerce on behalf of his organization. Without naming James B. Duke or Southern
Power, Jones openly accused the “capitalists who employ Mr. Taylor” of controlling
Charlotte‟s local government, newspapers, and banks. Jones further upbraided Southern
Public Utilities for gouging its customers at ten cents per kilowatt, while refusing to pay
their workers a living wage. Lastly, Jones attacked Zebulon Taylor‟s paternalistic
overtures as the “greatest piece of camouflage ever written,” while his propaganda served
as an “insult to the intelligence of every man.”42
Jones‟s outburst immediately met with venomous bites from the local press.
Charlotte Observer assistant editor William B. Sullivan challenged Jones to substantiate
his charges toward the newspapers. Sullivan called his statement “the most pronounced
instance of public incitation to the passions of man that has ever been promulgated in
Charlotte.” In the Charlotte News, Zebulon Taylor labeled Jones a “rank slanderer,”
appealing to the loyalty of “Anglo-Saxon” and “Scotch-Irish” citizens to reject his “filthy
falsehoods.” Taylor concluded his sermon on nativism with an imperative to his
wayward “boys”: “Away with him!”
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Even more injurious to the streetcar unions,

Jones‟s tirade alienated Frank R. McNinch, the one man who might have helped his
cause. The mayor decried Jones‟ accusation as a “willful and scurrilous lie.” On August
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22, Albert Jones subsequently retracted his words in a contrite letter to Mayor McNinch,
but the Ohio labor organizer would be excluded from future negotiations. Division 901
president W.A. McFarlane, however, remained in good standing. 44
Jones‟s public statement, if tactless in its accusations, certainly bore many
elements of truth. Did not Zebulon V. Taylor belong to the Charlotte Chamber of
Commerce? And was Taylor not a close advisor and partner to James B. Duke, one of
the pre-eminent capitalists in the region? Conciliator John W. Bridwell said much the
same of Southern Power‟s influence throughout the region, but he confined these
criticisms to his superiors in Washington. Jones cut ties he could not afford to
severbecause Mayor McNinch‟s disapproval now stripped the beleaguered streetcar
workers of their chief and most effective advocate. Fortunately, a new leader arose to
unite the Charlotte workingmen in the mounting struggle.
Charlotte attorney Marvin Lee Ritch (1889-1971) had little benefit to gain from
supporting the cause of organized labor. However, Ritch‟s Scotch-Irish Methodist family
shared agrarian roots with many resettled farmers who now staffed the Piedmont‟s textile
mills. Ritch escaped factory drudgery through his prowess on high school and college
basketball courts. Leaving Chapel Hill at age twenty-one, Ritch transferred to
Georgetown in 1910, where he captained their first varsity program. Playing both
forward and center during the 1912-13 seasons, Ritch achieved records that still stand
almost a century later. Ritch would remain active in high school and college athletics
throughout his public career, coaching basketball and football.45
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Ritch also seems to have been something of a square peg. His surviving daughter,
Ann R. Brantley, confesses Ritch was well-liked, but had little use for social graces.
During his sojourn at Georgetown, he was the only Protestant on the varsity basketball
team. Instead of finishing his program at Georgetown as a “tramp athlete,” Ritch chose
to clerk for several Washington law firms. Licensed to practice in North Carolina, Ritch
moved to the burgeoning city of Charlotte. Shortly before World War I, Ritch married
Hazeline Morris, a vivacious art teacher who soon gave birth to a daughter. During the
war, Ritch served as city attorney and coached football at Chapel Hill. But as the nation
celebrated the Armistice in November 1918, tragedy befell Hazel Ritch. Complications
from influenza led to her untimely death from pneumonia at age 28. Marvin Ritch‟s
promising legal career offered him the only positive means to work through his sorrow.
Ritch‟s loss might also explain his energetic burst of pro-labor activity in 1919-20,
leading streetcar and textile workers in a brief, yet impressive coalition.46
On August 18, Zebulon V. Taylor issued an ultimatum to his striking workers:
return to work by 5 p.m. on the following day or face a lockout. Taylor‟s lockout order
triggered a joint meeting of representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, the
Charlotte Merchant Association, the Charlotte Automotive Association, and the local
Rotary Club. Mayor McNinch‟s ad hoc Citizen‟s Committee subsequently exerted
pressure on Taylor to retract the lockout. Taylor agreed to meet with union
representatives, giving them his assurance that he would not discharge employees who
belonged to the union. However, his proposed contract once more fell short of
46
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expectations, because it lacked recognition of the AASERE. Workers resumed their
strike amid growing public concerns; the strike now approached two weeks without hope
of compromise.47
By this point, Albert Jones appears to have contacted William B. Fitzgerald at the
AASERE‟s Detroit headquarters. Fitzgerald consequently appealed to Hugh Kerwin,
chief conciliator of the U.S. Labor Department, to dispatch a Federal arbitrator to handle
the Charlotte situation. John W. Bridwell arrived from Atlanta on August 20, reporting
the chief problem as being one of union recognition. Bridwell quickly assessed Zebulon
V. Taylor as the central figure, and urged his superior to personally wire the Southern
Public Utilities executive, although no record exists of such a telegram. Bridwell also
concluded that Albert Jones‟s rash statement against Taylor had aggravated the union‟s
case in Charlotte. Bridwell instantly began coordinating his efforts with the Queen City‟s
Central Labor Union, which repeatedly commended the Washington conciliator‟s quiet
and earnest approach toward the streetcar strike.48
On August 19, attorney Marvin L. Ritch seized the proverbial gauntlet, speaking
on the strike at Mecklenburg Courthouse before two thousand Charlotte citizens. Early in
the strike, Ritch began mobilizing nearly 2,000 strike sympathizers among the region‟s
mill towns. Some came from North Charlotte, but many more were poor textile workers
from Gastonia and Albemarle. Gastonia‟s mill hands were accustomed to riding
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subsidiary lines belonging to Piedmont & Northern, but Ritch exhorted his friends to
boycott these trolleys in support of the AASERE.49 Foreseeing Taylor‟s employment of
armed strikebreakers, Ritch warned townspeople they would ride Piedmont & Northern
and Southern Public Utilities streetcars “at their own risk.” Some conservatives decried
Ritch‟s remark out of context, alleged a veiled threat on the attorney‟s part. However,
Ritch defended his speech, indicating that the strikebreakers were a risk factor for trolley
passengers owing to their violent nature and lack of work experience.50
Another brief period of uneasy quietude fell over Charlotte as the conciliation
process continued for three days under J.W. Bridwell‟s capable direction. Possibly at
Bridwell‟s request, Albert Jones formally apologized to the City Commissioners on
August 22, hoping for a rapprochement with Mayor McNinch. However, the mayor
barred Jones from further proceedings. Only one man, North Charlotte merchant W.H.
Hall, spoke in Jones‟s defense, protesting that Charlotte‟s new form of government
concentrated too much power in the hands of too few men. Meanwhile, electrician D.L.
Goble formally took over the representation of AASERE Divisions 893, 901, and 904.51
On August 23, Mayor McNinch and his Citizens‟ Committee proposed
recognizing the three AASERE divisions without reservations, for a trial period of one
year. Also present during the negotiations were Zebulon Taylor and his treasurer, E.C.
Marshall. However, Taylor spurned the Committee Report, announcing limited streetcar
service would resume on August 25 -- with strikebreakers manning the vehicles. In
exasperation, John Bridwell wrote his supervisor, describing the company president‟s
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obdurate refusal to accept even his “home people‟s” suggestion. He suspected Taylor‟s
union-busting tactics had received direct support from Duke himself. However, despite
obvious corporate connections, the conciliator also acknowledged each company had its
own president. Still hoping to appeal to Taylor as a disinterested party, Bridwell resolved
to reach a “peaceful solution” over the next week.52
Zebulon V. Taylor certainly had the capacity to make his own decisions. But
Bridwell‟s hope for compromise was ill-placed. Taylor‟s response to the Citizens
Committee said simply: “a thousand times no.” Taylor argued for his company‟s
“industrial freedom,” and upbraided Mayor McNinch for harboring sympathy for a
“Foreign Organization,” founded upon “I.W.W.-ism and Bolshevism.” More
significantly, Taylor withdrew his previous offer to reinstate his former employees. On
Monday, 25 October, Taylor‟s strikebreakers readied for their first day. Picketers
gathered at the Dilworth streetcar barn, where Police Chief Orr had stationed nearly forty
patrolmen. One replacement crew fired several gunshots to disperse a crowd blocking
the tracks, yet the police said nothing. Protecting Southern Public Utilities interests
through intimidation and force, Taylor‟s replacements enjoyed tacit support from
Charlotte‟s police chief, Walter Baxter Orr.53
Walter Orr (1883-1957) came from a family of police officers, beginning with his
father, Assistant Police Chief Joseph L. Orr, a Confederate veteran who lost one arm
fighting under Stonewall Jackson. Joseph Orr served as a police officer for forty-two
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years. Father and son also shared a tradition of ringing the First Presbyterian Church
bells for each New Year. Walter Orr rose swiftly through police ranks, serving as Deputy
Sheriff of Mecklenburg County during the war years. On 14 May 1919, Walter Orr
succeeded Police Chief Neal Elliot at age thirty-five. Hence, when the Charlotte strike
ensued in August, Chief Orr had just assumed his new responsibilities. Orr also had a
reputation for strong-arm tactics directed toward the working class in North Charlotte.
Therefore, he likely saw Taylor‟s strikebreakers as a means to combat lawless elements. 54
According to SPU conductor Loy Cloninger, local streetcar men came to view
gun-toting Southern Public Utilities strikebreakers as “outsiders” who usurped the
rightful jobs of Southerners. Following an unwritten code of the South, many working
men may have believed that no true Southerner would deprive his neighbors of their
livelihood. Strikebreakers allegedly pocketed daily income from their shifts, and outraged
locals with violent behavior. Loy Cloninger recalled “some guy” offering to catapult a
dynamite charge atop the paint shop building where the strikebreakers were quartered.
Even though most of the strikebreakers were from Georgia and the Carolinas, Cloninger
still believed these were Northern “scabs.” John W. Bridwell confirmed this general
perception toward strikebreakers as “foreigners” to his supervisors in Washington.55
At dusk, Taylor‟s men returned their cars to Dilworth, where two hundred
outraged townsfolk greeted them with harangues and threats. These men were mostly
rowdies from North Charlotte, according to several sources. Apparently, the only
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streetcar men present anywhere near the Dilworth barn were night foreman Loy
Cloninger and an inspector named Ramseur. They were permitted by their union leaders
to remain on line because the replacement workers lacked qualified night supervisors.
Jesse Ashe also did not believe there were any union members present, nor did he
acknowledge “foreign” strikebreakers manning the cars. Ashe, at best a passive strike
supporter, admitted several decades afterward that he had “lain low until matters were
straightened out.” 56
Mecklenburg Sheriff Newt W. Wallace made peaceful overtures to the hostile
crowd, observing no weapons among the strikers. Nonetheless, several men tried to
swarm over the rope barrier to lash out against the so-called “wops” and “scabs,” now
lodged in a nearby shop building. At approximately 10 p.m., Patrolman Thomas H.
Merritt struck teenager Clem Wilson to the pavement, senseless. Merritt described Clem
Wilson as having “pressed too closely.” One unnamed strikebreaker later attested Wilson
went for Merritt‟s holstered pistol. However, several other witnesses swore that Merritt
had kicked Wilson‟s prone body, while two other officers held rescuers at bay with their
sidearms. Loy Cloninger also witnessed a Charlotte police officer strike a young man
named Wilson using his gun, but decades later, the retired foreman confused Clem with
his older brother, John. Some spectators thought Clem dead, but Sheriff Wallace sent the
unconscious sixteen-year-old boy over to St. Peter‟s Hospital.57
Sheriff Wallace and a St. Peter‟s nurse later testified Clem Wilson had been
inebriated, which, if true, begs a question. Some eyewitnesses described many of these
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onlookers as being teenage boys in “shirtsleeves,” perhaps returning from a baseball
game. Hardly a Bolshevik, Clem may have passed through Dilworth to partake of illicit
alcohol after a hot summer‟s evening. Despite the recent advent of Prohibition, several
bars flourished in downtown Charlotte. Tavern-keeper Dick Wentz would later admit to
selling “enough alcohol to fill a courthouse” during the last August weekend.58
Some demonstrators allegedly threatened to lynch Thomas Merritt, perceiving
him as Clem Wilson‟s “killer.” However, Sheriff Wallace assured the boy‟s safety,
convincing most of the crowd to disperse. By midnight, only fifty or so hotheads
lingered to glare at Chief Orr‟s thirty-man barricade. Frank Boomershine, who resided
across from the Dilworth car-barn, later became a police eyewitness. Boomershine‟s
testimony later portrayed this small group of demonstrators as a lynch mob of two
hundred. Boomershine, a Charlotte businessman, said he overheard this mob take a vote
to kill Chief Orr as well as “the man who hit Wilson.” Boomershine also testified that a
gang proposed to overturn R.L. Wommack‟s private automobile parked in front of the
car-barn. Boomershine later alleged their ringleader to have been Clem Wilson.59 But
one must also consider that Boomershine‟s testimony emerged weeks after the strike,
when Clem Wilson proffered murder charges against Chief Orr. Clem Wilson may have
lacked good judgment, but he might just as well been a bystander caught up in a surge.
During this interval, John Wilson had learned of his sibling‟s injury from North
Charlotte police. In his horse buggy, he arrived at Dilworth by 12:45 a.m., seeking his
brother. The 1920 census manuscripts lists two John Wilsons in North Charlotte, both of
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whom were employed on farms. Chief Walter B. Orr later claimed John Wilson had a
“bad reputation as fighting man.” Loy Cloninger also described Wilson as a “rough kind
of guy.” According to Chief Orr, John Wilson reportedly approached the streetcar barn
with “a crowd surging around him,” demanding in “a boisterous tone” why his brother
Clem had been struck. However, Sheriff Wallace described John Wilson‟s conversation
with Chief Orr as “most friendly” in tone.” Deputy Sheriff V.P. Fesperman confirmed
Wilson shook his hand before speaking with Chief Orr. Orr absolved himself of Clem‟s
injury, but picketers condemned the senior policeman for a liar.60
Loy Cloninger stood just before several streetcars positioned as barricades to the
Dilworth car barn. Policemen had taken cover inside the streetcars, whose windows were
lowered to permit firing. Cloninger half-jokingly described the strike sympathizers as
forming their own “Hindenburg Line” across the street, meant to block outgoing
streetcars. Picketers taunted and challenged the strikebreakers to send out a car to be
vandalized – actions that the streetcar men would never have condoned. As a motorman,
Loy Cloninger‟s perspective is perhaps the most unbiased, although one must allow for
passage of time. When Cloninger reported his version of the events to a Southern Power
claims agent, the company official promptly buried his account.61
Chief Orr, after speaking briefly to John Wilson, later claimed a swarm of rioters
followed in Wilson‟s wake. “Get back, every damn one of you,” Orr called out to the
crowd before taking cover. Chief Orr‟s sidearm had already cleared his holster at this
point. The next few moments remain perhaps the most mysterious in Charlotte history.
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Suddenly a firearm discharged in the darkness, followed by over 100 more shots from
Charlotte police and perhaps several strikebreakers. Loy Cloninger averred that the
strikebreakers were all quartered in the paint shop and took no part in the violence. Most
of the streetcar workers laid the burden of guilt on Chief Orr and the police. However,
since later court testimony corroborated strikebreakers shooting into the fleeing crowd,
perhaps Cloninger could not account for all strikebreaker movements.62
Regardless of who opened fire on the crowd, flying bullets soon took effect
among several demonstrators. Three Charlotte citizens were slain outright, with two
victims more to follow. Neither Cloninger nor Ashe knew any of the shooting victims.
Moreover, the newspapers differed as to some victims‟ names. Caldwell Houston, a
Southern Railway engineer, crawled away to expire near the Dilworth laundry, where
several witnesses found his body next morning. Claude Hinson, a teenage grocery clerk,
fell instantly dead to the pavement. Walter (or William) Pope, newly arrived to
Charlotte, had only been employed at one of the region‟s mills for three weeks.
Machinist J.D. Aldrich (or Aldred) suffered five buckshot wounds to his abdomen; he
would die the next morning after surgery. William R. Hammond of Fidelity Cotton Mill
suffered a fatal shot through the throat, severing his spinal chord. Hammond died at age
36 on the following morning, leaving a widow and a four-year-old son.63
Shortly after the shooting incident, John W. Bridwell left the New Central Hotel
to confer with the streetcar union. Several spokesmen told Bridwell their divisions had
no role whatsoever in the Dilworth battle. Bridwell later reported thirty or so “armed
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professional strike breakers” staying at the car barn, “inviting trouble.” One witness,
combing the scene for injured people, later said a strikebreaker showed him “a hand full
of new bullets,” warning him there would be “more killing done.” Witnesses also told
the federal conciliator that the first gunshot came not from the protesters, as Chief Orr
stated in the press, but from “some one in the car barn.” Moreover, some of the gunshot
victims had called out for aid, but only Sheriff Wallace and Deputy Fesperman offered
them succor. Bridwell concluded this entire tragedy could have been avoided if Taylor
had followed the position proposed by Mayor Frank McNinch. 64
Meanwhile, Mayor McNinch hurriedly summoned six state National Guard units
to restore order to his city. The first North Carolina guardsmen arrived from nearby
Lexington at approximately 8 a.m. on August 26. That same Tuesday morning, hundreds
of enraged citizens mobbed the Southern Public Utilities streetcars during their morning
runs. Numerous arrests were made for obstruction and vandalism of property. John
Temples, responsible for firing a slingshot through several streetcar windows, received a
fine of $158.15. Charlie Goodwin later served thirty days at hard labor for hurling a
brick toward Assistant Superintendent T.H. Drum, dealing him a serious head injury.
Drum also suffered rough treatment when sympathizers threw him off a streetcar.\65
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In total, fourteen injured strike victims were taken to Charlotte hospitals. Thomas
Head made an astounding recovery from two chest wounds, despite grim expectations.
A.T. Baker and H.N. Seaman received abdominal wounds, while Lewis Wilson and
George Smith‟s backs had been pierced by buckshot. Wilson‟s presence is noteworthy
because he was listed as a North Charlotte weaver. Several other citizens, including
Everett Wrenn and Walter Yandell, took bullets in their arms and legs. Clem Wilson,
however, simply received first aid for his concussion wounds and left for home.66
To maintain “law and order,” Chief Walter B. Orr circulated a warning through the
Charlotte Observer and Charlotte News, concerning “the danger of rushing to the scene
of any disturbance during the present street car strike.” Orr‟s position became quite
clear: “it is difficult for the police… to distinguish between active participants…and
innocent spectators.” Chief Orr‟s intimations of possible force worked to stifle further
demonstrations in North Charlotte.67 Meanwhile, 600 National Guardsmen and
militiamen patrolled central Charlotte for one week. One “Special Officer,” David
Ovens, later became a notable Queen City philanthropist and local politician. Before the
strike, the Canadian-born Ovens had supported the right of workingmen to organize, but
he felt these demonstrators had gone too far. Given a sidearm at the Charlotte Police
armory, Ovens “hardly [knew] which end [of the gun] you fired from.” His squad
patrolled Dilworth, considered to be “the most vulnerable spot in town.”68
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Throughout the Queen City‟s crisis, the president of Southern Public Utilities
remained buoyant. “I have carried my case to the people,” Zebulon Taylor boasted on
August 27. “They have placed their faith in the Power Company… [The people are]
tonight patrolling the streets, waiting a possible riot call. There is no sympathy for the
strikers.” Taylor derided cooperative efforts by “Outside Instigators” to restore order
following the strike. He blamed the “Amalgamated” for stirring up sympathizers, and
asked “Citizens of Charlotte” if they would like to “welcome its permanent citizenship.”
Echoing Taylor‟s thoughts, ex-Governor Joseph “Little Joe” Brown of Georgia also
wrote his own vicious diatribe against the AASERE, accusing them of conspiracy and
murder across America. Taylor ensured Brown‟s telegram appeared in several regional
newspapers after the violence to discourage sympathy.69
Mayor Frank McNinch also sought to punish Albert Jones, urging the Citizen‟s
Committee to publicly retract its previous endorsement of AASERE Division 901. While
McNinch later re-established friendly ties with the Charlotte Central Labor Union, he
could not afford to seem in league with perceived agitators. On August 27, McNinch
further approved laws permitting Southern Public Utilities‟ employees to carry firearms,
citing an obscure Jim Crow statute reserved for race riots. This decision, in no small
way, allowed the strikebreakers to persist in their intimidation of Charlotte townspeople.
Despite his wartime popularity, the Democratic mayor now stood vulnerable to political
opponents, who prepared petitions for his recall within hours of the Dilworth shootings.70
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In contrast, Southern Public Utilities Magazine took a less combative approach
toward the strike. Estimating the costs at close to $500,000, John Paul Lucas asked his
readers: “What of the loss and inconvenience to the public?” He openly regretted the
bloodshed, which he blamed on the “criminal bent of troublemakers on the outside of the
local car men‟s organization.” Without specific references to the company‟s gunwielding strikebreakers or the riotous textile workers, Lucas roundly decreed these
shadowy “troublemakers” as neither representative of the striking car men, nor “the best
element” of Charlotte‟s organized labor. These conciliatory gestures aside, Lucas also
warned that unless organized labor is “purged” and controlled by the “fair-minded
conservative element,” the AFL would soon face rigid regulation by the federal
government in order to restore “normal equilibrium.”71
Predictably, the Charlotte Observer took on a tone smacking of “I told you so.”
Blaming “false leadership” and “foreign influences,” the Observer extended condolences
to aggrieved families, while portraying the fallen as victims of “misrepresentation” and
“class feeling.” Charlotte Observer editors charged the city‟s Central Labor Union with
the responsibility of policing their ranks of radicals. Charlotte News columnists decried
“Red Terrorism” in the Queen City, accusing the AASERE of interference with Southern
Public Utilities‟ peaceful “operatives of the cars.” Essentially, both newspapers rendered
lip service to theoretical rights of organized labor while condemning actual unions for
attempting to practice these freedoms. In contrast, both newspapers also praised the
“courageous” actions of Charlotte policemen under Walter B. Orr‟s command.72
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News of Charlotte‟s short, bloody insurgence traveled across the nation, even
appearing briefly in the New York Times. Most regional newspapers remained curiously
detached from Charlotte‟s affairs. Raleigh‟s News & Observer and Columbia‟s The State
covered the immediate events, but neither state capital newspaper offered much opinion.
Charles O. Hearon‟s Spartanburg Herald focused more on national strikes. Calvin
Hemphill‟s Journal & Carolina Spartan noted one of the Charlotte National Guard
officers, Army Lieutenant M.G. Caldwell, had led a South Carolina infantry unit in
France. The Greenville Daily News merely reprinted Charlotte editorials and Zebulon
Taylor‟s company diatribes.73
Not every news editor throughout the region accepted the national streetcar union
as a convenient scapegoat. From the northern end of the Carolina Piedmont, the
Greensboro News proclaimed drily that “the law in Charlotte… is still supreme.” Citing
a recent Charlotte lynching in which Walter Orr‟s officers failed to protect a single
“wretched Negro,” the Greensboro editor derided the Charlotte police for their
willingness to kill its own citizens in order to protect Southern Public Utilities streetcars.
He concluded that the Charlotte strike had been “a sorry exhibition all round,” blaming
Zebulon Taylor for his “contemptuous” rejection of compromise.74
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Columbia‟s Labor Advocate also covered the Charlotte strike from Marvin
Ritch‟s courthouse speech onward. Editor Charles Henry held Taylor liable for
engineering the whole incident, having ignored pleas from the Chamber of Commerce
and the Rotary Club of Charlotte. However, Henry concerned himself more with the
strike‟s localized effects in Greenville, South Carolina, where conciliator John W.
Bridwell described an “acute” situation developing since August 26. Taylor later
admitted he had contemplated sending replacement workers to operate his cars in
Greenville. However, no Southern Public Utilities cars ran there for one week, nor did
they operate in Winston-Salem.75
One reason why Taylor may have reconsidered his strategy became apparent soon
after the Dilworth incident. Taylor‟s professional strikebreakers demonstrated a
disturbing penchant for hair-trigger violence, even while National Guardsmen lingered in
the city. On Saturday, August 30, one streetcar ran through the wealthy residential sector
of Myers Park, Taylor‟s one-time neighborhood. Its operators were allegedly “trainers,”
lacking the experience to handle the brakes. When the Southern Public vehicle went off
track, a nearby group of carpenters interrupted their work long enough to jeer at the
crewmen. In reply, these strikebreakers opened fire with their handguns. Bullet holes
were plainly evident at one private residence. Taylor fired the offending streetcar men,
but condemned the carpenters for their “very provoking” behavior. While the Charlotte
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Observer dutifully reported this Myer Park incident, their journalists and editors
downplayed its darker ramifications.76
Greenville‟s platform men were the first to surrender their strike on September 2,
after meeting with H.E. “Smoke” Thompson of the South Carolina Arbitration Board.
Charlotte streetcar workers settled with Southern Public Utilities on September 5, while
Winston-Salem followed on September 6. Zebulon Taylor honored the strikers‟ central
requests for overtime hours and a graduated pay scale to 43 cents per hour. Taylor also
promised no discrimination toward former strikers, providing they were not involved in
the Dilworth riot. Jesse B. Ashe later recalled that Superintendent Wommack discharged
a few troublemakers, but the company permitted the remainder, like prodigal children, to
return to its fold. Despite such magnanimity, Taylor also underscored the benefits of
loyalty and servility when he subsequently rewarded Anderson‟s steadfast men
preferential assignments and markedly higher wages, at 46 1/2 cents.77
Federal Conciliator John Bridwell had temporarily vacated Charlotte on August
30 when the news of Greenville‟s capitulation reached him in Atlanta. Returning just in
time, Bridwell played a leading role in the settlements offered Charlotte and WinstonSalem‟s workers, who received slightly better arrangements than their compatriots in
Greenville. Total raises averaged about 9 cents hourly. Bridwell consequently believed
his role in the Carolinas almost complete, having “went further” than previous labor
hearings to secure a favorable compromise. Forty Southern Public electricians under D.
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L. Goble still remained on strike, hoping for full union recognition, but Bridwell
predicted they would fare no better than had the company‟s 163 streetcar employees.78
In late August, Solicitor John W. Abercrombie of the Labor Department also
received a telephone call from U.S. Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina. Overman
also sent a formal request to investigate the Charlotte situation, hoping for a mutually
beneficial adjustment. Taylor certainly did not desire greater federal scrutiny, so this
might also explain his expedited labor resolutions, as well as his decision in early
September to discharge his remaining strikebreakers in anticipation of a settlement.79
Albert E. Jones played no further role in the strike negotiations with Southern
Public Utilities Incorporated. John Bridwell confirmed Southern Public streetcar workers
in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Greenville had reached their agreements in exchange
for yielding national recognition. Nevertheless, Jones reported a complete union victory
in all three instances, gestures that researcher Carol Shaw describes as “face-saving cries
in the wind.” One also senses a policy of damage control at work. Motorman and
Conductor‟s first inkling of Charlotte‟s trouble arose during the AASERE‟s Seventeenth
Convention. On 11 September, President William Mahon briefly announced that Jones
had just reported from Charlotte, where a “very serious situation existed.” Mahon also
demonstrated his near-complete detachment from the whole affair, characterizing the
strike as being against three separate companies instead of one major corporation.
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This would suggest Jones, as a Special Organizer, enjoyed broad authority and very little
supervision throughout these proceedings. In fact, Jones benefited from involvement in
the Carolinas, receiving his promotion to 11th Vice President that same year.80
North Carolina Lieutenant Governor O. Max Gardner supervised the restoration
of order in Governor Bickett‟s absence. North Carolina troops soon demobilized,
departing Charlotte on the first of September. Zebulon Taylor agreed to release Southern
Public‟s “trainers” from their contracts, in anticipation of settlements with his workers.
Yet, despite these tentative steps toward normality, Charlotte did not recover immediately
from its summer of mistrust and class conflict. When the streetcars resumed their
accustomed runs, the North Charlotte lines were pointedly left without service for weeks
to come. 81
During these watchful days, state and county officials launched their inquest
concerning the Dilworth shootings. Meanwhile, the Central Labor Union engaged Jake
Newell to represent their cause in the courts. However, these legal procedures proved to
be fraught with controversy. Even a cursory investigation would reveal the Charlotte
police‟s excessive use of force. Newspaper accounts indicated no policemen or
strikebreakers reported injuries sustained during the “Battle of the Barn.” This fact John
Bridwell also confirmed to his supervisor in Washington. Moreover, Dr. J.R. Alexander
of Presbyterian Hospital would swear that only one of the five dead men had suffered
from frontal gunshot injuries. This would suggest the police fired at fleeing protestors,
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and not the angry, charging mob that Chief Walter Orr described on the night of August
25. However, no one drew much attention to this fact in subsequent courtroom
testimony, nor did the major newspapers interview surviving gunshot victims.82
Initially, the Mecklenburg County Coroner, Z. A. Hovis, dragged his feet,
rescheduling the official inquest from August 28 to September 2, one week after the
slayings. Jake Newell grew impatient when this date fell through, and he expressed his
personal doubts to Governor Thomas Bickett. Evidently, Hovis had fallen ill on the
inquest date, as had the clerk of court responsible for naming a deputy. Moreover,
another deputy coroner had been disqualified on a technicality. Newell professed his
desire to “discover the truth,” whether it exonerated or implicated his clients. He also
attested to “two hundred or more witnesses” who could speak of strikebreaker
involvement at Dilworth. He also alleged Chief Walter Orr fired his sidearm first.
Newell concluded his letter with a plea for full state investigation. However, little
evidence exists to suggest Governor Bickett wanted to interfere in what was widely
perceived as local politics.83
Moreover, Raleigh‟s access to evidence appears to have been greatly limited.
Days after North Charlotte‟s uprising, the Raleigh News-Observer still reported John
Wilson as the chief culprit. However, by this point, Charlotte police reports indicated
Wilson carried no weapons. Nevertheless, many conservatives were anxious to make an
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example of unruly North Charlotte. Carol Shaw‟s research hints that Southern Public
Utilities had sought to “press the textile workers into submission.” Before a grand jury,
John Wilson received a lesser charge of inciting a riot, and subsequently left jail on a
$2000 bond. Mecklenburg County, stung by Wilson‟s release, approached the North
Carolina Attorney General to prosecute John Wilson‟s impending trial in late September.
However, in keeping with Raleigh policy, the state‟s attorney, John Hall Manning,
believed local courts would find the truth “when the public is less excited.”84
So, if John Wilson did not carry a gun, then who fired the shot that triggered the
“Battle of the Barn?” During Wilson‟s preliminary hearing, Chief Orr would describe
someone close to the defendant raising a handgun. The chief‟s own sidearm
subsequently got caught on his thumb, “discharging into the air.”85 Sheriff Newt W.
Wallace believed the mystery shot came from Chief Orr‟s left -- perhaps toward the shop,
where strikebreaking crewmen had taken cover. Plummer Stewart, John Wilson‟s
defender, keenly scrutinized the role of Taylor‟s men. However, only one patrolman,
Officer McKnight, corroborated the strikebreakers‟ involvement during the firefight.86
After John Wilson‟s arraignment and bail, a legal impasse in Mecklenburg
County Superior Court threatened to ensue. Charlotte‟s Labor Council, representing each
trade union, made formal charges of murder and conspiracy against Chief Orr‟s staff and
twenty-seven of Taylor‟s strikebreakers. However, the Charlotte police force refused to

84

National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Division
of Mediation and Conciliation, Box 111, Jake Newell to Gov. Thomas H. Bickett, letter, 3
September 1919; Raleigh News and Observer, 30 August 1919, 1-2; Charlotte Observer,
5 September 1919, 1-2;; Charlotte Observer, 5 September 1919, 1-2.
85
Charlotte Observer, 5 September 1919, 1-2.
86
Raleigh News and Observer, 26 August 1919, 1-3; Charlotte Observer, 18
November 1919, 9-10.
174

serve these subpoenas, obviously out of concern they could be implicated in the courts.87
Jake F. Newell, representing the chief plaintiff, Clem Wilson, fought to have these
subpoenas released in order to force the strikebreakers into court. On September 1, chief
strikebreaker T.J. Fitzgibbons had earlier faced charges for the shooting of Caldwell
Houston, but five witnesses were unable to conclusively identify Fitzgibbons during his
preliminary hearing.88 Unquestionably, the resultant Charlotte Police Trial diverted press
attention from John Wilson, whose own defense against conspiracy charges encountered
“woefully slow progress” in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.
North Carolina Attorney General Manning soon held a conference with Charlotte
officials and labor unions, and supported Jake Newell‟s case for a lawsuit. Newell vowed
to personally swear the warrants over any police objections, but he held back the warrants
until the mayoral recall election, to avoid political complications. Ultimately, fifteen
strikebreakers and 31 police officers, including Chief Walter Orr, stood accused of
murder by Charlotte‟s Labor Executive Board. Newell had won his request for a full
courtroom enquiry, but Orr welcomed such an investigation, maintaining his story.89
The outcome of the Charlotte Police Trial hinged upon the political fortunes of
their incumbent mayor. During an October 21 recall vote, Mayor Frank R. McNinch won
a sweeping victory, with a margin of 1,433 votes against J. Frank Flowers out of a total of
5,273.90 During their single public debate on October 11, McNinch sparred with his
Republican opponent. Ridiculing the fact Frank Flowers had not been present during the
87

Charlotte Observer, 24 October 1919, 4.
Charlotte Observer, 2 September 1919, 2; 24 October 1919, 4; Charlotte News, 3
September 1919, 1.
89
Ironically, at least five Charlotte policemen were former streetcar men. (Columbia
Trade Review, 24 October 1919, 3; Charlotte Observer, 13 October 1919, 4).
90
District voting trends are unavailable. (Charlotte Observer, 22 October 1919, 1).
88

175

crisis of August 26; McNinch mocked the lawyer for missing his chance to be a
“terrifying-looking policeman.”91 McNinch also publicly deprecated “the mobocracy” of
organized labor in order to stay in office, but behind the scenes, the mayor consistently
strove for a course of moderation. McNinch‟s speech to the State Federation of Labor on
9 August 1920 stated his opposition to “class government,” either by employers or
workers. His tough stance in 1919 had been primarily directed at “dangerous… radical
leadership,” although McNinch did not directly implicate individuals. Mayor McNinch
not only supported rights of organized labor, but felt such worker‟s organizations, under
“thoughtful and conservative leadership” would serve the “general good.”92
Despite McNinch‟s political victory, his opponents sought to make him squirm.
On October 22, fifty-eight warrants were served to Chief Walter B. Orr‟s men and those
strikebreakers not already discharged by Southern Public Utilities. Republicans forced
these summonses to overshadow McNinch‟s triumph. However, these subpoenas proved
difficult to serve, for many of Zebulon V. Taylor‟s hirelings had fled to other parts of
North Carolina, or down toward Georgia and South Carolina. Eventually, twenty former
strikebreakers, including T. J. Fitzgibbons, stood in the docks once more in Charlotte.93
Meanwhile, a war of words ensued in Charlotte, threatening to fan the flames
once more. Shortly before his defeat on October 21, J. Frank Flowers had denounced
Police Chief Walter B. Orr for the five “unlawful deaths” at Dilworth. In return, the
Observer accused Flowers of cowardice. Thereafter, a brief editorial battle sparked
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between Charlotte Observer and the local worker‟s paper, Charlotte Labor Herald.94
Chief Orr‟s court statement (endorsed by thirty-three policemen) made print in the
Observer beside twelve „anonymous‟ Labor Herald reports. 95 If Flowers‟s witnesses
withheld their identities, then perhaps they had good reasons to do so. Chief Walter B.
Orr had many powerful supporters in Charlotte. During this era of renewed Ku Klux
Klan, witness intimidation, even death threats were common occurrences, especially if
one questioned the established order. One did not need to be African-American to risk
this new Klan‟s hatred of organized labor. Because the Charlotte Observer sought to
make straw men of labor witnesses, official summaries often discounted their testimony.
Two witnesses said Chief Orr allowed the crowd‟s taunts to provoke his temper.
Just after John Wilson accosted the chief, someone in the crowd mocked Orr for being
such a “nice chief.” Orr allegedly said “I‟ll show you what kind of a chief I am,” before
firing his rifle -- most reports describe Orr firing his sidearm in the air. But it is possible
that Orr may have carried both rifle and pistol; Officer Thomas Merritt, Clem Wilson‟s
actual assailant, certainly did. This would also suggest Chief Orr had come looking for a
quarrel. Orr‟s former superior, Sheriff Newt Wallace, also had the difficult position of
defending his former protégé‟s actions. He acknowledged “considerable cursing” among
the demonstrators, and that one had pronounced the chief a “son of a bitch” who had
struck Clem Wilson. But despite his earlier testimony that the demonstrators had been
unarmed, Wallace now agreed that someone had fired to his left.96
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As the rhetoric against Chief Walter Orr escalated, the Mecklenburg County
Superior Court threatened to transform John Wilson into a scapegoat. On the first of
October, Solicitor George Wilson (no relation) shackled the hapless prisoner with two
conspiracy charges. Another magistrate, John Shaw, turned the court proceeding into a
bully pulpit against labor movements, heedless of the fact John Wilson had carried no
weapon on August 26, nor held any known union memberships.97 All the while,
attorneys Edward T. Cansler and J.D. McCall coordinated Chief Walter Orr‟s defense set
for November.
Edward Cansler, a notable orator, had recently prosecuted Marvin L. Ritch in
Albemarle, North Carolina. Following the Dilworth incident, Ritch received several
threats promising violence if he did not leave Charlotte. Yet, Ritch persevered in his
advocacy for textile workers. On September 15, Ritch had organized two thousand
textile workers in a strike against Wiscasset Mills. Stanly County policemen suppressed
the picketers, one of whom received a mortal gunshot wound. Wiscasset strikebreakers
joined in the fray, wielding axe-handles, while their opponents fought back with rotten
eggs. Ritch faced scorn in Charlotte, but later paid a fine. Ann R. Brantley, Ritch‟s
daughter, recalls that a prominent Stanly County citizen actually paid Ritch‟s bail.98
Now it was Ed Cansler‟s turn to feel the squeeze. Prosecutor Jake Newell fenced
with Cansler for several days, providing Charlotte with a colorful clash of legal minds.
Even Charlotte Observer reporters had grudging praise for the “wily” Newell‟s crossexamination. Several eyewitnesses testified that Chief Orr‟s unrestrained use of his
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police revolver precipitated the “Battle of the Barn.” R.C. Frazier stated the chief pushed
a man away, brandishing his handgun. “Get back or I‟ll kill you,” were Orr‟s alleged
words, C.K. Coleman recalled when the shots began, strikebreakers poured out of the
powerhouse to join the gunfight. Other reports indicated the crowd fought with mere
stones, liquor bottles and baseball bats. All but two victims had been shot in the back. 99
On November 21, Assistant Prosecutor John J. Parker forced Chief Orr to concede
discharging the first shot. Several officers verified their leader fired upward and away.
Orr justified his conduct, stating thirty police officers could not have arrested the
demonstrators yet still preserve order. The chief thought he saw a gun in the crowd,
maintaining he raised his own weapon to protect his face -- accidentally pulling the
trigger.100 This statement remains at variance with Orr‟s first statement denying that he
fired, yet no charge of perjury would ever be leveled against the Charlotte police chief.
Reviewing the case from hindsight, one also should raise questions about Orr‟s
reckless endangerment of Dilworth‟s citizens. Although they were both children at the
time, Myrtle B. Teague, and her sister, Frankie B. Graves, recalled the nighttime events
of August 25. Their father, Taylor Baker, had been a Southern Public Utilities motorman
for many years. On the night in question, fifteen-year-old Myrtle Teague and six-yearold Frankie “heard the bullets hitting the screens,” outside their bedroom window. Frank
Lethco also reported bullets “coming right toward [his] house,” located across the street
from the streetcar barn. One of the slain men actually fell before Lethco‟s dining room
window. Finally, an unsubstantiated account from one of J.F. Flowers‟s eyewitnesses
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claimed that a Mrs. Smith of Louise Avenue was indeed injured by a stray bullet, and
taken to an undisclosed hospital by her husband.101
Between Chief Orr‟s contradictory statements and the real possibility of further
lawsuits against the police force, Mecklenburg County faced a serious dilemma. Should
Chief Orr incriminate himself further, the city of Charlotte might be held accountable for
five deaths. On November 23, Superior Court justices F.B. Alexander and J. Lee Sloan
moved to exercise damage control. The two justices summarily dismissed the
prosecution‟s charges against Chief Orr. “Whatever verdict we might render… would
subject us to an immense amount of criticism,” Alexander ruled. “That a very
unfortunate tragedy has happened in Charlotte cannot be denied,” he added. “There must
be some latitude… left to the parties, else we may as well put a dummy on the bench.”102
Moreover, the courts refused to charge Clem Wilson for court costs. “We cannot
adjudge the [legal] action was frivolous and malicious… [The plaintiff] had a right to
come into the courts.” Yet Judge Alexander also believed “those five mounds in the
cemetery… do not have to be marked by gravestones to refer to this for ages to come…
we have to take into consideration [those] responsible for the misfortunes.” Rather than
blame the living, the Mecklenburg Courts placed culpability on the five dead men, to
prevent them from becoming martyrs.103 The sensational Charlotte Police Trial was over.
Apparently, the Queen City wished to put this unpleasant occurrence behind
them. Even the Charlotte Observer made no further mention of the strike, following the
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courtroom verdict of November 23. John Wilson‟s fate remains unclear, given the
absence of complete trial records. According to Carol Shaw, Wilson faced trial in
criminal court in September, yet no mention is made of such a trial. At worst, one can
hope Wilson may have received hard labor or fines, if not outright acquittal.104
According to Fritz Lang‟s Metropolis, “the mediator between head and hands
must be the heart!" If so, why did this “very unfortunate tragedy” occur in North
Carolina‟s own metropolis? Zebulon Vance Taylor, the head of Southern Public Utilities
Company, undermined hope for compromise. The executive had no qualms about
employing big-city strikebreaking tactics, circulating defamatory propaganda, while
recruiting a private army to crack down on his rebellious workers. Beyond question,
these heavy-handed methods got big-city results. In so doing, Taylor demonstrated a lack
of compassion toward his workers, despite his outward professions of generosity.
Furthermore, Zebulon Taylor showed disrespect and contempt toward his
progressive colleagues, who had all but hammered out a trial contract recognizing the
streetcar union for one year. In so doing, Mayor Frank McNinch and Public Works
Commissioner Arthur H. Wearn affirmed the right of local workers to unionize, even as
they gestured to regional mistrust by excluding organizer Albert Jones from the
discussions. Taylor not only slighted Mayor McNinch, but other commission members,
such as W.S. Alexander, C. A. Williams, and Clarence O. Kuester – respected city
leaders. Seventy-five years later, Clarence Kuester, Jr. remembered his father‟s horror
when he came back from the scene on South Boulevard and Bland Street. “Booster”
Kuester had earned his reputation as “a great diplomat,” preferring to “smooth matters

104

Charlotte Observer, 29 September 1919, 7; 13 November 1919, 18; Shaw, 45.
181

over and for people to get along.” Thereafter, the Charlotte leader recalled the strike with
bitter disappointment. 105
One could liken Taylor‟s refutation of the August 23 commission decision to an
absolutist monarch defying a parliamentary decree. Obviously, Taylor did not recognize
municipal or state authority when it contradicted his business policy. Perhaps Taylor‟s
own past as Greensboro mayor gave him the impression he knew what was best for the
Queen City. If not for Taylor, Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Greenville might well have
followed the successful union model of Columbia, South Carolina. As one Charlotte
historian, David Goldfield, remarked in 1994, “Civility, not conflict, characterizes the
decision-making in the corporate culture of Charlotte.” Most historians, from Carol
Shaw to Dan Morrill, tend to agree the local union men and city officials acted with
civility, leading up to Taylor‟s deployment of strikebreakers on August 24.106
While David Goldfield‟s assessment of Charlotte business may ring true in
modern times, this research into Charlotte‟s history does not substantiate any such claim
during the first part of the twentieth century. One could hardly describe Edward Latta‟s
high-handed actions in 1903 as an example of cordiality and gentlemanly conduct toward
his workers. Unless “civility” is defined by Wade Harris‟s vicious newspaper attacks,
Zebulon V. Taylor‟s browbeating tactics, or Chief Walter Orr‟s excessive violence, then
one should look elsewhere. While Mayor Frank McNinch and Clarence Kuester acted in
good faith, they unfortunately lacked the clout to make a crucial difference in preventing
the Charlotte tragedy.
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Without local support, Charlotte‟s AASERE Division 901 gradually withered on
the vine. In March 1922, the Charlotte streetcar union formally disbanded due to low
membership. Ultimately, the defeat of streetcar workers in Charlotte meant a major
setback to regional forces of labor – particularly streetcar unions. Within scant weeks of
Charlotte‟s debacle, Knoxville, Tennessee, experienced its own streetcar strike, leading to
another defeat. Reverses in South Carolina and Georgia also occurred. Readers should
also keep in mind the simultaneous struggle for textile mill workers in the Carolina
Piedmont. Even while Charlotte‟s public transportation lay paralyzed in that summer of
1919, Palmetto textile mills in Rock Hill and Aragon struck for higher wages. Then,
Marvin Ritch led the disastrous strike at Wiscasset Mills, in Albemarle County, North
Carolina, in September. Over 6,000 textile workers participated in autumn strikes as
widespread as Macon, Georgia, and High Point, North Carolina. Quelled by Georgia
state police, Macon strike leaders faced jail sentences, while North Carolina Governor
T.W. Bickett personally resolved the High Point strike.107
Almost a decade would pass before unionism recovered sufficiently for future
recruitment drives in the Upper Carolinas. By then, electric streetcars were in decline,
and the AASERE presence in the Carolinas a mere shade of its former self. The next
chapter will chiefly examine the subsequent reversals of streetcar unionism in
Spartanburg and Columbia, South Carolina. In the latter case, Division 590 experienced
two strikes, a brief contractual argument in February 1920 and a more serious lockout,
beginning in January 1922. But Charlotte‟s immediate effects may well have affected
the outcome of October 1919‟s streetcar strike in Knoxville, Tennessee – a major
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Appalachian town known for its coal-mining operations. Moreover, Spartanburg‟s
reversals in early 1920 require further assessment in light of the outcome of Charlotte‟s
“Battle of the Barn.”
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Chapter 7: All Covered With Rust

Columbia, a city of 40,000 during the 1920s, today serves as a gateway to the
Upcountry textile mill region. Once a major labor stronghold in the South, Columbia
ultimately proved to be the last major battleground for streetcar labor. Under new
postwar leadership in 1920, the Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company
(CRG&E) sought to eliminate their streetcar union, Division 590, ostensibly as a costcutting measure. Meanwhile, a strengthening anti-labor climate in Columbia revealed a
deeper peril for unionism. It would be too simplistic to view this chapter merely as a
Gotterdammerung for the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway
Employees. Instead, Columbia‟s episodic strikes in 1920 and 1922 should be interpreted
as a symptom of general decline in South Carolina‟s urban labor culture.
Throughout the Charlotte regional strike, Columbia‟s labor community kept
abreast of developments. Charles Henry of the Labor Advocate continued his support for
conservative labor politicians. His newspaper endorsed Democrat John Hughes Cooper
during an off-year Congressional election in 1919. Long a supporter of unionism, John
Hughes Cooper also won favor among Greenville textile workers for his opposition to
immigration. Two other Upcountry pro-labor candidates, Colin Monteith and George B.
Timmerman, also relied on mill supporters in the 1920 state elections. In 1918, AASERE
Division 590 president Ambrose A. Gerald and his lieutenant, William D. Hampton, had
each won seats in 1918 as South Carolina legislators, representing Richland County.1
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Initially, Division 590 of Columbia, like most of its local counterparts, remained
distantly sympathetic toward the Charlotte strikers. There were no demonstrations in
Columbia, nor were there specific editorials concerning the major strike occurring to their
north. However, the tense events of August 1919 were still on the minds of labor leaders.
On Labor Day, Columbia‟s workingmen chose to observe the holiday without any
demonstrations or parades, ostensibly to enjoy a peaceful holiday with their families.
One week after Labor Day, Charles Henry saluted “Lucky Columbia” for escaping
“strikes, riots, dissentions (sic), and chaos.” Henry likely meant the Labor Day violence
of Centralia, Washington, but once more, Charlotte loomed in the regional backdrop.
Charles Henry also reminded his readers that “Employer and Employee have learned that
it is more profitable to grasp the hand than the throat of each other.” 2
In October 1919, Charles Henry, the self-styled “Conservative Labor Leader,”
assailed the “carnival of strife” fomented by Bolshevik radicalism across the nation. In
this spirit, Henry renamed the Labor Advocate of Columbia, perhaps as a gesture toward
the country‟s gathering anti-labor atmosphere. Until January 1920, Henry published the
Trade Review, a rather bland, non-confrontational masthead if ever there was one.
Despite this shift in attitudes, Henry still supported the local streetcar union of Columbia.
That same month, the Trade Review boasted the benefits of organization, citing Division
590‟s decade-long record of 9-hour workdays, competitive wages peaking at 44.5 cents,
seniority benefits, and arbitration guarantees. Henry also commented on high worker
morale, with very few accidents and low turnover rates.3
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On October 7, the very same day Charles Henry extolled Columbia‟s streetcar
service, AASERE Division 767 struck after Knoxville Railway and Light Company
(KRL) refused to renew a favorable contract brokered in August 1918 by the National
War Labor Board. KRL manager Charles H. Harvey, in a feat of legal legerdemain,
reasoned that his workers would have to take their contractual grievances up with the
NWLB, an organization that no longer existed by October 1919. Like Charlotte‟s recent
upheaval, the Knoxville strike erupted into violent demonstrations after Harvey, sent
armed strikebreakers – including ex-WWI soldiers -- to man his streetcars. Strike
sympathizers, aided by the local policeman‟s union, clashed in late October with vigilante
groups led by the local Tennessee Law and Order League. Historian James A. Burran
also underscores the complications of Knoxville‟s recent race riot, plus an ongoing coal
mine strike in Kentucky and East Tennessee. Hostilities did not cease until Tennessee
Governor Albert Roberts mobilized troops from Camp Gordon, Georgia.4
Burran‟s research does not correlate to similar events in the Carolina Piedmont,
but one may assume Knoxville did not exist in a vacuum in 1919. Henry‟s Trade Review
noted a meeting of the Tennessee Labor Convention just before the Knoxville strike,
which Burran speculates may have inspired Division 767 toward militancy. Moreover,
Columbia‟s labor paper covered the strike‟s particulars, including the city‟s decision to
ban public displays or parades in an effort to quell labor sympathizers.5
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By 1920, Knoxville‟s Division 767, established in September 1917, had ceased to
exist in all but name. Most of its membership had already sought other employment.
Shortly after the Knoxville strike, the city railway company fell into receivership.
Knoxville‟s defeat of streetcar labor in some ways mirrors the outcome in Columbia,
South Carolina‟s 1922 strike. However, this labor defeat still lay ahead when Charles
Henry blithely forecasted “the wave of industrial unrest [had] reached its crest, and is
now on the wane.” Endorsing Woodrow Wilson‟s measures to investigate labor
grievances, Henry blamed the U.S. Congress for inactivity and “war-profiteering”
capitalists for its intolerance of responsible labor unions.6
Soon after, Charles Henry‟s influence in Columbia ended when the Trade Review
of Columbia passed into different hands in 1920. Reasons for this transition have been
lost with passage of time. Given the forthcoming changes in the weekly paper‟s format,
one might guess finances might have been a major factor. Throughout the paper‟s short
existence, Henry consistently exhorted his readers to advertise their business in his
newspaper. But, following the holiday issue of 26 December 1919, C.H. Parks took over
as editor, and T.A. Wilson became Trade Review‟s publisher. By April 1920, T.A.
Wilson took over permanently as both editor and publisher of a reduced bimonthly labor
newspaper, numbering only four pages. Reductions could not save the paper; Columbia
Trade Review seems to have vanished by the end of 1920.7
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In late January 1920, Columbia witnessed a brief walkout of AASERE Division
590 over the Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company‟s renewal of their annual
contract. Interestingly, in January 1920, Franklin H. Knox had assumed the presidency
of CRG&E, replacing Edward Robertson, who had respected the union‟s request for a
contractual guarantee for “closed shop” preference. Whether Knox‟s takeover of
Columbia‟s utility services had connections to Southern Power remains unclear, but his
subsequent actions in Columbia and Spartanburg expose Knox‟s redoubled determination
to completely destroy the streetcar union across the South Carolina Upcountry.8
The first inkling of trouble surfaced in the Trade Review, which reported: “Street
Railway Employees Want Renewed Contract.” No renewal of Division 590‟s exclusive
contract had been forthcoming after its expiry on December 31, 1919. John B. Lawson, a
special organizer for the Amalgamated Association, sought negotiations with the new
company management, only to be rebuffed. Lawson soon discovered “company
officials” had drawn up “yellow dog” contracts to break the streetcar union‟s influence.
Furthermore, Knox turned away a local delegation from the Columbia Federation of
Trades requesting a modest raise for the streetcar workers. However, Governor Robert
A. Cooper and Senator Pearce both urged the new president of Columbia Railway to
bargain with the unions. According to union spokesmen, a trolley strike was “by no
means improbable.” In a show of solidarity, car barn workers and electricians also went

Herald, edited by George McFarlane. (Trade Review of Columbia, 2 January 1920, 1; 2
April 1920, 1).
8
Columbia Record, 28 January 1920, 1.
189

on stand-by until an agreement could be reached. After nearly a month of patience,
Division 590 finally staged a peaceful walk-out on 28 January 1920.9
Predicting a long “tie-up,” Columbia Record journalists initially sought to remain
balanced in their interviews with strike principals. CRG&E president Knox outlined his
refusal to accept any new contract proposal retaining Section 15, stipulating a closed shop
policy. Knox even agreed to the sought-for wage increases, if only streetcar workers
omitted the union clause, which he claimed no longer applied in peacetime. Without a
National War Labor Board to enforce original contracts, Knox reserved his right as
CRG&E‟s chief executive to nullify prior agreements made by his predecessor.10
Toward this end, Knox placed a full-page advertisement in the 29 January
Columbia Record. Taking a page from Zebulon V. Taylor, Knox rhetorically asked:
“Why Did the Men Quit Their Jobs?” He blamed their purported act of “bad faith” on
questionable advice from their leaders. Claiming the “closed shop” provision had been a
mistake, Knox cited possible abuses, should the union demand that the company collect
their unpaid dues. As proof of his professed fairness toward labor unions, Knox upheld
his willingness to grant the Electrician‟s Union a raise.11
To rebut Knox‟s arguments, Ambrose Gerald of Division 590 stressed to reporters
that CRG&E‟s closed shop guarantee had been observed for eight years by Edward
Robertson. Gerald alleged that Knox only made an issue of union membership to “divert
the public eye” from the real issue, Division 590‟s relatively low wage scale. With
Columbia‟s recent fare increase from 5 to 7 cents, Gerald believed Knox could easily
9
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afford a living wage for his men, especially since Columbia streetcar men were paid
somewhat less than Knox‟s employees in the smaller town of Spartanburg.12
By the first week of February 1920, the transportation strike in South Carolina‟s
capital city threatened to embroil both Governor Cooper and the South Carolina General
Assembly. Headlines reported “No End in Sight for Car Strike,” as Governor Cooper
supervised two fruitless conferences between union representatives and company
president Knox. South Carolina‟s road engineer, D.G. McAlister, acted as mediator,
perhaps because Governor Cooper may have been too deeply involved. Under political
pressure from the South Carolina House of Representatives, Governor Cooper soon
referred the strike negotiators to the State Conciliation Board, helmed by two familiar
figures with streetcar strike experience -- Benette E. Geer of Greenville, and H.E.
“Smoke” Thompson of Batesburg. Geer and Thompson were joined by W.H. McNairy
of Chester. Streetcar workers expressed their desire for hourly wages peaking at 54
cents, plus union recognition by CRG&E. Knox offered 52 cents per hour in exchange
for dropping the issue. Both sides refused to budge on the sticking point of recognition.13
How did the Columbia public respond to this episode? Fears of major railway
strikes spiked, as major railroads reverted to private service at the end of February.
Revealing their corporate biases, Columbia Record editors Charlton Wright and Walter
Duncan openly accused the street railway men of making “ill-timed demands” and
promoting “class interests” in their support for government control. When conservative
anti-labor assemblymen proposed to ban the closed shop in South Carolina, the Columbia
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Record upheld such legislation, stating that a given employer “should be free to follow
his purpose without the intervention of the law.” 14
In the final week of February 1920, the McDonald Anti-Closed Shop Bill went up
for votes. This state proposal aimed to restrict collective bargaining and ban public labor
demonstrations. Over two hundred workingmen were present during the session to
demonstrate their solidarity. Most Upcountry representatives opposed this proposal.
Only Congressman Gray of Spartanburg sided with the anti-labor delegates, who
mounted an unsuccessful filibuster. Reporting from Columbia, C.H. Parks of the Trade
Review hailed the McDonald Bill‟s defeat as South Carolina labor‟s “greatest victory.”15
South Carolina‟s McDonald Bill coincided with similar anti-union proposals at
every level. During 1919, no fewer than seventy sedition bills were introduced in
Congress. C.H. Parks singled out the proposed Graham-Rice Sedition Bill in Trade
Review, warning this legislation could imperil the national labor movement, as it called
for censorship of all labor newspapers, with restrictions over the use of postal services.
Striking workers could be tried on conspiracy charges, facing imprisonment for twenty
years. Under this code, even landlords who privately rented to labor unions could be held
liable. Given Columbia‟s well-established union leadership, the McDonald Anti-Closed
Shop Bill, and its many federal counterparts, would have done great injury to the
workingmen of South Carolina.16
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Meanwhile, the first Columbia streetcar strike entered its second week with little
hope for resolution. With little fanfare and no newspaper coverage, Albert E. Jones
arrived from Ohio. Now the AASERE‟s Eleventh Vice-President, Jones met with South
Carolina‟s Conciliation Board to settle a dispute that threatened to eclipse Charlotte. On
February 6, Jones garnered some company concessions for Ambrose Gerald‟s striking
motormen. In exchange for Knox‟s 52-cent hourly wage offer, Columbia‟s Division 590
regretfully sacrificed their “closed shop” status. However, Gerald‟s streetcar crewmen
retained their union recognition and bargaining rights with Columbia Railway.
Significantly, this new contract for 1920 did not include Knox‟s signature. Witnessed by
“Smoke” Thompson and Ambrose Gerald, CRG&E General Manager V. S. Wright
signed for the company president, who had other problems brewing.17
Division 590‟s strike coincided with similar disgruntlement for Spartanburg‟s
Division 897. In April 1920, Columbia Trade Review reported further “car trouble” at
South Carolina Light, Power, and Railway. Workers complained that, since the
resolution of their strike in July 1919, one of their streetcars still operated on city streets
with replacement crewmen. They also alleged President Knox had failed to abide by his
earlier promise not to discriminate against union employees, resorting to discriminatory
practices designed to force union members to quit their jobs. New recruits signed
“yellow-dog” contracts with Spartanburg Power and Light, promising not to join the
now-depleted ranks of Division 897. These actions mirror Knox‟s strategy in Columbia,
where his new broom sought to sweep clean at CRG&E.18
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Offenses toward streetcar union members continued to accumulate. Spartanburg
Division president H.E. Sitton requested a wage increase in late 1919. But Knox had
refused to even look at a new 1920 contract proposal from union representatives. The
contract mirrored the original bargain struck in 1919 by the Spartanburg arbitration
process, except for a modest wage increase up to fifty cents per hour for the senior men.
Knox‟s actions might be seen as cost-cutting measures, considering that SCLP&R had
steadily lost money since 1916. But the company president‟s pettiness knew no bounds.
Knox also broke his July 1919 guarantee of monthly vacation days, leading T.A. Wilson
of the Spartanburg Central Labor Union to sympathize with the strikers. He defined the
“unrest fermenting in Spartanburg” as the results of a “plain case of discrimination”
against the labor union that had caused Knox so much recent grief.19
H.E. Sitton appealed to South Carolina‟s Labor Department, whose
representative, William C. Liller interceded unsuccessfully on behalf of the Spartanburg
chapter. Columbia‟s Local 590 planned a rally on 15 April, to demonstrate support for
their neighboring local union in distress. However, a second streetcar strike did not take
place in Spartanburg. In forcing the streetcar union to knuckle under in Spartanburg,
Knox may have taken some grim satisfaction for his previous defeat in 1919. If so, Knox
did not savor his victory in Spartanburg for very long. South Carolina Light, Power and
Railway owed several debts to various corporations, including $13, 358 to General
Electric. During February 1921, Spartanburg‟s street railway system fell into state
receivership. This development could not have pleased Zebulon Taylor, as Southern
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Public Utilities still owned stock in the Spartanburg-based utility enterprise. Knox,
however, still retained control of Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company. 20
During the watchful year of 1921, Columbia Railway also began to lose revenues,
as even fewer people rode the trolleys in Columbia. Inexorably, private automobiles and
jitney buses had begun to eclipse the electric streetcar across the region. Transportation
historian Thomas Fetters -- slightly biased toward the business side -- blamed CRG&E‟s
decline on town ordinances designed to keep one-man cars out of Columbia. Fetters also
cited the company‟s recent fare hikes to seven cents (ten cents for transfers) as another
factor. Yet, Franklin Knox‟s ensuing actions in early 1922 reveal his underlying motive
to purge the local streetcar union. 21
In January 1922, Knox submitted a new contract deemed unacceptable by the
union, chiefly because its terms no longer guaranteed arbitration. Knox further cut his
workers‟ pay scale by a full 10 percent, and announced his plan to introduce one-man
cars. Division 590‟s president, Ambrose A. Gerald, told Columbia reporters that his men
decided to “stomach wage reductions,” but felt union arbitration rights were “inviolable.”
Gerald, recently elected to a third term as Richland County‟s representative, also served
as the South Carolina House Chairman on Railroads. Gerald‟s platform also boasted a
plan for textile mill reforms. While the South Carolina Senate defeated Gerald‟s proposal
for eight-hour workdays, Gerald sponsored a successful bill enforcing statewide
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maximums of 55 hours per week. He also authored the Discharged Laborers Act,
requiring corporations to pay employees immediately upon dismissal.22 Holding a
distinguished state office, as well as union leadership, A.A. Gerald proved a formidable
adversary for Franklin Knox throughout the coming months.
After a tense month, with Knox refusing to renegotiate with Gerald‟s union,
matters came to a serious head. On Valentine‟s Day of 1922, Knox discharged 21
streetcar men, citing his company‟s rising overhead. Nearly all these employees
belonged to the Columbia streetcar union. On February 15, President Knox publicly
aired his business concerns, explaining his street railway had deficits totaling
$119,758.46. Furthermore, CRG&E‟s state property taxes were unpaid as of February,
raising the company‟s total debt to $209,758.46. Knox argued that his decision to
discharge its employees was solely based on January losses of $11,886.32.23
That same day, Ambrose Gerald led his workers on strike. Gerald accused Knox
of seeking to destroy the Columbia streetcar union, claiming that his 21 discharged
compatriots were all local members in good standing. Nearly all Columbia Railway‟s108
conductors and motormen belonged to Division 590, so Knox‟s mass firing reduced the
union‟s strength by one-fifth. Gerald informed the AASERE General Executive Board
that Knox displayed an “attitude threatening to dismiss more,” with the “apparent
purpose of destroying the organization.” Undisputedly, President Knox of the Columbia
Railway had taken a calculated risk in triggering this second streetcar strike in two years.
Under Columbia city law, his company had 90 days to resume service or lose its
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exclusive contract. Once more emulating actions of Zebulon V. Taylor, Knox purchased
a full-page advertisement in the sympathetic Columbia Record to submit his case.
Moreover, Knox decided to confront Gerald in the public forum.24
First, Knox replied to Gerald‟s imputations of hostility to unions, emphasizing his
policy aimed to “give every man a square deal.” However, the wily president refused to
allow Gerald any leverage for argument. “Just what [constitutes] a square deal cannot be
defined in any agreement, as it is a very broad term,” Knox hedged. Then, Knox warned
his striking workers, as well as the general public, that CRG&E might soon “find it
necessary to discontinue operations.” On the subject of state arbitration, Knox felt his
company “could not agree to submit to arbitration the question of whom we shall employ
or discharge.” Claiming his right to decide CRG&E‟s best course, Knox instructed
Ambrose Gerald and his supporters to “consider the position of this company final.” In
the company president‟s view, the 108 strikers brought the resulting lockout on
themselves. Knox washed his hands of all blame.25
Within a few days, A.A. Gerald made a press statement, albeit without front-page
coverage. In Gerald‟s estimation, Knox may have desired to cut costs, but felt his union
compatriots had been unjustly fired “without a clear purpose.” Gerald suggested the
reduction of older streetcars in CRG&E‟s service might cut operation costs. Gerald
reassured Columbians that his union did not seek to control the company through closed
shop doctrines. As a state legislator, Gerald believed state laws providing for worker
arbitration would justify their cause. He proposed an arbitration plan, wherein labor and

24

Columbia Record, 15 February 1922, 1, 10; Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 30, No.
3 (February 1922), 13-14.
25
Columbia Record, 15 February 1922, 1, 10.
197

capital each would have one representative. Since Division 590 and Knox would likely
not agree on a mediator, Gerald suggested the Columbia mayor, R. Johnson Blalock.26
Mayor Blalock held a town meeting during the strike‟s first week, endorsing the
arbitration process. However, the mayor could not compel Knox to cooperate with the
State Board of Conciliation. Moreover, as Columbia served as the state capital, Blalock
most likely deferred this serious labor matter to Robert A. Cooper, still in office as a
lame-duck governor. Throughout the month of February, both the mayor and governor
kept their own counsel, coordinating with the State Board of Conciliation. Meanwhile,
John B. Lawson from the Amalgamated Association‟s General Executive Board came to
assist the local union.27
Columbia Record editors predicted the city‟s streetcars would remain “idle for
many days,” observing the city‟s “traveling public” used streetcars less frequently.
However, there were still “many who depend on street railways.” Though streetcar tracks
were “covered with rust,” the strike at least kept the company “out of more losses.” 28
Meanwhile, Ambrose Gerald, true to his word, went to the state legislature with his
special arbitration proposal, which quickly passed both houses of South Carolina‟s
General Assembly. This narrowly-stipulated legislation applied specifically to Columbia,
requiring CRG&E‟s management to fully explain its firing of employees. Moreover, it
re-affirmed the city‟s 1917 wartime measure, requiring streetcars to run with experienced
crewmen, or substitutes with two weeks of training under such motormen. Violators
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could face maximum fines of $100 or jail sentences of up to one month for each day of
operation. Such measures were designed to prevent Knox from hiring strikebreakers. 29
By February 22, Governor Cooper had signed the Gerald Arbitration Act into law,
naming Former Richland County Sheriff John McCain as the mediator. However,
Columbia Railway attorney J. B. Lyles questioned the constitutionality of Gerald‟s
measure, especially the clause re-affirming the streetcar regulations. When the State
Attorney General‟s office indicated the existing ordinance was indeed constitutional, J. B.
Lyles promised to challenge the state‟s ruling in the South Carolina Appeals Court.30
On February 27, Lyles went before Associate Justice T.P. Cothran to secure an
injunction against lower courts and labor representatives to prevent them from enacting
either the Gerald Act or the 1917 statute. Invoking that well-used ploy of businessmen,
the 14th Amendment, Lyles claimed the Gerald Act hurt his company‟s profits because it
prevented them from hiring new motormen. He also alleged that no other utility
company in South Carolina had to deal with such discriminatory regulations. 31
As Justice Cothran weighed the Gerald Arbitration Act‟s legality, CRG&E
president Knox appealed once more to public opinion, demanding the right to select his
company‟s own motormen and conductors, specifying their work conditions, and
reserving the power to discharge them without arbitration. Knox certainly had supporters
among the business community of Columbia. Charlton Wright and Walter Duncan
editorialized in the Columbia Record after the strike‟s second week had passed.
Addressing the “Car Strike,” Wright and Duncan summarily dismissed the local streetcar
29
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union, a respected part of Columbia‟s labor movement for ten years, as a mere
organization “banded together for their private purposes… without the least responsibility
towards the public.” The editors also considered the 1917 ordinance too powerful for the
likes of such an “unimportant group to bludgeon the company into submission.” While
claiming to support only the public‟s interest, Columbia Record‟s editors openly sided
with the company‟s desire for “some freedom of action.” 32
By the end of February, the Columbia streetcar strike of 1922 developed into a
stalemate. William A. Coleman told reporters that the City Council alone could not bring
a ready solution, although its members continued to work as private citizens to bring an
end to the impasse. City Council members proposed to refer the strike to the state courts,
which agreed to review the case on March 7. In the meantime, South Carolina
representatives adopted their own measure to investigate Knox‟s claims of financial
hardship. Under W.D. Barnett‟s resolution, state tax commissioners would investigate
Columbia Gas, Railway, and Electric‟s tax claims. Barnett‟s resolution passed amid
doubts whether it would affect the state‟s forthcoming judicial review. 33
Meanwhile, the city of Columbia dealt with the transportation shortage through
means of a legitimate jitney service. On March 1, the Chamber of Commerce approved
two local organizations of volunteer drivers, calling themselves the “Jump in and Ride”
and “Ride with Me” movements. William Lykes served as city transportation chairman,
funding signs and placards to inform suburbanites of the city‟s assembly points.
Needless to say, “Jump in and Ride” and “Ride with Me” programs were well-received
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by auto owners, because participation allowed them to make spare change. Several
hundred townsfolk assisted in this initiative to relieve the streetcar strike during the rainy
season. Coincidentally, state lawmakers took a courtesy ride on a newly paved Richland
County road on March 3, promoting a budget for improved South Carolina roads.34
Division 590 seems to have tolerated these voluntary driving programs, if only
because they discouraged would-be passengers from riding non-union streetcars.
Whereas streetcar unions often saw jitneys as unfair competition under normal
circumstances, such measures could prove beneficial during a strike. Such had been the
case in Charlotte almost three years earlier. For now, the Columbia streetcar union
concentrated on the March 7 court proceedings, which would determine the final
authority over the streetcar situation. On the night prior to their court date, John Lawson
and A.A. Gerald rallied their supporters at the courthouse. Censuring the Columbia
Railway‟s obduracy, Gerald nevertheless promised his men would “go to work in the
morning” if their company offered contracts similar to Charleston‟s recent agreement,
guaranteeing overtime benefits and city arbitration, among other rights.35
Columbia Record thereafter dismissed the union‟s courthouse demonstration as
“staged gestures,” because its audience consisted solely of union members, or those with
political grudges against the Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company. “Public
utilities in Columbia have long been the football of small politicians and small
candidates,” the editorial opined, taking a subtle swipe at Ambrose Gerald‟s political
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career. Columbia Record openly sided with “vitally interested” businessmen who “work
for a living,” with implications that Gerald and his supporters were not industrious.36
After a week‟s deliberation, the Columbia court ruled on the strike. As state
capital, Columbia‟s street railway system came under “direct scrutiny” of the South
Carolina Board of Railroad Commissioners. This governmental body had just been
expanded by the state legislature from three to seven panelists. Immediately, the
Railroad Commission ordered Columbia Railway to get their streetcar lines running
within one week, or they would assume control. Franklin Knox now faced a serious
deadline, complicated by the fact Augusta, Georgia‟s streetcar lines commenced with a
strike of their own.37
Shortly after the court‟s ultimatum, Knox delivered one of his own: Columbia
Railway streetcar men had until noon, March 17, to cross the picket line, or risk being
replaced by new workers. Knox promised nine-hour shifts, recognizing seniority
wherever possible, but claimed the right to dismiss employees without union arbitration.
A.A. Gerald read the company‟s proffered contract, and promptly rejected Knox‟s
demands, on grounds that his terms would return Division 590 workers to the exact
obligations they had endured prior to the strike.38
However, Knox‟s appeals met with some success. Some prior streetcar crewmen
defected from the union, while others applied for vacant positions. Columbia Railway
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Superintendent J.W. Spence later told reporters that 35 men in total had answered
CRG&E‟s first calls for employment. Some recruits came from Georgia, North Carolina,
and Virginia.

With a small workforce prepared to resume car service within the week,

Knox felt confident enough to decline Gerald‟s contract proposal, under supervision of
the state Railroad Commission. While Governor Cooper had expanded the commission‟s
powers to act in the public interest, it lacked the power to compel Knox into City Hall. 39
Columbia‟s city councilors, in the meantime, agreed that South Carolina‟s
Railroad Commission, with its broad authority, obviated the need for the city‟s wartime
ordinance restricting streetcar crewmen from operating cars without training. This
decision dashed Gerald‟s hopes of testing the 1917 law against Knox‟s new employees.
This sent a clear sign to Division 590 that their days in Columbia were numbered.40
On March 20, Columbia Railway activated three streetcars for limited service in
downtown Columbia. That afternoon, one of Knox‟s streetcars passed the Union Hall on
the 1500 block of Main Street. Two crewmen were allegedly dragged from their posts by
a small crowd. Police could find no injured parties on Main Street, but discovered
broken windows toward the streetcar‟s rear. One operator, Brooks, later claimed to have
been blackjacked. Three men were arrested. Meanwhile, a second report brought two
carloads of policemen to Colonial Heights, where a crewman and one passenger had been
taken to Columbia Hospital for treatment.41
Mayor Blalock and the city magistrates heard both cases on the next day.
Conductor H.T. Shannon accused three defendants, J.L. Jennings, D.K. Spiers, and S.P.
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Snelgrove, of participation in the Main Street incident. However, owing to a lack of
corroborative witnesses, Jennings, Spiers, and Snelgrove were released on peace bonds,
free to go as long as no further problems arose. In the meantime, Columbia police had
apprehended two men in connection with the Colonial Heights incident. B.S. Ward, J.O.
Williams, and three others were seen following the Colonial Heights streetcar in an
automobile prior to the assault. Ward and Williams were both charged with multiple
counts of assault and battery, while the other suspects were held on lesser charges.42
Indubitably, such incidents significantly damaged the union‟s standing in
Columbia. Columbia Railway took their cars off-line to prevent further damage, and
Knox appealed to Governor Robert Cooper for protection. Cooper vowed to protect the
streetcar service, even promising to deploy the National Guard if necessary. His
justification for such a drastic step hinged upon the company‟s compliance under the
state Railroad Commission. Meanwhile, the city of Columbia charged the men of
Division 590 to refrain from further hostility. Gerald pledged to exert discipline among
his ranks, even as Columbia Railway‟s streetcars resumed service on March 22. 43
Throughout the tense days of late March, Gerald persisted in seeking lawful
means to end the company lock-out. On March 23, Associate State Justice Cothran
finally upheld the Gerald Act‟s provisions for state arbitration. However, CRG&E‟s
attorney, J.B. Lyles, insisted his company did not require arbitration, as it had already
complied with the state Railroad Commission‟s order to resume street railway services.
Moreover, Lyles argued that Judge Cothran‟s ruling could not alter the company‟s
ongoing process of employing and training new workers. Unfortunately for Division
42
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590, Lyles had built a persuasive case against the 1917 law. Under its wartime
provisions, new streetcar workers were required to train for fifteen days under
experienced motormen. Since some veteran workers had already crossed the picket line,
Knox‟s strikebreakers now had qualified trainers. But the question now remained
whether these new men were trained for the requisite period before assuming duty.44
This legal point quickly became moot. Ambrose Gerald brought his test case to
the Richland County courthouse, where County Judge C.J. Kimball dismissed the
streetcar union‟s case against T.C. Chalker, a replacement motorman accused of violating
the wartime code. In rebuttal, Chalker testified to several years of streetcar experience in
Jacksonville, North Carolina, corroborated by CRG&E superintendent J.W. Spence.45
Furthermore, Kimball sided with Columbia‟s city councilors, believing the state
Railroad Commission overrode city law, effectively repealing the wartime condition on
street railways. One might question whether due legal process had actually repealed the
ordinance in question, or if these decisions simply reflected widespread opposition
toward the law‟s original intent – to protect Division 590 from downsizing and
strikebreakers. Gerald promised to appeal Kimball‟s ruling to higher courts. Shortly
after Kimball‟s decision, the union representatives appealed to the District Court to name
a state arbiter who would force Franklin Knox to listen to grievances. Knox, however,
maintained that arbitration would put his company out of business.46
By Monday, March 26, ten Columbia Railway streetcars were running under
police guards, with an eleventh car joining them on the next day. By March 29, twelve
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streetcars plied their routes across Columbia. That week, Mayor Blalock ordered six
policemen to convoy each streetcar, with five officers in automobiles and one astride a
motorcycle. Rural police and sheriff‟s departments were to escort streetcars over
CRG&E‟s three suburban lines. Citing public safety, Blalock asserted his regard for the
streetcar union, refusing to blame Gerald‟s men for the recent violence. Blalock blamed
“other elements” for taking advantage of the Columbia strike to commit crimes.47
Only one arrest took place under these vigilant circumstances, which lasted until
March 30. Will Etters, rumored to have been involved in the Colonial Heights incident,
openly criticized police escorting the streetcars. More serious charges awaited J.O. Ward
and B.S. Williams, the two men charged with leading the Colonial Heights attack on
March 20. Already booked on charges of assault and battery, with murderous intent,
these two men also faced possible federal prosecution, as two Columbia streetcars had
been carrying U.S. mail on the date in question.48
Even after Mayor Blalock‟s removal of police escorts on March 30, some officers
were kept on station at suburban lines to deter vandals. Franklin Knox welcomed the
normalization, even going so far as to accept A.A. Gerald‟s word that his union chapter
did not authorize the violence on March 20. But Knox‟s magnanimity had its limits.
Even as he reassured Gerald that his policy did not mean a war against organized labor,
the general manager of Columbia Railway still refused to meet with state arbitrators.49
With the Columbia street railway system in full service under replacement labor,
South Carolina‟s capital city went back to normal. But the streetcar union held on until
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the bitter end. J.B. Lawson kept in contact with A.A. Gerald and his loyal band of
streetcar workers. Throughout the remaining months of 1922, union correspondents
informed Motorman and Conductor that CRG&E operated its streetcars at a loss. Low
patronage had taken its toll on the company, even while strikebreakers received full pay.
Meanwhile, some of the streetcar workers began operating “auto-buses” to “care for the
people.” Such tactics were also practiced in Richmond, Virginia, where another lock-out
had endangered two AASERE chapters since January 1922. In Columbia, independent
jitneys now competed with the streetcars their drivers had once operated with pride and
purpose. Transportation historian Thomas Fetters confirms that these buses had a
palpable effect on CRG&E‟s economic decline over the next few years.50
By June 1922, Division 590 recognized their fight with Knox as being “one to the
finish.” At James B. Lawson‟s urging, the AASERE General Executive Board granted
Division 590 full relief from its membership dues as they struggled for survival.
Columbia Railway increased its operational cars to twenty-two vehicles by July.
Division 590‟s correspondent also noted the company‟s losses had continued to deepen,
owing to decreased patronage. Union men attributed low patronage to popular opposition
toward “scabs.” Such men, in the words of one union member writing to Motorman and
Conductor, were “undermining the shaft that will fall upon their own heads.” 51
By November 1922, most of the Division 590 members had sought other
professions, or became bus drivers in competition with their former company. Rumors
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circulated that Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company teetered on the edge of
receivership under Stone & Webster that fall. However, the union members reported the
same “self-seeking” company management remained in charge of Columbia Railway that
December. Following the holidays, fortunes did not improve for A.A. Gerald‟s union
chapter. Motorman and Conductor‟s last contact with Division 590, April 1923, stated
“it is problematical as to how long this condition will survive.”52
Knox‟s successful strategy against the streetcar union yielded a pyrrhic victory at
best. In this goal, Knox had the willing aid of many influential state and local authorities,
which outmaneuvered the forces of labor in the courts and public opinion. But Thomas
Fetters indicates Columbia‟s defeat of unionism did not solve CRG&E‟s problems.
Operating streetcars at a loss, competition from former personnel, and rising passenger
fares all took their toll on the Columbia utility corporation. But Fetters also brought up
another major catalyst in streetcar decline, borne out by the newspapers of the era. Even
while the streetcar strike had been but a month old, Columbia townsfolk were already
preparing for the second of three Palmetto State Festivals, known colloquially as
Palmafesta. Sponsored by South Carolina‟s Chamber of Commerce, these auto festivals
encouraged local dealerships and promoted state roads.53
Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company declined after the strike. In 1922,
South Carolina tried to seize an unfinished canal from CRG&E, citing the state‟s original
possession of the property. Since 1917, the utility company had failed to complete a
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hydro-electric dam, yielding 500 horsepower to the city of Columbia. Expensive lawsuits
and countersuits accumulated, until the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the company‟s
property rights in January 1923. By 1925, Franklin Knox had been replaced by F. K.
Woodring. Patronage on Columbia Railway trolleys had fallen quite dramatically, a onethird reduction from the previous year‟s figures. Columbia‟s Chamber of Commerce,
likely noting the success of competing motor-buses on the city streets, suggested CRG&E
should replace their trolleys. Columbia Railway ceased to exist in 1934. Columbia,
however, retained a few electric streetcars for interurban lines until they were retired in
1936. That same January, Franklin H. Knox passed away at age 71.54
With the proliferation of automobiles, as well as Columbia‟s lobby for better
roads, public opinion ultimately found the streetcar union question of marginal relevance.
Despite operating at a loss, Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric still managed to starve
the local streetcar union out of existence. Ambrose Gerald had built a successful local
streetcar union, lasting barely a decade. Like those of Charlotte, Winston-Salem,
Greenville, and Spartanburg, Columbia‟s streetcar men were victims of the “open-shop”
movement, later known as the “American Plan.” But, unlike Zebulon V. Taylor, Franklin
H. Knox had won his personal war against industrial democracy. Although his campaign
to break AASERE Division 590 proved a Pyrrhic victory, Knox emerged victorious
without firing a single shot.
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Chapter Eight: Epilogue and Conclusions

Wheels of progress ground across the Piedmont‟s millstone, even as the streetcar
strikes of Spartanburg, Charlotte, and Columbia receded into unhappy memory, and then,
near-obscurity. While the previous chapter addressed the fate of Franklin Knox‟s
enterprises in South Carolina, this chapter will summarize the successful evolution of
Southern Public Utilities into Duke Power, focusing upon its transition from electric
street railways to bus lines. Furthermore, principal figures involved in the Carolina
Piedmont streetcar strikes will receive final analysis.
Streetcar labor organization in the Carolina Piedmont withered on the vine after
the events of 1919-22. Neither Columbia‟s nor Spartanburg‟s unions survived Franklin
Knox‟s waiting game. Motorization soon obviated the demand, if not the need, for
trolley systems in South Carolina‟s major towns. By the mid-1920s, Charleston remained
the only South Carolina town with unionized street railways. In North Carolina,
Charlotte‟s union had disbanded in the spring of 1922, while embryonic organizations in
Salisbury and Durham, North Carolina (Divisions 920 and 923) also came to naught.
Winston-Salem‟s movement lingered on for a brief time, but soon, Division 893 followed
Charlotte‟s union into oblivion. Both Asheville and the coast city of Wilmington
experienced strikes that jeopardized their streetcar unions, but in both cases, new
contracts preserved old agreements. By 1925, Asheville Division 128 sent the Western
Carolinas‟ sole union delegate, William B. Plemmons, to the AASERE‟s annual
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convention. Between Asheville, Wilmington, and Charleston, no signs of the streetcar
union remained in the Carolina heartlands throughout the next two decades.1
Southern Public Utilities quickly regained its economic momentum after the
Charlotte strike. Company sources estimated over $100,000 in lost revenues and
property damage, plus at least $400,000 in lost business. Returning streetcar men were
said to have lost $40,000 in wages and expenses. John Paul Lucas of the Southern Public
Utilities Magazine speculated the total loss approached “three-quarters of a million
dollars,” with some estimates closer to a full million. “Crippled companies do not
expand and provide work… and service for more people,” Lucas observed. Yet,
Southern Public Utilities – and Southern Power – were far from crippled. By 1922,
James B. Duke had built ten hydroelectric and four steam plants, providing 93 percent of
the Carolina Piedmont‟s utility needs. Seventy-five percent went to textile mills, while
15 percent went to manufacturing and agricultural interests. The remaining thirteen
percent went to towns and select households – Duke was much slower to embrace rural
electrification.2
Duke‟s growth accelerated the modernization of North and South Carolina‟s
Piedmont regions, but it also alarmed other businessmen, as well as the governments.
Even while the Charlotte Regional Strike took place, the Salisbury & Spencer Railway
Company built an anti-monopoly case against Southern Power, which went to the North
Carolina Supreme Court in December 1919. Later in 1920, James B. Duke and Zebulon
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Taylor also faced state hearings before the North Carolina Corporation Commission.
Since 1913, state Democrats had sought to limit Southern Power‟s utility rates. In 1920,
the Corporation Commission in Raleigh sponsored a rate-control bill. Duke listened from
the gallery as Zebulon Taylor and William States Lee argued on the corporation‟s behalf.
One should note Duke‟s rare personal appearance. Herman Wolf, an engineer employed
by Southern Power at that point, later recalled that Duke did not “take kindly to
interference with his electric rates.” Despite strong popular support, North Carolina‟s
regulatory measure failed to pass General Assembly by a single vote in March 1921.3
Soon after his victory, Zebulon V. Taylor passed away on 18 April 1921.
Taylor‟s death occurred en route to New York aboard James B. Duke‟s personal train.
Taylor‟s official cause of death appears to have been “acute indigestion,” but the
company president had also lost his wife and suffered from appendicitis in 1920. Others
speculated Taylor‟s personal exertions during Southern Power‟s “Rate War” may have
also taken their toll. In Habits of Industry, Allen Tullos described a similar fate for D.A.
Tompkins in 1914, because “strenuous” devotion to his North Carolina business empire
left little room for “exercise and recreation.” It would seem both Tompkins and Taylor
had fallen prey to their own Protestant work ethic, taken to its most extreme conclusions.
Numerous tributes poured out to Taylor from regional newspapers, as company treasurer
E.C. Marshall quickly assumed control of Southern Public Utilities.4
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James B. Duke‟s legacy has been well-documented by Robert Durden and other
historians. In December 1924, Duke set aside $40 million for the Duke Endowment,
funding several colleges across the Carolinas. One-third went to Trinity College in
Durham, North Carolina, renamed Duke University in its benefactor‟s honor. Two
Charlotte colleges also benefited from Duke‟s generosity; the traditionally black Johnson
C. Smith University and the Presbyterian Davidson College. Duke‟s friend and trustee,
Ben E. Geer, also received support for Furman College in Greenville, South Carolina.
Yet, James B. Duke did not live long enough to see his vast endowment come to fruition.
In the fall of 1925, the entrepreneur developed pneumonia, dying in his New York City
mansion on October 10, at age 68.5
In 1927, Southern Power changed its name to reflect its creator, a man who
undoubtedly fulfilled the New South ideal, whether or not he believed in it. That year,
Southern Public Utilities continued to appropriate streetcar lines, gaining 30 cars and 19
track miles in Greensboro and High Point. Duke Power retained Southern Public Utilities
until its absorption in 1935. Duke Power went on to become the most significant utility
company in the South, a leader of the so-called “Piedmont Carolinas Movement,” a
consortium of industrialists and “go-getters” who followed in James B. Duke‟s wake.
Low wages continued to prevail through the region, although Duke Power did not lay off
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its workers during the Great Depression. Herman Wolf recalled how Southern Public
Utilities and its parent company “stuck together like a family” during the ongoing crisis. 6
Transportation historian Walter Turner indicated that even during the 1920s, the
North Carolina Corporation Commission had been discouraging toward electric
streetcars. Competition with modern highways, auto-bus traffic, and a three-fold growth
in car ownership, plus the costs of road maintenance, had rendered streetcars an
endangered species. Smaller towns, such as Concord and Goldsboro, adopted buses just
before the Great Depression. Other towns made the transition more slowly. Asheville,
Raleigh, and Greensboro each reported high levels of ridership until the late 1920s. But,
when these cities ended their street railway franchises in 1934, others began to follow
suit. High Point and Winston-Salem ended streetcar service in 1935 and 1936. Trolleys
remained one of Wilmington‟s popular beachside attractions, but in 1939, their bells
clanged for the last time.7
On 15 November 1937, the North Carolina Utility Commission approved Duke
Power‟s proposal to replace its aging streetcar lines with bus service throughout the
company‟s sphere of influence. Over the years, Southern Public Utilities had
experimented with trackless trolleys and motor-buses. Finally, the company settled on
motorized buses, because they were perceived as “nearly noiseless” and more flexible
than street railways. With 15 buses already in service, Duke Power estimated 45 more
vehicles would be required over a six-month period. Within one year, most of the old
6
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streetcar terminals were remodeled and modernized for Duke‟s bus-lines. Although
“dime taxis” still competed for passengers in 1938, the new Charlotte bus system now
served approximately fifty percent more citizens than had the street railway system.
Duke‟s highly publicized bus campaign, with comfortable seats (in comparison with
streetcars at least) and well-appointed bus terminals, met with public approval throughout
the Carolina Piedmont.8
Over the course of several decades, Duke Power (now Duke Energy) engineers
followed the traditions of William States Lee and Herman Wolf, providing electricity for
residential districts and corporate sectors. Today, Charlotte has become a metropolis,
dominating much of South Carolina‟s Upcountry, despite state boundaries. Parallel
developments in Arkansas have allowed Bentonville to dominate the Ozarks. Bethany
Moreton‟s To Serve God and Wal-Mart examines the evolution of Sam Walton‟s
business empire, which not unlike Southern Power derived its original work-force from
rural people steeped in Protestant work ethic, patriotic virtues, and hostility toward
organized labor. Even in the midst of the Great Recession, Wal-Mart has proven resistant
to labor reform, and consistently purges union sympathizers from its outlets.9
To borrow an apt political adjective, entrepreneurs such as Zebulon Taylor and
Franklin Knox were “irreconcilables” toward organized labor. They usually employed
lawful means to exert their will, but were capable of legal chicanery to outmaneuver
unions. To these civilizers of the Piedmont, organized labor represented a barbaric
“foreign” power seeking to stir up their otherwise content employees with false promises.
8
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While this work duly acknowledges James Duke‟s philanthropy, Southern Power‟s
language belies the benevolent image constructed by Robert Durden and others. Zebulon
Taylor, in particular, comes across as paternalistic toward workers and yet inflammatory
toward labor reformers, who were consistently – some would say unjustly -- portrayed as
“aliens” or “outsiders.” But Duke and Taylor were not unusual cases of corporate
paternalism, nor were they the worst. Historian Allen Tullos describes the role of
conservative Protestantism in determining the long “stretch-outs” and “speed-ups” for
textile mill hands and streetcar workers. Enlightened fathers of Piedmont industry knew
best what their employees needed: more work. Free time, some employers argued,
would permit black and white workers more opportunity for the Devil‟s work. Some
probably viewed joining a labor union in one‟s spare time an even worse sin than
rampant alcoholism. After all, labor organizers were portrayed as urban liberals wishing
to force their alien views on the pure, American South. Whipping up prejudices, New
South industrialists effectively blocked workers from unionizing.10
The events detailed in Between the Wheels also wrought significant changes on
regional North and South Carolina politics. Mayor Frank R. McNinch became one
casualty of the 1919 strike, at least in the short term. One of McNinch‟s Charlotte rivals,
F.M. Shannonhouse, characterized Charlotte‟s 1919 recall election as a public
condemnation for the progressive mayor‟s initial reluctance to use force against the
“rapidly growing spirit of Bolshevism.” For his part, McNinch regretted the violent
outcome, and he seemed to quickly lose enthusiasm for Charlotte politics. On a rainy
August evening one year after the strike, he addressed the State Federation of Labor at a
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local high school. The mayor felt Charlotte had “misinterpreted and misjudged”
organized labor‟s motives during a period of high passions. McNinch voiced his
philosophical opposition to “class government,” whether by powerful industrialists or
labor agitators. Instead, he exhorted Charlotte‟s workingmen to use “constructive…
lawful methods” to effect positive changes, avoiding the influence of “gold-diggers” with
“selfish purposes.” Shortly after this revealing speech, Frank R. McNinch resigned as
Charlotte‟s mayor to accept a regional position with the National Recreation Association
of America, the forerunner of our present-day National Recreation and Parks Association.
In this capacity, McNinch spent nearly a decade in the political wilderness.11
Over the ensuing two decades, Frank McNinch‟s later career reflected the difficult
path of Southern Progressivism. In 1928, McNinch styled himself an “independent
Democrat,” convincing many North Carolinians to reject Alfred Smith, a Catholic who
opposed Prohibition. Frank McNinch also stumped in favor of the conservative National
Origins Act of 1924, invoking the wrath of W. J. Cash, managing editor of the Cleveland
Press in Shelby, North Carolina. Deriding the concept of “Nordic Superiority,” Cash
also accused McNinch of extending the nation‟s “anti-Catholic pogrom” for his own
political ambitions.12
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Like the arch-conservative North Carolina Senator Furnifold M. Simmons, Frank
McNinch defected to the “Hoovercrats,” reaping great political rewards. Under the
Federal Power Commission‟s statute, Hoover had to name one member from the
opposition party, so McNinch seemed a safe bet. In December 1930, the Senate
confirmed McNinch (47 to 11) as a member of the regulatory commission, governing
public utility programs and energy resources. Despite Hoover‟s expectations, the short,
unflappable North Carolinian soon boasted a progressive anti-monopoly record heralding
the New Deal. Under Franklin Roosevelt, McNinch became the Federal Power
Commission president, visiting the Netherlands in 1935 for the World Power Conference.
McNinch also supported the New Deal‟s rural electrification programs, using Federal
authority to escalate processes once begun through private industry. 13 James B. Duke
and Zebulon V. Taylor would likely have balked at such comprehensive changes.
In 1937, McNinch became the first director of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), once appearing on the front cover of Time. McNinch opposed the
manipulation of communications by political interests, stressing equal time for
oppositional viewpoints. McNinch‟s biographical entry asserts his steadfast opposition to
censorship. However, McNinch‟s defense of free speech reached its limit after actress
Mae West irked the religious Southerner with one of her ribald witticisms on the air.
During World War II, McNinch went back to his lawyerly roots, serving as special
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assistant to the Attorney General until his retirement under the Truman administration.
Frank Ramsay McNinch died on April 20, 1950.14
Chief Walter Baxter Orr, the man most responsible for escalating the crisis in
Charlotte, suffered little adversity for his conduct on August 25, 1919. Nor did Orr ever
face perjury charges for contradicting his first testimony shortly after the “Battle of the
Barn.” Unlike his mentor, Sheriff Newt Wallace, Orr lacked the patience to control large
crowds. Relatively young for his newly-appointed rank, Walter Orr nonetheless faced a
thankless situation. But one is judged by their actions under duress, and Orr‟s
mishandling of the Dilworth situation speaks volumes. Chief Orr retained his position
until March 26, 1926, when he retired after twenty years. Thereafter, Orr served as
director of Charlotte‟s Sanitary Department, where he once more courted controversy
over his zealous enforcement of sanitation across Charlotte. Walter Baxter Orr passed
away on April 24, 1957, mourned as a lost part of “old Charlotte.” 15
Attorney Marvin Lee Ritch continued to reside in Charlotte, coaching Charlotte
High School‟s football team and maintaining his legal practice. However, Ritch suffered
for his efforts on behalf of Piedmont workers. For his leadership during the Wiscasset
Mills strike, Ritch paid over $500 in fines and court costs, and he subsequently lost a
1920 bid for U.S. Congress as a “Square Deal” Democrat, largely due to an editorial
smear campaign. Ann R. Brantley confirms that her father‟s continual endorsement of
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liberal causes hurt his political career. But there were happier moments for Ritch. In
April 1922, the widower married his wife‟s first cousin, Lois Wilson, an emancipated
college graduate from a prominent Gaston County family. Within ten years, the Ritch
family had grown to include two more daughters.16
Throughout the next two decades, Ritch represented a coterie of legal clients,
including disabled mill workers, high-profile murder suspects, even a former Ku Klux
Klan member. Ritch‟s expanding legal practice enabled him to build a house for
$17,000, which he ultimately lost during the Depression. During the Second World War,
Ritch won two non-consecutive terms (1939-42) as a New Deal Democrat in the General
Assembly, but lost to Clyde Hoey in a bid to succeed U.S. Senator Robert Reynolds.
Thereafter, Ritch switched to divorce law, even while still coaching high school athletics.
During the 1950s, Ritch supported integration of black athletes in North Carolina schools.
Helped by state voting district reforms in 1966, Marvin Lee Ritch returned once more to
the North Carolina General Assembly, at a venerable age of 77. But plagued by diabetes,
Ritch suffered a stroke in 1971, and died in Charlotte at age 82.17
Concerning the South Carolina personalities, far less information is currently
available. Franklin H. Knox, as mentioned previously, died in 1936, the same year much
of the Piedmont‟s electric streetcar service converted to motorization. Benette Geer
continued to act as a trustee to the Duke Endowment for the remainder of his life. During
16
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World War II, Geer came out of business retirement to serve as a Roosevelt appointee on
the National Labor Relations Board, representing the textile industry‟s interests during
arbitration. Venerated by Furman University for his philanthropic efforts, Benette E.
Geer passed away in 1957. Ben Geer‟s service to South Carolina eventually resulted in
the state‟s dedication of Geer Highway, a 25 mile stretch of U.S. Highway 276,
connecting Greenville to Brevard, North Carolina.18
Despite the Columbia streetcar union‟s defeat, Ambrose A. Gerald continued his
political career in South Carolina for a time. Gerald had represented Richland County,
the state capital‟s home, at the Seventy-Third (1919-20) and Seventy-Fourth (1921-22)
General Assemblies. Even as Columbia‟s strike entered its last throes, Gerald won a
third term with the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly in November 1922. Gerald lost two
bids for re-election in 1924 and 1926, but returned for his final term as Richland County
representative in the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly (1929-30). Thereafter, Ambrose
Gerald‟s paper trail appears to run out.19
Albert Essex Jones, the union organizer who sought to overturn the Piedmont
establishment, has been less difficult to trace. His own streetcar union in Cincinnati
foundered in March 1922, contemporaneous with similar setbacks in Charlotte and
Knoxville, Tennessee. However, Jones‟s union standing improved shortly after his
departure from Charlotte. His official report made no mention of his treatment by
Zebulon Taylor, or his summary dismissal by Mayor McNinch. But evidently, AASERE
President William D. Mahon did not hold Jones responsible for events in Charlotte. In
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October 1919, he became Eleventh Vice-President. As mentioned in Chapter Seven,
Jones took part in the Columbia negotiations of 1920, without incurring the wrath of its
city fathers. Jones later visited other imperiled union chapters across Ohio, Kentucky,
and Tennessee. By August 1923, Jones had risen to Seventh Vice-President. But
afterward, Jones‟s union activity seems to have tapered off. Cincinnati‟s 1930 census
reports reveal Jones at age 55, still laboring as a streetcar conductor. Jones remained in
Cincinnati, Ohio, until his death in 1962, at age 87.20
During the 1920s, unionism became a taboo subject in the region. Almost a
decade after the Charlotte strike, major textile strikes erupted across the Piedmont over
unionization. In 1927, the United Textile Workers began a recruitment drive in
Henderson, North Carolina, where “stretch-outs” and wage cuts had angered workers.
More drastic events took place in 1929, when the North Carolina mill towns of Marion
and Gastonia witnessed strikes over union recognition. Both incidents, like the Charlotte
Regional Streetcar Strike, ended with bloodshed and legal recriminations. Southern
Public Utilities streetcar workers played no visible role during these textile strikes, owing
largely to the fact they had no union organization to galvanize their support. By 1929,
only Division 128 in Asheville remained extant. Moreover, labor efforts in Gastonia
drew true radicals to the Piedmont, notably Communist Party leader William Z. Foster.
Even if streetcar men held sympathies for the Loray Mill strikers, they were unlikely to
become involved with actual labor radicalism, given their experiences ten years before.21
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The campaign for union representation was not, however, a total failure for the
streetcar men. Charlotte‟s strike actually improved Southern Power‟s treatment of its
transportation workers, especially after Taylor‟s death. Southern Public Utilities pay
raises turned out to be permanent, and Loy Cloninger saved enough by late 1920 to
purchase a home for his wife on South Tryon Street. Cloninger also sported a HarleyDavidson motorcycle, which he and his spouse rode every year to the Charlotte
Fairgrounds. Cloninger‟s four children finished high school and his two sons later
worked for Duke Power. Like many former conductors and motormen, L.C. Cloninger
retrained for the city‟s new bus service. After years as a mechanic and part-time driver,
Loy Cloninger retired in 1955 with a pension from City Coach, the contractor operating
Duke Power‟s bus lines. Cloninger‟s later memories of City Coach seem to have been
happier than his earlier recollections of working for Southern Public Utilities.22
Jesse B. Ashe‟s career at Southern Power also flourished in the years following
the strike. Ashe often drove a streetcar through the Queens College district, where he
became something of a favorite with the co-eds. But unlike Loy Cloninger, Ashe did not
meet his future wife until shortly before he turned forty. In 1926, Ashe began a family
and helped raise three sons. Soon after, Ashe became inspector of streetcars, at $150
monthly. By the time Ashe retired from City Coach in 1955, a bus supervisor earned
$358 monthly. With this income, Jesse Ashe could afford to put one son through the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, one of his own unrealized dreams.23
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But one wonders if the material improvements enjoyed by Southern Power‟s
streetcar men were adequate compensation for their defeated effort to achieve true
collective bargaining. We have already touched upon the suppression of Loy Cloninger‟s
eyewitness account, and Jesse B. Ashe‟s selective memory of the strike. In 1933, Russell
Campbell came to work as a streetcar conductor during Southern Public‟s final days.
When interviewed in 1994, Campbell had been retired from Duke Power since 1974. As
nephew to Assistant Superintendent T.R. Drum -- among those injured in the riot –
Campbell remembered well the chief lesson of the Charlotte Streetcar Strike. Former
participants were “advised not to say too much about it,” in order to prevent younger
employees from “getting ideas” about unionism. Charlotte historian Dan Morrill also
blamed newspaper publisher Wade Harris for obscuring the actual truth behind the strike,
labeling the Observer as “a mouthpiece for corporate Charlotte.” 24
Following World War II, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
once more sought to unionize Duke Power. Much as their Southern Power counterparts
had done in 1919, Duke Power electricians assembled for a union vote in 1948. Herman
Wolf recalled convincing his junior electricians that union organizers were untrustworthy
agents. He further reasoned that “Mr. Adair,” the union organizer, “stood to gain
financially” from collecting union dues. Citing the company‟s welfare programs for
retirees, Wolf warned his colleagues that union rules would require the company to end
these services. Herman Wolf expressed his belief to Allen Tullos that his arguments
convinced nearly all Duke‟s electrical workers to defeat the 1948 union vote. Harkening
back to the Charlotte strike, Wolf concluded that AFL union organizers did not win any

24

Maschal, 1E-2E.
224

converts in 1919. This erroneous statement encapsulates the degree to which Duke
Power‟s management discouraged – and distorted -- memories of the streetcar and
electricians‟ strikes. Certainly, hundreds of pro-union transportation and utility workers
once existed in Columbia, Spartanburg, and Charlotte, or historians and journalists would
not consider today their wider significance to the Piedmont, the New South, or the postwar United States.25
*

*

*

So what should scholars and other readers learn from the preceding examples of
Spartanburg, Charlotte, and Columbia? Spartanburg and Charlotte‟s 1919 transportation
strikes inaugurated a regional anti-labor backlash in the Piedmont Carolinas, comparable
to such events as Centralia, Washington‟s Armistice Day Massacre, or the 1920 Denver
Tramway strike in Colorado.26 But in a larger sense, the Red Scare exerted a profound
effect upon the Carolina Piedmont, especially in Charlotte, where industrial unions did
not gain headway until the 1960s. Anti-labor arguments prevalent in 1919 still hold sway
in conservative towns across the Piedmont, even as textile mills and fabric plants closed
their gates and redeployed on foreign shores in the final quarter of the twentieth century.
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Even today, the two Carolinas still compete for the lowest concentration of labor unions
across the United States. 27
Between the Wheels also addressed the ideals of Southern Progressivism at every
level of Carolina Piedmont society. Governor Robert Cooper of South Carolina and
Mayor Frank McNinch represent the elite political leaders who brokered labor
compromises and promoted regulatory reforms, in keeping with the goals of President
Wilson‟s “New Freedom.” Ambrose Gerald and Marvin Ritch both hailed from middleclass Carolina yeomanry, but they suffered frustrations in their respective efforts to
combine labor reforms with state legislature. Finally, we observe working men such as
Loy Cloninger and Jesse Ashe, whose hopes for better pay and improved futures
translated into their support for a streetcar union.
Outside the Carolina Piedmont, some streetcar unions managed to weather the
anti-union reaction during the 1920s, most notably Wheeling, West Virginia‟s Division
103. Unlike Columbia‟s isolated Division 590, Wheeling‟s streetcar union benefited
from a truly regional labor network, the Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly.
Division 103 even sent organizers into Southern West Virginia, hoping in vain to
unionize streetcar workers in coal towns, such as Princeton and Bluefield. Division 103,
however, managed to rescue their company from receivership during the Great
Depression, transforming Wheeling Traction Company into the employee-owned
Cooperative Transit System, which served the city for three more decades. Whether
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Ambrose Gerald‟s South Carolina labor alliance could have mobilized a similar drive to
purchase Columbia Railway after its 1925 decline is a matter for speculation.28
Division 590‟s defeat certainly did not extirpate the Palmetto capital‟s union
presence, but judging from the city‟s overall decline in labor activism, and the
Upcountry‟s relative quietude throughout the 1920s, the streetcar strike of 1922 reversed
an entire decade‟s worth of progress. Embattled after the Charlotte strike of 1919, the
Columbia Federation of Trades watched in trepidation as Franklin Knox engineered the
downfall of streetcar unionism in two South Carolina cities. While Knox‟s two streetcar
lines quickly fell into receivership, his victory against unionism discouraged further
efforts to expand into the South Carolina Upcountry. Columbia‟s protracted
transportation strike in 1922 affected the Piedmont region much in the same fashion that
the National Railroad Shopmen‟s Strike halted labor progress across the country. Both
cases reveal a dramatic rollback of union gains during World War I, weakening their state
and federal support until the New Deal ushered in a new period of activism.29
Unfortunately, Piedmont streetcar workers did not figure prominently in these
later struggles for industrial democracy. Their torch subsequently passed to oppressed
textile workers who organized across the Carolinas during the Depression. Like the
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participants in Charlotte‟s labor protest movement, these textile workers paid for their
courage with blood and defamation.
Duke Power‟s trolleys are no more. However, like old trolley tracks beneath
Charlotte‟s asphalt streets, the Queen City‟s historical tradition has emerged into public
consciousness since the late 1970s. Owing to journalists and public historians,
Charlotte‟s collective amnesia toward its strike has dissipated, helping to rekindle interest
in trolleys as modern agents of local tourism and public transit. To a lesser extent, South
Carolina cities, such as Columbia and Spartanburg have also revisited their New South
roots as streetcar towns in recent decades.30
Charlotte‟s trolley debate seems to have accelerated in the 1980s, during the
tenure of Mayor Harvey Gantt, the city‟s first African-American mayor. Part of Gantt‟s
interest in the project lay in his concerns over rising traffic congestion in his everwidening city. However, the projected costs for surveys and construction deterred the
city council from endorsing Gantt‟s plan. Eventually, Mayor Gantt abandoned this
project to expand public transportation in Charlotte. 31
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Enthusiasts such as Steve Snow and Dan Morrill kept trolley interests simmering
until the next decade. In 1996, streetcars finally returned to Charlotte, using volunteer
conductors instead of low-wage employees. A private group began efforts to restore the
original Dilworth building for a new transportation museum. In late 2001, the Levine
Museum of the New South also reevaluated the Dilworth barn‟s historical importance.32
In 2003, Dan Morrill and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Historic Landmarks
Commission appeared before the Mecklenburg County Board of Commissioners. Two
potential sites were assessed for a new transportation museum, with Atherton Mill
estimated at $3.4 million, and the Dilworth Barn had been projected at $5.2 million. On
May 21, 2003, Mecklenburg County‟s board members voted 6 to 3 to preserve both sites.
However, Dilworth‟s preservation bond fell through in 2007, and the site is under
development. Retired Charlotte Observer reporter Jack Claiborne explained this tragedy
as a case where preservation could not make a persuasive argument for profitability.33
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Unfortunately, no marker exists to commemorate the five slain men who fell on
August 25, 1919. Few people recognize that these unarmed men, drawn from different
walks of life, were mercilessly gunned down by Chief Walter B. Orr‟s police officers,
augmented by strikebreakers. After Orr‟s trial, Judge F.B. Alexander predicted
gravestones were not necessary to remember the strike for ages to come. Caldwell
Houston, Walter Pope, J. D. Aldrich, William R. Hammond, and Claude Hinson deserved
better remembrance. Though these five men were undeniably native Piedmont yeomen,
the state and local authorities have yet to erect a marker to acknowledge their unjust
deaths at the city‟s hands. It is almost as though these five men were foreign invaders,
instead of workers voicing their opposition to strikebreakers in their city.
Across the post-war United States in 1919, terms such as “foreigner” and
“outsider” were subject to elastic interpretations. Wartime hatreds toward Germany
quickly translated into Red Scares against Bolshevik Russia, with American labor unions
caught in a political no-man‟s land after the decline of Wilson‟s presidency. While the
South experienced these same impulses, Piedmont Carolina employers and workers
expressed a notable antipathy toward labor unions.
Yet, overstated myths of cultural independence and Protestant industry have
obscured the wider view of North and South Carolina‟s mountain and upcountry folk.
They did not need “foreign” agitators to feel anger and resentment toward low wages,
long hours, and no benefits. However, while labor unions were not widely welcomed,
neither were they unsupported in the Piedmont or the Blue Ridge Mountains, as
evidenced by the AASERE campaign to connect Columbia and Asheville‟s streetcar
unions through Spartanburg, Greenville, and ultimately, Charlotte. Historians should
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now reassess these brave men who challenged the powerful industrialists of yesterday.
Despite the Carolina Piedmont‟s gradual losses of textile mill industry and culture, labor
unions are still relevant to the region‟s future. We still need native-born labor advocates
in the molds of Ambrose Gerald and Marvin Ritch, who can embrace progressive goals
and work on behalf of today‟s Southern workers. Nearly a century after their efforts
failed valiantly, American workers still languish between the wheels, even in this new era
of Wal-Marts and Starbucks.
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